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Abstract 
This doctoral thesis investigates empirically and theoretically the effect of tax on the 
composition of the optimal allocation of wealth to risky assets from various points of 
view. The first empirical chapter considers the effect of tax on a U.K. personal investor 
targeting domestic financial products. This research helps investors estimate the impact 
of a future tax change and maximize their portfolio return using a newly proposed 
optimization model and solution method. Following Bonami and Lejeune (2009), 
personal portfolios are constrained to meet or exceed a prescribed return threshold with 
a high confidence level and satisfy buy-in threshold and diversification constraints. 
Their model is improved by incorporating complex tax trading rules with withdrawal 
features that enhance those considered by Osorio et al. (2004, 2008). A solution based 
on Greedy methods is developed to deal with the proposed large-scale portfolio 
optimization problem. The empirical results report substantial non-linear tax effects on 
riskier assets and enhanced effects of withdrawal tax only when tax rates are high. The 
developed framework better enables investors to react to tax changes, and tax policy-
makers to quantify the influence of tax changes on private investment preferences.  
The second empirical chapter investigates the effect of an international transaction 
tax, the so-called ‘Tobin tax’, from the point of view of U.K., U.S., and E.U. personal 
investors targeting international financial products. This empirical research helps the 
policy maker to estimate the impact of Tobin tax on international capital flows and, 
therefore, assess the optimal way to introduce the new tax.  An optimization model is 
proposed to maximize the expected net Sharpe ratio and find the optimal risky portfolio 
internationally. Complex trading and tax rules are considered. To examine the precise 
effects of different investment and transaction tax rules, a comparison of four tax 
settings is presented: source only, residence only, mixed with credit and mixed with 
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double taxation. The experimental results show that a source only tax union has more 
capital transits in international markets than a residence only tax union, and its optimal 
market portfolio is more sensitive to regional tax policy. In a mixed tax system, double 
taxation between residence- and source-taxed markets significantly reduces the 
attraction of the latter while its attraction is maintained with the credit method. Tobin 
tax can reduce the volatility of the market but the effect varies with tax rate, certain 
market specifications (e.g., expected returns and correlations with overseas markets) 
and investment tax rules. It does not depend on which side of the capital flow (inflow or 
outflow) is subject to Tobin tax. Finally, an agreement among countries to produce a 
consistent Tobin tax rate globally can significantly reduce the negative effect of Tobin 
tax on capital flows while retaining its positive effect on market stability in comparison 
to heterogeneous Tobin tax rates. 
Finally, the third analytical chapter investigates theoretically the effect of tax from 
the point of view of an arbitrageur. This theoretical research addresses the condition of 
the existence of arbitrage opportunities on an after-tax basis, helping the policy maker 
improve the fairness and efficiency of markets by addressing effective tax policy. To 
track tax arbitrage, continuous time optimization models are developed with 
heterogeneous taxation between investors programmed with continuous rather than 
static income and capital gains (or losses). It is proved analytically that arbitrage 
opportunities exist for both perfectly correlated and non-perfectly correlated assets. For 
perfectly correlated assets, the analysis shows that tax arbitrage may exist, with the 
investor’s top tax rate and some static asset parameters determining the existence of 
arbitrage opportunities. It is also proved that many of the equilibria obtained under 
income tax only are not optimal if investors are also subject to capital gains tax. For 
non-perfectly correlated assets, however, it is the market prices of cap and floor options 
on asset returns that decide the existence of tax arbitrage. In the government fixed-
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income bond market, tax arbitrage between investors is difficult to eliminate unless 
investors are all subject to the same tax rates. But the return from this arbitrage can be 
limited if the government applies the same top tax rate to all investors. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out the objectives of the thesis, provides an introduction to portfolio 
investment and corresponding tax rules, outlines the structure of the thesis and provides 
an overview of the remaining chapters. 
 
1.1 Objectives of the Thesis 
This thesis investigates the impact of taxes on the decision making process of financial 
investment and implications for governments and investors. Extant research on post-tax 
portfolio optimization is improved by introducing more tax rules. These rules are 
programmed as mathematical constraints into a portfolio optimization model. The 
optimal portfolio on an after-tax basis can then be obtained by solving the model. The 
quantitative impact of tax is assessed by observing a change of the optimal portfolio by 
a change of tax constraints. The three main objectives of the thesis are:    
 To quantify the impact of investment taxes and corresponding tax benefits 
from investment bonds in an individual investor’s portfolio by improving 
Osorio et al.’s (2008a) Model (Chapter 3) 
 To quantify the impact of Tobin tax and withholding tax on capital flows 
between regional markets (Chapter 4) 
 To quantify the impact of income tax and capital gains tax on single asset 
prices and arbitrage opportunities by improving Basak and Croitoru’s (2001) 
model (Chapter 5) 
The sections below expand on each of the above objectives. Section 1.2 
introduces the tax rules on investment bonds, explains why the incorporation of tax 
constraints is important to portfolio optimization, and details the contribution of the 
work in Chapter 3. Section 1.3 introduces Tobin tax and withholding tax, explains why 
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an introduction of Tobin tax could lead to a change of capital flows between regional 
markets, and shows detailed contributions of the work in Chapter 4. Section 1.4 
introduces the subject of tax arbitrage, states why it is important to improve Basak and 
Croitoru’s model, and shows detailed contributions of the work in Chapter 5.  Section 
1.5 outlines the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Impact of Investment Taxes on an Individual’s Portfolio  
The first objective of this thesis is to quantify the impact of investment taxes and 
corresponding tax benefits from investment bonds in an individual’s portfolio. Portfolio 
optimization is the process of choosing the proportions of various assets (e.g. 
commodities, bonds and equities) to be held in a portfolio, making the portfolio best 
match an investor’s demands according to certain criteria. In modern portfolio theory, 
developed by Markowitz (1952), the optimal portfolios are obtained with an assumption 
that an investor wants to maximize a portfolio's expected return contingent on any given 
amount of risk, with risk measured by the standard deviation of the portfolio's rate of 
return.  
However, in Markowitz’s model, the calculation of total return from a portfolio is 
highly simplified. A lot of trading restrictions and costs are neglected. For example, 
there is no constraint to include a minimum purchasing amount of securities, annual 
management fees of investment accounts, transaction fees, and taxation. People try to 
improve Markowitz’s work by including more real trading restrictions into the mean-
variance model. According to Kolm et al. (2014), “there are some new trends and 
developments in the area of portfolio optimization, such as diversification methods, 
risk-parity portfolios, the mixing of different sources of alpha, and practical multi-
period portfolio optimization”. Details will be introduced in Chapter 2. The 
incorporation of trading rules (such as minimum purchasing amount) and trading costs 
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(such as management fees and transaction costs) has been solved. However, how to 
programme taxation into an optimization model is still a significant issue. Tax rules are 
so complex that it is difficult to simulate taxation precisely in a mathematical model. 
There are many heterogeneous tax rules internationally and across investors that it is 
challenging to consider all tax rules in one optimization model. Osorio et al. (2008a) 
discuss the benefits of tax rules for U.K. investment bonds, and their impact on the 
portfolio choices of U.K. investors. They consider the special tax treatments of 
investment bonds in a multi-stage portfolio optimization model. The complexity of tax 
rules along with other trading constraints makes the model hard to solve by extant 
algorithms, particularly when the number of asset classes considered increases to over 
100. In fact, only three high-level asset classes, cash, bonds and equities, are considered 
by Osorio et.al (2008a). This simplification significantly reduces the model’s level of 
complexity but ignores the correlation between individual bonds and equities. For 
example, the performance of a bond from an oil producer may be highly correlated with 
the performance of a share from the same company. Ignoring correlation may lead to 
sub-optimal allocation across asset classes. To solve this correlation issue, more low-
level asset classes and their variance-covariance matrix is included in the proposed 
optimization model, and a new algorithm needs to be developed to solve the model. 
This is one of the main contributions of the thesis and will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3.  
The following sections introduce relevant U.K. tax rules, explain how Osorio et 
al.’s (2008a) work can be improved, why the improvement is significant, how the 
improvement is made and the expected results from the improved model.  
 
1.2.1 U.K. tax rules  
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According to Osorio et al. (2008a), the optimal portfolio is highly sensitive to tax. 
Consequently, tax constraints should be considered in a portfolio optimization exercise. 
However, effective tax rates vary with investors’ conditions and products that investors 
purchase, and tax constraints largely increase the complexity of a portfolio optimization 
model. As a result, some level of abstraction is needed in progressing meaningfully with 
plausible analyses. Prior to setting out the abstraction, however, taxes on financial 
investments in the U.K. are introduced in detail. The information that follows relies 
heavily on the official U.K. government website (www.gov.uk)1.   
The total return from a financial investment is usually composed of income and 
capital gains. Investment income includes interest payments and dividends, and all 
investment income is subject to income tax. In general, however, most people earn a 
large portion of their total net income through employment. Capital gain is defined as 
the increase in the value of an asset above its purchase price. A capital loss is the 
decrease in the value of an asset below its purchase price. In the U.K., realised capital 
losses can be used to reduce the capital gains tax payment in the same tax year. If an 
investor’s total taxable gains, following this reduction, are still above the tax-free 
allowance, this investor can deduct unused losses from previous tax years. If the losses 
reduce an investor’s gain to the tax-free allowance, the investor can carry forward the 
remaining losses to a future tax year. 
In addition, in financial markets, most investments are subject to an annual 
income tax payment while only capital gains tax can be deferred until the disposal of the 
assets. However, some insurance products, such as investment bonds, are subject to 
more complicated tax treatments whereby income tax can be deferred as well. 
Consequently, investments of these products may be more sensitive to tax constraints in 
the optimization process. 
                                                          
1 This website introduces tax rules in the UK. 
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An investment bond is generally a single premium life insurance policy. However, 
it is an investment rather than insurance in the general sense. An insurance company 
will take the premium and invest it for income or capital gains which accrue until an 
investment bond holder withdraws money from the policy. 2 As the holder does not 
receive income from the policy, personal income tax is deferred. Thus, an investment 
bond is a potentially tax-efficient way of holding a range of investment funds in one 
portfolio. These funds offer a range of asset classes, helping investors diversify and to 
build their own portfolio indirectly. 
Investment bonds are of two main types, on-shore and off-shore. Onshore bonds 
are policies whose funds are subject to U.K. tax. Corporation tax is payable at 20% on 
most of the income of onshore bonds. This part of tax is paid annually, and the payment 
of this tax is equivalent to investors having paid basic rate income and capital gains tax, 
so investors have no personal liability to basic rate income tax and capital gains tax on 
the proceeds from the bond. 3  However, a liability to income tax and capital gains tax 
above the basic rate may arise if the bond is disposed of, or withdrawals are made.  
Regarding withdrawals, there is a 5% annual allowance. If one withdraws more 
than 5% per policy year of the amount that one has paid into the investment bond, a tax 
payment is required on the excess amount. Otherwise, if one withdraws less than 5% 
per policy year of the amount that has been paid into the investment bond, the 
remaining withdrawal allowance is cumulative, and can be carried forward to future 
years, subject to the total cumulative 5% allowance amount not exceeding 100% of the 
amount paid into the investment bond. Tax rules on withdrawals from investment bonds 
are complicated. First, any tax liability on withdrawals is calculated on the amount 
withdrawn in excess of the accumulated 5% allowances. The gain in this excess is then 
                                                          
2 For example, Prudential UK, one of U.K. largest insurance companies, founded in 1848. 
3 In the U.K., tax is payable at the basic rate of 20 per cent on taxable income up to £31,785 (2015-16 tax 
year). 
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taxed if it falls into the higher rate (and the additional rate, where applicable) tax bracket 
when added to investors’ taxable income for the tax year.4  In the proposed model of 
Chapter 3, withdrawal taxes are considered when calculating the total tax liability of the 
portfolio. 
Offshore bonds are issued from tax havens outside the U.K. There is little or no 
tax charged on the insurance company’s funds. Most offshore bonds offered to the U.K. 
investors are based in the Isle of Man, Dublin, Luxembourg or the Channel Islands. The 
income and capital gains of such a fund will normally be free of tax in the relevant 
jurisdiction. Hence, they are often referred to as 'gross roll-up'. Gross roll-up is actually 
something of an illusion for offshore bonds. This is because, the fund is likely to incur 
some withholding taxes on its underlying investments even if there may be no tax in the 
particular tax haven in which the insurance company is based. In other words, when 
investors dispose of all their off-shore bonds, cumulated income tax and capital gains 
tax have to be paid at the end. This special tax treatment on offshore bonds is also 
considered in the model of Chapter 3. 
 
1.2.2 Improvements and contributions 
As discussed in Section 1.2.1, tax constraints may have a significant impact on optimal 
portfolios and, hence, should be included in the optimization model. Besides tax, there 
are many other constraints that need to be considered. All trade orders should have a 
minimum purchasing amount, such as 1 share or 100 shares. As a result, in the 
optimization model, a binary variable should be used to make sure that if an asset is 
purchased, a minimum purchasing amount is applied. Similarly, investment risk, 
                                                          
4 If an investor has taxable income of more than £31,785, he/she will have to pay the higher rate of 40 per 
cent tax on the amount above £31,785 up to £150,000. If the investor have taxable income of more than 
£150,000, he/she will have to pay the additional rate of 45 per cent tax on the amount above this level 
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diversification requirements, management fees, and transaction costs should also be 
considered in the model. Details of these trading constraints are introduced in Chapter 3.   
In Osorio et al.’s (2008) work, taxation of investment bonds in the U.K. is 
discussed. Income tax and capital gains tax are calculated to get the net portfolio return. 
The annual withdrawal allowance is also considered together with other trading rules, 
such as management fees and transaction costs. Mixed integer non-linear programming 
(MINLP) techniques are used to incorporate these market constraints. There are some 
extant algorithms able to solve it, but they lack efficiency and the precision of the 
optimal solution cannot be guaranteed when a large number of integer variables and 
non-linear constraints are introduced. As mentioned in Section 1.2.1, Osorio et al. (2008) 
deal with this issue by reducing the number of asset classes considered. Only 3 high-
level asset classes (cash, bonds and equities) are used but the portfolio obtained from 
the model may be sub-optimal because correlations between low-level asset classes are 
ignored.   
One of the main objectives of this thesis is to improve Osorio et al.’s model by 
developing a more advanced algorithm that allows for the inclusion of more low-level 
asset classes (up to 288). Also, their model is improved further by incorporating 
estimation risk and introducing more realistic trading rules.   
Risk is a key feature of portfolio optimization. Many approaches have been 
developed to measure risk and uncertainty. Goldfarb and Iyengar (2003), for example, 
propose a robust factor model to manage risk. Other authors use historical asset return 
data to represent future risk (Bodnar and Schmid, 2007; Bonami and Lejeune, 2009; 
Lejeune, 2010) or assume that asset returns follow a normal distribution (Bodnar and 
Schmid, 2007). In Chapter 3, the approach used to measure risk falls within the 
Markowitz mean-variance framework. The classic Markowitz framework, however, 
assumes perfect knowledge of the expected returns of the assets and the variance-
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covariance matrix. It assumes that there is no estimation error in both the expected 
returns and the variance of and covariance between assets. However, obtaining accurate 
estimates of these measures is difficult. There are many sources of estimation error in 
the process. For example, it may be impossible to obtain sufficient data samples, data 
may be unstable, and estimates of future returns will vary across investors (Mulvey and 
Erkan, 2003). This leads to the so-called ‘estimation risk’ (Bawa et al. 1979). It has 
been shown that estimation risk can lead to incorrect decisions on the composition of 
optimal portfolios (see, e.g., Ceria and Stubbs, 2006, and Cornuejóls and Tütüncü, 
2007). Very small differences in the value of measures can change the composition of 
portfolios significantly. Broadie (1993) and Chopra and Ziemba (2011) show that 
portfolio estimation risk is due mainly to errors in the estimation of expected returns 
than in the estimation of the variance-covariance matrix (Ceria and Stubbs 2006). 
Accordingly, one focus of Chapter 3 is on estimation risk of expected returns (Bonami 
and Lejeune, 2009) rather than the variance-covariance matrix (Lejeune and Samatlı-
Pac, 2012). Since the algorithm proposed by Lejeune and Samatlı-Pac (2012) is tailored 
to the consideration of estimation risk of the variance-covariance matrix, the focus of 
the thesis is on the estimation risk of expected returns which makes their algorithm 
unsuitable for the proposed problem. A new algorithm is developed, instead, based on 
the work of Bonami and Lejeune (2009). This issue will be discussed further in Chapter 
3.  
The estimation risk of expected returns has attracted renewed interest in recent 
years, and several approaches to incorporate it into portfolio selection have been 
developed. We use Roy’s safety first risk criterion (Roy, 1959) that identifies as optimal 
the portfolio for which the probability of its return falling below a prescribed threshold 
is minimized to assess the estimation risk of expected returns. The constraint ensures 
that the total expected return exceeds the prescribed minimal level with a minimal 
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probability. In this thesis, stochastic constraints are used to introduce estimation risk. 
More detail regarding estimation risk will be introduced in Chapter 3. 
 
1.2.3 Methodology 
One of the main contributions of the thesis is the development of an efficient algorithm 
to solve large scale portfolio optimization with integer and non-linear constraints 
(MINLP). The covariance between low-level asset classes is also considered. 
In the literature, algorithms for solving MINLP problems are often based on 
relaxation schemes. For the standard mean-variance portfolio problem, different 
approaches based on nonlinear Branch and Bound (B&B) algorithms (Bonami et al., 
2008; Bonami and Lejeune, 2009) and outer approximations (Lejeune and Samatlı-Paç, 
2012) have been discussed. However, the increased complexity of the proposed 
optimization problems due to the inclusion of taxes, probabilistic returns and the 
increased number of assets limits the use of these proposed algorithms. The tax 
withdrawal rules necessitate the re-evaluation of the entire objective function and 
constraints every instance in which the control variables are perturbed or integrality 
restrictions on the integer variables restored. In Bonami and Lejeune (2009), portfolio 
variance is the objective function, and their integer variable scoring process depends on 
a function of the specific contribution of each variable to the overall risk of the portfolio. 
This is estimated through the Lagrangian function, and for their simple variance-
minimising objective function there is a direct link (mapping) between the control 
variables (asset weights) and the objective function (portfolio variance). This allows 
them to calculate the effect of a small change to the control variables with two simple 
equations. In the problems considered in this thesis, however, this is not possible since a 
change in the control variables does not map directly to the objective function, which is 
net-of-tax total returns. This is because changes in asset weights lead to complex 
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changes in tax and this in turn changes the total post-tax return used in the objective 
function. 
In Chapter 3, a solution method for the proposed post-tax portfolio optimization 
problem is developed based on a Greedy algorithm, implemented with a new dynamic 
ranking procedure. The algorithm is used to find the optimal portfolios under various 
tax settings. The quantitative impact of tax on an individual’s portfolio can be observed 
from the change of the optimal portfolio as various tax constraints are applied. 
 
1.3 Impact of Tax on International Investments and Capital Flows 
The second objective of this thesis is to quantify the impact of Tobin tax and 
withholding tax on capital flows between regional markets. Tobin tax is a type of 
transaction cost. It is still just an idea and not applied yet in any country in the world. In 
concept, if a Tobin tax is introduced, investors will be subject to such a tax if, and only 
if, capital is transferred from one country to another. This tax is different from income 
tax and capital gains tax. The payment is based on the total amount of capital that is 
transferred rather than the return on investments. In addition, withholding tax is 
specially designed for international investments. Returns from international investments 
may be subject to withholding tax. But this tax is calculated differently across countries. 
More detail regarding Tobin tax and withholding tax are introduced in Section 1.3.2.  
The tax on an international investment is more complicated than the tax on a 
local investment. The tax payment on an international investment may include not only 
income tax and capital gains tax but also Tobin tax and withholding tax. These types of 
taxes may have a significant influence on investors’ decision-making. The impact of 
Tobin tax on international investments has been investigated in the literature (more 
detail is given in Chapter 2). However, in most cases, the investigations ignore other 
types of tax, such as income tax, capital gains tax, or withholding tax. The optimal 
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portfolio, obtained while considering Tobin tax only and ignoring other major taxes, 
may be sub-optimal. This issue is investigated in detail in Chapter 4. 
Section 1.3.1 introduces the concept of the market portfolio and the mutual fund 
separation theorem. Section 1.3.2 outlines the relevant tax rules in the U.K., U.S., and 
Eurozone. These tax rules include those relating to income tax, capital gains tax, Tobin 
tax and withholding taxes. Section 1.3.3 outlines the main contributions of the Chapter 
4 and why they are significant. Section 1.3.4 introduces the methodology used to 
achieve the objective. 
 
1.3.1 Market portfolio and mutual fund separation theorem 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) was developed from the work of Markowitz 
(1952). It is used to determine a theoretically appropriate required rate of return for an 
asset. The theoretical price can then be compared with the market price to judge if the 
asset is relatively over-priced or under-priced.  
In the CAPM, there is an important input that needs to be estimated - the 
expected return of the market portfolio. In practice, it is approximated by the rate of 
return of a market index (e.g. FTSE 100, S&P 500). In theory, the market portfolio is 
the portfolio that provides the highest excess return per unit of risk (usually referred to 
as the Sharpe Ratio). Given a required rate of return, a combination of the risk-free asset 
and the market portfolio will usually have a lower variance than investing in any risky 
portfolio on the minimum-variance frontier (apart from the market portfolio itself). The 
capital market line (CML) is derived by drawing a line from the risk-free rate of return 
tangent to the minimum-variance frontier of risky assets. The CML is superior to the 
minimum-variance frontier since it takes into account the risk-free asset in the portfolio. 
In addition, for a given risk-free rate, there is only one optimal portfolio (the tangent 
point on the minimum-variance frontier with CML) which can be combined with the 
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risk-free asset to achieve the lowest level of risk for a given required return. This is the 
market portfolio.  
All rational investors can obtain a particular level of expected return efficiently 
by holding a linear combination of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio. 
Consequently, the market portfolio, in theory, is a portfolio containing the equilibrium 
weight of each risky asset in the market. The market value of an asset is simply equal to 
the asset’s weight in the market portfolio multiplied by the sum of the aggregate market 
values of all assets.  
If all resources are allocated efficiently and there is no foreign exchange risk, in 
equilibrium every asset should have only one price across regional markets. Otherwise 
an arbitrage opportunity will arise by buying the asset at a lower price in one country 
while selling it at a higher price in another country. As a result, the same required rate 
of return should be given by the CAPM for any single asset5. To get this required rate of 
return, an expected rate of market return is needed in the CAPM. However, this 
expected rate of market return is difficult to calculate after considering taxation. On an 
after-tax basis, the expected rate of market return varies across investors as investors are 
subject to different tax rates, leading to heterogeneous required rates of return even for 
the same asset. As a result, to get the right required rate of return for an asset on an 
after-tax basis, the right expected rate of market return must be obtained.  
The standard mutual fund separation (Fisher’s separation) theorem without tax 
states that, under certain conditions, the optimal portfolio for each investor can be 
constructed by holding each of certain mutual funds in appropriate ratios, where the 
number of mutual funds is smaller than the number of individual assets 
                                                          
5 A single asset refers to assets whose values are derived from the same resources and should be equal all 
the time even if they are traded in different regional markets. For example, the value of 1% share of 
Apple traded in the U.K. market should always be equal to the value of 1% share of Apple traded in the 
U.S. market (assuming there is no foreign exchange risk). So these two assets are the same and can be 
treated as a single asset. 
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 in the portfolio. The selected mutual funds will be the same across investors, 
but the ratios held by each investor may vary. In standard portfolio theory the market 
portfolio and the risk-free asset are the two separating mutual funds, and investors hold 
proportions (either positive for going long or negative for going short). In this setup, the 
ratio of risky assets to the risk-free asset determines the overall return, and this 
relationship is clearly linear.  
In the presence of taxes, Trauring (1979) develops a three-fund separation 
theorem leading to a three-term Capital Asset Pricing formula. He shows that an 
investor’s optimal allocation is a linear combination of three identified risky portfolios, 
G, D, and E (not defined in detail in Trauring’s paper), which are independent of 
investors, their utility function, and tax brackets. This independence does not, however, 
extend to the weights for each identified risky portfolio. These weights are functions of 
investor i’s income tax and capital gains tax brackets, and will be denoted by ai, bi, and 
ci. As a result, investors with different tax brackets will hold different optimal risky 
portfolios, Xi. Trauring presents the following formula to calculate the market portfolio 
with tax: 
1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( )a
n n n n
i i i i
i i i i
M G D EX b c
   
                                                                             (1.1) 
where, n is number of investors in the market, Xi is the optiomal portfolio of each 
investor i, and M is the so-called market portfolio. He further proves that the 
capitalization-weighted sum of all investors’ optimal risky portfolios provides the 
market equilibrium condition. In Trauring (1979), however, the taxation process is still 
highly simplified. An asset’s net return is calculated as (1-t)*r where only fixed tax rates, 
t, are considered while more complex tax rules such as annual income tax, deferred 
capital gains tax, withholding tax on foreign investments, and transaction tax are not 
considered.  
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In Chapter 4, Trauring’s work is extended by introducing more realistic tax 
conditions (e.g. withdrawal tax and Tobin tax) to the basic capital gains tax and income 
tax. Consequently, the proposed model can be used to investigate the impact of 
withholding tax and Tobin tax on international investments. Only the variation of 
income tax rate and capital gains tax rate across individual investors is considered in 
Trauring’s work. Although the variation of withholding tax rules across countries can be 
reflected in the effective income tax rate and capital gains tax rate, his model is unable 
to show a direct link between withholding tax and basic investment tax. In other words, 
Trauring’s model cannot show how withholding tax rules change the effective income 
tax and capital gains tax payments and, consequently, investment decisions. This issue 
is investigated in Chapter 4 where detailed withholding tax rules are discussed and 
incorporated in the proposed optimization model. The impact of withholding tax on 
investors’ decision-making process and, consequently, on international capital flows is 
tested by observing the behaviour of the optimal portfolio under different withholding 
tax constraints. Tobin tax, a transaction tax for foreign investments, is also discussed in 
the model proposed in Chapter 4, while it does not feature in Trauring’s work. 
Withholding tax and Tobin tax are now introduced in more detail in Section 1.3.2. 
 
1.3.2 Tax rules 
In addition to the U.K. tax rules which have been discussed in Section 1.2.1, tax rules in 
other countries and their impact on international financial markets are also investigated 
in this thesis. In this section, income tax and capital gains tax in the U.S. and the 
Eurozone, as well as Tobin tax and withholding tax in the U.K., the U.S. and the 
Eurozone are introduced.  
 
a. Income tax and capital gains tax rules in the U.S. and the Eurozone 
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In the U.S., a tax is imposed on income by the Federal, most state, and many local 
governments. This tax payment is citizenship-based, and all U.S. citizens, regardless of 
place of residence, are obliged to report income and pay income tax every year. The rate 
of this income tax may increase as income increases. To present a manageable yet 
realistic model in Chapter 4, an effective tax rate is assumed and used to calculate 
effective tax payments. Taxable income is defined as total income less allowable 
deductions and although income is broadly defined, in this thesis the term ‘income’ is 
taken as that which is received on financial asset investments. Further, it is assumed that 
most investors would have already used up their allowable deductions before paying tax 
on investment income and, hence, all investors’ allowable deductions are considered as 
zero.  
As in the U.K., capital gains in the U.S. are also taxable, and capital losses are 
allowed to reduce taxable capital gains. Investors must self-assess their income tax by 
filing tax returns. Due dates and other administrative procedures vary by jurisdiction. 
Typically, April 15 is the last day for individuals to file tax returns for Federal and 
many state and local returns. Tax as determined by the investor may be adjusted by the 
taxing jurisdiction. However, capital gains tax is paid only when realised, which usually 
occurs when the assets are sold. These general rules are broadly the same as those in the 
U.K. 
In the Eurozone, tax is also charged on both income and capital gains. The 
Eurozone, officially called the Euro area, is a monetary union of 19 of the 28 E.U. 
members that use the euro as their common currency for local business activities. The 
European Central Bank (ECB) sets the monetary policy of the zone. It is governed by a 
president and all the heads of national central banks in the E.U.. One main task of the 
ECB is “to keep inflation under control. [Although] there is no common representation, 
governance or fiscal policy for the currency union, some co-operation does take place 
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through the Euro Group, which makes political decisions regarding the Eurozone and 
the Euro. The Euro Group is composed of the finance ministers of [the] Eurozone states, 
[but] in emergencies, national leaders also form the Euro Group”. As a result, although 
countries in the Eurozone have independent tax policies, co-operation on tax policy-
making exists between Eurozone governments. In the discussion of Tobin tax, 
introduced later in this section, it is assumed that the Eurozone applies the same basic 
income and capital gains tax, and capital transactions  within the Eurozone are not 
subject to a Tobin tax charge. In the Eurozone, Germany and France are two countries 
leading the group. Consequently, understanding their tax policy is important. 
In Germany, all investment income of residents is subject to income tax but 
unlike the U.S., income tax is residence-based. Income is reported and taxed annually. 
“In January 2009, [however], Germany introduced a very strict capital gains tax (called 
‘Abgeltungsteuer’) for shares, funds, certificates, [and bank interest]. Capital gains tax 
only applies to financial instruments (shares, bonds… etc.) that have been bought after 
31 December 2008. Instruments bought before this date are exempt from capital gains 
tax (assuming that they have been held for at least 12 months), even if they are sold in 
2009 or later, barring a change of law.” In addition, there is a tax-free allowance 
(‘Freistellungsauftrag’) on capital gains in Germany of €801 per person per year. 
Capital gains tax is due only when the asset is sold and the gains realized. 
In France, capital gains on the sale of financial instruments (shares, bonds, and 
other financial products) are taxed at the marginal tax rate (up to 45%), plus 15.5% of 
social contributions (i.e. up to 60.5%). A deduction of 20% to 40% on the gross capital 
gain can be applied if the instrument has been held for at least 2 years. In addition, if a 
special account, the so-called PEA, is used to purchase shares, the capital gains are 
subject to social security taxes only. This is the case only if the PEA is held for more 
 17 
 
than five years. There is a maximum amount, €152,000 that can be deposited in the 
PEA. As far as income tax is concerned, it is also residence-based and paid annually.  
In Chapter 4, the tax rules of Germany and France are simplified and used as tax 
constraints to calculate tax liability for investments in the Eurozone. This is explained 
further in Chapter 4. 
 
b. Withholding tax rules 
Beside local investment taxes, such as basic income tax and capital gains tax, there are 
other types of tax to consider in respect of international investment. In Chapter 4, 
withholding tax and Tobin tax, as well as income tax and capital gains tax, are 
considered in examining the impact of tax on international capital flows.  
Withholding tax is a type of levy deducted at source by some countries on 
income paid to foreign investors. In most regions, employment income is subject to 
withholding tax. Furthermore, payments of interest or dividends, sometimes even 
royalties, rental income and the sale of real estate are subject to withholding tax in many 
regions. International withholding tax rules vary with investors and countries. Many 
governments impose a levy on income from foreign investments, but there are no broad 
general rules for the taxing method. Existing variations range from double taxation 
(meaning that the same income is taxed by more than one country) to no tax at all. To 
avoid double taxation, countries that tax income generally use one of two systems: 
source-based or residence-based. In the source-based system, only local income, which 
is income from a source inside the country, is taxed. In the residence-based system, 
residents of the country are taxed on their worldwide (local and foreign) income, while 
non-residents are taxed only on their local income.  
A residence-based tax system is often justified on the grounds that people and 
firms should contribute from all their income regardless of where it is earned, towards 
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the public services provided by the country where they live. Consequently, if all 
countries adopt the residence-based tax system (i.e. a residence-based tax union), the tax 
rate on an investment would not only be dependent on the asset and the country of 
investment, but also on the country of residence. All foreign investments are taxed 
firstly by the government in the country of investment and then by the government in 
the country of residence. Many countries, however, have tax treaties with each other to 
allow credits for the tax that residents have already paid to other countries on their 
foreign income. In addition, the residence-based tax system faces the daunting task of 
defining "residence" and characterizing the income of non-residents. Such definitions 
vary by country and investor, but usually involve the location of the investor's main 
residence/home and number of days the investor is physically present in the country.  
In contrast to the residence-based tax system, a source-based tax system is 
usually justified on the grounds that the country which provides the opportunity to 
generate income or profits should have the right to tax it. Consequently, if all countries 
adopt the source-based tax system (i.e., a source-based tax union), all investors, 
regardless of their residence, would be subject to the same tax rules internationally. In 
other words, the tax rate on an investment would be dependent only on the asset and the 
country of investment (e.g., U.S. equities or Eurozone bonds), but not on the country of 
residence.  
As discussed above, in a source-based tax union, tax payments are dependent on 
the country of investment only. In a residence-based tax union, however, tax payments 
are dependent on both the country of investment and the country of residence. It would 
be easy to model withholding tax mathematically if all countries are in one tax union, 
whether residence-based or source-based. In reality, however, this is not the case. 
International tax environment can be mixed where one country might adopt a residence-
based tax system and another adopts a source-based tax system. Including different 
 19 
 
withholding tax regimes in a single model increases the level of complexity. To deal 
with this issue, two different methods are used to calculate the tax payment, the double 
taxation method and the credit method.  
In the double taxation method, tax is charged by two or more jurisdictions on the 
same investment. This method reduces the net return from foreign investments and, 
consequently, the investors’ motivation to invest in foreign markets. In order to mitigate 
the burden of double taxation, many countries provide for tax relief on foreign 
investments. This is achieved using the credit method. 
The credit method is used when two countries are in a tax union. For investors 
resident in the country with the residence-based tax system and investing in the country 
with the source-based tax system, the effective tax rate on the investment is the higher 
rate of the two countries. The double taxation method is used if the two countries are 
not in a tax union. For investors resident in the country with the residence-based tax 
system and investing in the country with the source-based tax system, the investment 
will be taxed by both governments. For investors resident in the country with a source-
based tax system and investing in the country with a residence-based tax system, the 
investment will be taxed only by the government of the latter. Both methods will be 
incorporated into the optimization model to investigate the differential impact on 
international financial investments. 
It follows that the optimal portfolio across countries using different withholding 
tax regimes may be sensitive to the local tax policy. In order to find an optimal portfolio 
for an international investor, it is necessary to take withholding tax into consideration in 
the optimization model. In Chapter 4, heterogeneous withholding tax is programmed as 
mathematical constraints in the proposed model to investigate its impact on 
international capital flows.  
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c. Tobin tax 
In addition to withholding tax, there have been discussions on the introduction of a 
transaction tax on international capital movements and investments, the so-called Tobin 
Tax. The concept was introduced by James Tobin in the 1970s, and was initially defined 
as a tax on all spot conversions between two currencies, with the intention of imposing 
a penalty on short-term financial round-trip excursions into a foreign currency. As such, 
it was initially defined as a currency transaction tax levied only when transfers are made 
from one currency to another. The concept has since been extended to an international 
Tobin-style transaction tax on general wealth transfers across countries (or union, such 
as the Eurozone). This type of tax would be dependent on the size of the transaction. 
The concept has recently gained support among European governments. In 2013, the 
European Commission announced that a tax on financial transactions out of or into 
eleven EU countries would be introduced in 2014. The proposal was favoured by 11 EU 
members and passed in the European Parliament in 2012. It was then approved by the 
Council of the EU in 2013. The approval of the formal agreement on the details of the 
European Union financial transaction tax (EU FTT) by the European Parliament is still 
pending.   
 
1.3.3 Improvements to the global portfolio optimization model 
The main contribution of Chapter 4 is to extend Hanke et al.’s (2010) research by 
combining Tobin tax with investment taxes and withholding tax in a single optimization 
model.   
The incorporation of Tobin tax may have a significant impact on investment 
decisions. It is expected to increase the cost of foreign investment, and will therefore 
decrease the incentive of a local investor to transfer money to a foreign market in search 
of higher asset returns. This impact may be large or small depending on the effective 
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rate of Tobin tax and how it is charged (e.g., only capital outflow to foreign markets is 
subject to tax, or only capital inflow to the local market is subject to tax). In Chapter 4, 
the main objective is to quantify this impact under different tax settings. As discussed in 
Section 1.3.2, Hanke et al. (2010) show that the impact of Tobin tax on trading volume 
depends on the size of the market. Accordingly, if Tobin tax affects trading volume and, 
hence, initiates capital flows, and since these are subject to local income tax and capital 
gains tax, then it is reasonable to expect interaction effects and sensitivity to income tax 
and capital gains tax. To investigate this sensitivity, it is necessary to include both 
investment tax (income tax and capital gains tax) constraints and withholding tax 
constraints along with Tobin tax constraints in a single mean-variance model. 
Obviously, this increases the level of complexity.    
Withholding tax may also have an impact on international capital flows. 
Residence-based or source-based tax will change tax payments, leading to different net 
returns from invested assets, thereby changing investors’ preferences for foreign 
investments. In Chapter 4, this impact is quantified by studying the behaviour of the 
optimal portfolio under different withholding tax settings. In addition, a further 
comparison between credit and double taxation methods can help us better understand 
the importance of an international tax union. Accordingly, a further objective of Chapter 
4 is to investigate whether the introduction of the credit method improves capital flow 
between regional markets, and whether or not the double taxation method has an 
obvious lock-in effect on local capital.  
An aggregated market portfolio can be obtained from the model by using the 
methodology introduced in Section 1.3.4. The impact of Tobin tax and withholding tax 
on international investments and global capital flows can then be tested by observing 
the aggregate market portfolio under different tax settings. With regard to withholding 
tax, initially it is assumed that all three regions, the U.K., the U.S., and the Eurozone, 
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are in a residence-based tax union. By changing the rate of income tax and capital gains 
tax in each country, the effect of tax on the aggregate market portfolio can be observed. 
The three regions’ withholding tax rules are then changed from the residence-based to 
the source-based, one by one, and the impact is investigated. The impact on the 
aggregated market portfolio is also investigated for the same ranges of the rate of 
income tax and capital gains tax, and compared to previous observations.  
With regard to Tobin tax, the tax rate is initially set to be 0. The aggregated 
market portfolio is observed under different rates of income tax and capital gains tax in 
each country. The rate of Tobin tax in each country is then increased incrementally and 
the differential impact on the aggregated market portfolio is noted under the same range 
of the rate of income tax and capital gains tax. The impact of withholding tax and Tobin 
tax can be quantified from these comparisons. From the experimental results, 
implications of the introduction of Tobin tax and the choice of withholding tax method 
can be obtained which should be of interest to governments. 
 
1.3.4 Methodology 
In Chapter 4, an improved mean-variance model that considers heterogeneous tax rules 
across investors is proposed. In addition, it is assumed that there are three types of 
investors: residents of the U.K., the Eurozone and the U.S. To pay more attention on 
heterogeneous tax across regional markets, all investors within the same country of 
residence are assumed to be subject to the same tax rules and therefore should hold the 
same optimal risky portfolio. This risky portfolio can be combined with the risk-free 
asset to maximize individual utility. The aggregated market portfolio under taxation is 
just the capitalization-weighted sum of the optimal risky portfolios for each type of 
investor.   
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As in Trauring (1979), the market portfolio with taxation is not a unique portfolio that 
all investors would hold. Nevertheless, it can provide the theoretical equilibrium of 
international markets if all investors are included. In other words, it can provide the 
percentage of a certain asset class that it should be included in the whole international 
market. 
In Chapter 4, the aggregate market portfolio is obtained from the newly 
developed mean-variance model. The tax effect on the composition of the market 
portfolio and corresponding capital flows are investigated under different tax settings 
(Tobin tax and withholding tax on international investments). 
 
1.4 Impact of Tax on Tax Arbitrage Opportunities 
As discussed in Sections 1.2 and 1.3, tax constraints may have a significant impact on 
both individual investment decisions and international capital flows. However, in those 
two sections, the discussion is confined to the portfolio level. The impact of tax on a 
single asset (such as how heterogeneous tax rules are reflected in a unique fair price of 
an asset, and how an investor takes advantage of tax to secure an arbitrage opportunity 
on an after-tax basis) should also be discussed.  This is the main objective and 
contribution of the analysis of Chapter 5. 
One of the assumptions of the traditional CAPM, reviewed in Section 1.3, is that 
there is no tax. All prices obtained are on a before-tax basis. Attempts to extend the 
model by including simplified income tax were made (e.g., Elton and Gruber, 1978). 
This earlier work shows that the introduction of taxes will change an asset’s fair price 
significantly. The fair price for a single asset, on a before-tax basis, varies across 
investors and countries because of heterogeneous tax rules. Having more than one fair 
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price for the same asset may lead to an arbitrage opportunity across regional markets. 
This is usually called ‘tax arbitrage’. In practice, however, tax rules are so complicated 
that it is hard to comprehensively include all taxes in a single pricing model. 
Accordingly, even if a tax arbitrage opportunity exists, it would be difficult to detect 
and take advantage of. Basak and Croitoru (2001) attempt to overcome this issue by 
introducing a highly generalized tax function to represent the complicated taxation 
process. The fair price of an asset on an after-tax basis is then discussed, in theory, 
through a theoretical model that they propose.  
The main objective of the analysis in Chapter 5 is to extend the Basak and 
Croitoru (2001) model to a theoretical discussion on the existence of tax arbitrage. In 
Chapter 5, tax rules, asset prices, and the correlation between two assets are considered 
to formulate the conditions necessary for the existence of a tax arbitrage opportunity. 
The discussion centres around two cases. One considers tax arbitrage between two 
perfectly correlated assets, and the other considers the case between two non-perfectly 
correlated assets. The conditions for the existence of tax arbitrage are different for these 
two cases. The main contribution of this analysis stems from relaxing some of 
assumptions made by Basak and Croitoru (2001) that progresses the discussion towards 
a more complete treatment of this issue. First, the assumption of no capital gains tax is 
removed by introducing capital gains tax liability in the model. Second, the assumption 
that all tax arbitrage is dependent on the size of holding, and will disappear after 
enlarging the size to a certain level, is also removed. A tax arbitrage that is independent 
of the size of holding is defined and discussed.  
The remainder of this section is organised as follows: Section 1.4.1 sets out the 
background of tax arbitrage, Section 1.4.2 introduces the main proposed improvements 
to Basak and Croitoru’s (2001) model, and Section 1.4.3 introduces the methodology. 
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1.4.1 Tax arbitrage opportunities 
There are two types of arbitrage opportunities: riskless and risky arbitrage. One example 
of riskless arbitrage is the practice of taking advantage of a price difference for a single 
asset between two or more regional markets. This arbitrage is a transaction that involves 
no negative cash flow at any probabilistic or temporal state and a positive cash flow in 
at least one state. For instance, a riskless arbitrage is present when there is the 
opportunity to instantaneously and simultaneously buy an asset at a low price and sell it 
at a high price. An example of risky arbitrage is statistical arbitrage that refers to 
expected profit (though losses may occur).  
The main arbitrage argument of arbitrage pricing theory is that if the price of an 
asset diverges from its fair value, arbitrage action should exert supply and demand 
forces that bring the price back into line. In other words, if the price reflects the fair 
value of an asset, there should be no arbitrage. In theory, the fair value of an asset can 
be obtained by finding the arbitrage-free equilibrium (Basak and Croitoru, 2001). This 
arbitrage-free equilibrium is also the precondition of many other pricing models, such as 
the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model. 
   However, the discussion of arbitrage-free equilibrium on a post-tax basis 
would be complicated as the taxing process varies across investors and countries. It is 
not easy to consider all tax rules in a single pricing model. That is why discussions of 
pricing models usually assume there is no tax. By using such a pricing model, arbitrage 
on a before-tax basis can be found and lead the asset’s price to move around its before-
tax fair value. This is because speculators will buy (or sell) assets when they are 
undervalued (or overvalued), driving their prices back to fair value. However, an 
arbitrage-free equilibrium on a before-tax basis may not be the same as an arbitrage-free 
equilibrium on an after-tax basis. Although it is difficult to consider all tax rules in a 
single pricing model, it is necessary to find the differences between the two equilibria. 
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Arbitrage on an after-tax basis, so-called Tax Arbitrage, is “the practice of 
profiting from differences between the ways that transactions are treated for tax 
purposes” (Basak and Croitoru 2001). Tax rules are so complex that many taxpayers 
can restructure their investments to minimize tax. In some cases, tax arbitrage is legal. 
For example, it is legal if investors profit from receiving revenues in a low tax country 
while incurring costs in a high tax region. In this way, tax payments can be reduced. In 
other cases, however, tax arbitrage is illegal. Tax arbitrage is likely to be very 
widespread. However, it is not easy to estimate the extent to which tax arbitrage is used.  
The main consideration of the analysis in Chapter 5 is arbitrage on an after-tax 
basis. A single model including both capital gains tax and income tax is proposed to 
discuss the conditions for the existence of tax arbitrage. 
 
1.4.2 Improvements to tax arbitrage model 
Basak and Croitoru (2001) investigate the equilibrium implications of the existence of 
redundant securities with non-linear taxation, and the consequent opportunities for tax 
arbitrage. Heterogeneous tax rules across investors and countries lead to discrepancies 
in assets’ pre-tax market prices of risk. They show that this mispricing is set so that 
investors effectively cooperate to minimize aggregate tax payments, even though 
individually each investor may not minimize his own tax bill. In their work, the 
standard Brownian motion is used to simulate income changes and capital gains of an 
asset. Two main assumptions are used in their work. First, there is no capital gains tax. 
Second, there is no global tax arbitrage.6   
Basak and Croitoru’s (2001) work is extended in Chapter 5 by relaxing these 
two assumptions. When Basak and Croitoru discuss tax arbitrage opportunities, they 
only consider income tax and assume that there is no tax on capital gains. In reality, 
                                                          
6 A tax arbitrage of which the existence is not dependent on the size of the investor’s position, is called 
‘Global’ tax arbitrage. 
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though some of assets and investors may be exempt from capital gains tax, this 
assumption may lead the analysis to produce an incomplete conclusion. In Chapter 5, in 
order to re-check their conclusion in a more complete tax environment, their model is 
extended by incorporating capital gains tax. In addition, Basak and Croitoru (2001) 
assume that there always exists an arbitrage-free equilibrium in the market where a fair 
asset price can be found. This assumption is not always true as global arbitrage 
opportunities may exist in the market. Therefore, investors can enlarge their profit by 
increasing their holdings given enough market liquidity. There will be no arbitrage-free 
equilibrium for this case. To deal with this issue, in Chapter 5, the tax arbitrage is 
divided into three types and each is discussed separately. The solution of removing 
global tax arbitrage from the market is discussed from the point of view of a tax policy 
maker. Furthermore, Basak and Croitoru (2001) consider tax arbitrage between two 
assets that are perfectly correlated, but ignore the more realistic case of non-perfectly 
correlated assets. In Chapter 5, their work is extended to consider both cases. 
 
1.4.3 Methodology 
To achieve the third main objective of the thesis, in Chapter 5, tax is included in an 
analysis of statistical arbitrage. Sharpe ratios of assets on an after-tax basis are 
calculated and compared with each other. A simulation model with standard Brownian 
motion is proposed to determine the condition of the existence of tax arbitrage. In this 
process, both income tax and capital gains tax are considered as a generalisation. 
Regarding perfectly correlated assets, the analysis in Chapter 5 proves that tax 
arbitrage opportunities may exist, but such arbitrage is dynamic and does not exist 
consistently. If there is no global tax arbitrage, an arbitrage-free equilibrium can be 
obtained by minimizing the sum of aggregate market income and capital gains tax 
payments. A proof is also presented that the arbitrage-free equilibrium obtained without 
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considering capital gains tax may be different from the equilibrium obtained with 
considering capital gains tax. It is therefore beneficial to incorporate capital gains tax 
when considering tax arbitrage and arbitrage-free equilibrium. 
For non-perfectly correlated assets, it is not possible to completely offset an 
asset’s risk by using other assets. To solve this issue, caps and floors on assets’ income 
and capital gains are introduced to the model so that risk can be removed by short 
selling an asset whose cap is lower than the floor of the holding asset. The cap is a call 
option that sets a maximum future return for an underlying asset. The floor is a put 
option that sets a minimum future return for an underlying asset. Three new continuous-
time optimization models are proposed to find conditions for the existence of local, 
global and restricted global arbitrage opportunities.7  These opportunities are further 
divided into two categories, type A and type B, depending on whether a strictly positive 
or only non-negative future net (after-tax) return will be realised for certain without an 
outflow of funds at any time. Further, given a set of tax rates and asset parameters, a 
new function, which requires asset holdings as inputs, is proposed to calculate an asset’s 
marginal cap and floor for its total net return. The theoretical analytics show that the 
existence of tax arbitrage opportunities between non-perfectly correlated assets simply 
depends on the difference between assets’ marginal caps and floors. 
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical literature of tax constraints in portfolio optimization 
and asset pricing. Chapter 3 extends Osorio et al.’s (2008) model by including more 
trading constraints and introducing a new algorithm to solve the model with a large 
number of asset classes. Chapter 4 investigates how the introduction of Tobin tax 
                                                          
7 Different from ‘global’ tax arbitrage, the existence of a local tax arbitrage is dependent on the size of 
investor’s position. Too small or too large position may lead to the disappearance of the local tax 
arbitrage. In addition, if there is a tax arbitrage whose existence has a requirement on the minimum size 
of investor’s position but no requirement on its maximum size, then this kind of tax arbitrage is called 
‘restricted global’ tax arbitrage. More details will be introduced in Chapter 5. 
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changes the capital flow between regional markets taking into account local investment 
tax and international withholding tax. Chapter 5 improves Basak and Croitoru’s (2001) 
work by including capital gains tax in the discussion of tax arbitrage, and extending 
their work by considering tax arbitrage between two non-perfectly correlated assets. 
Chapter 6 draws together the conclusions for theory, research and policy implications.  
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on the impact of tax on portfolio optimization and 
asset pricing. The existing literature on this subject can be divided into two groups, the 
impact at the micro level and the impact at the macro level. For the former, the 
discussion centres mainly on how to program tax constraints into personal portfolio 
optimization and how to solve this complex problem by an advanced algorithm to 
reduce total computing time. For the latter, the discussion mainly concerns how to 
include differential taxation rules to address fair value for an asset or asset class on an 
after-tax basis and how a change on investment tax rules leads to a new aggregate 
market portfolio and therefore a capital flow between regional markets.  
 
2.1 Impact of Tax on Portfolio Optimization  
This section presents a literature review on the impact of tax at a micro-level. The focus 
is mainly on how to program tax and other trading constraints into a personal portfolio 
optimization model and how to solve this complex problem using an advanced 
algorithm to reduce total computing time.  
 
2.1.1 Tax constraints and mathematical programming 
To quantify the impact of taxation on personal asset portfolio choice and composition, 
an optimization with tax and other real-market trading constraints needs to be developed.  
Portfolio optimization has been studied using different models. For example, an 
important issue relating to basic mean-variance optimization is the uncertainty with 
problem parameters or the so-called estimation risk or uncertainty in the estimation of 
expected returns. Bonami and Lejeune (2009) minimize portfolio variance while 
simultaneously considering uncertainty in expected returns (estimation risk) and trading 
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restrictions modelled with integer constraints. They incorporate uncertainty in expected 
returns through a probabilistic constraint that follows Roy's (1952) safety first criterion. 
This identifies the optimal portfolio as that for which the probability of its return falling 
below a prescribed threshold is minimized. The portfolio's expected return is guaranteed 
to be above a prescribed minimum level with a high probability, typically [0.7, 1). In 
addition, the three trading restrictions they consider are diversification, which ensures 
investments in a number of industrial sections, buy-in threshold, which prevents 
investors from holding small positions, and round-lot purchasing, which incorporates 
even-lot block trading behavior of institutional investors. Their research, however, 
ignores the substantial effects of taxation. Brandes et al. (2012) worked on the 
relationship between stock-specific transaction costs and portfolio optimization. They 
found that “the inclusion of stock-specific transaction costs at the portfolio construction 
stage permits higher turnover levels and allows portfolio managers to run larger 
portfolios without facing detrimental cost effects”.  However, they did not include tax 
issue in the discussion either. 
Taxation is important to investors and adds substantial complications to 
portfolio optimization problems. Feldstein (1976) analyzes the composition of 1799 
households’ portfolios and claims that personal income tax has a very powerful effect 
on individuals’ demand for portfolio assets after adjusting for the effects of net wealth, 
age, sex and the ratio of human to nonhuman capitals. Constantinides and Scholes (1980) 
investigate the effect of capital gains tax on individual asset portfolios and conclude that, 
although riskless hedging by options and futures can eliminate capital gains tax, 
transaction costs blunt and may negate the strategy’s effectiveness. As a result, capital 
gains tax does matter and renders the optimal investment strategy complex. 
Constantinides (1983 and 1984) extends the discussion on capital gains tax and claims 
that “tax law confers upon the investor a timing option - to realize capital losses and 
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defer capital gains. With the U.S. tax rate on long term gains and losses being about half 
the short term rate, the law provides a second timing option - to realize losses short term 
and gains long term, if at all”. His simulations over the 1962–1977 period establish that 
investors subject to high tax should realize capital gains in the long term from high 
variance stocks and buy back stock so that potential future losses in short term can be 
realized. He also claimed that the small-firm anomaly cannot be explained by tax 
trading. But tax trading activities can predict a seasonal pattern in trading volume, and 
stock price volatilities, the so-called January effect, only if investors are irrational or 
ignorant of the price seasonality. Hubbard (1985) also reaches the conclusion that 
personal taxation has a significant impact on portfolio choice by analyzing U.S. cross-
sectional data.  
The above articles led to a discussion at the beginning of this century, of the 
impact of personal investment taxation. Dybvig and Koo (1996), Dammon et al. (2001 
and 2004), De Miguel and Uppal (2005), and Birge and Yang (2007) investigate this 
issue using mathematical programming and all conclude that taxation constraints need 
to be incorporated in portfolio optimization to ensure a global optimal solution. Their 
work, however, does not consider real-market variations in tax rules within different 
accounts and across different countries and regions. In general, investment returns arise 
mainly in the form of income or capital gains and these are subject to different tax rates. 
Investors may withdraw funds as income either from returns or from initial invested 
capital. Tax rates also differ across investment accounts, investment assets and global 
regions. For example, to maximize tax advantage, some investment accounts have 
restrictions on the amount, timing and source of withdrawal from income or initial 
capital that investors can make. Some withdrawal limits increase over the investment 
horizon, while others are constant. Further, some taxes are payable immediately upon 
encashment of a certain type of income, while others can be deferred to the end of the 
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investment horizon. Tax rates and policies also vary across countries and global regions. 
These tax and withdrawal rules complicate portfolio optimization problems mainly in 
two ways: they introduce constraints that may involve binary or integer variables, which 
require integer programming, and cause an indirect mapping between the control 
variables (asset weights) and the portfolio optimization objective function. In other 
words, the objective function is neither linear nor perfectly convex with respect to asset 
weights in the portfolio. 
Some recent papers on post-tax portfolio optimization improve long-term 
investment models by adding real-market features such as tax withdrawals (Osorio et al., 
2002, 2004a) and bank taper relief (Osorio et al., 2008b). 
Recently, Fischer and Gallmeyer (2016) discussed the performance of trading 
strategies with consideration of capital gains taxes and transaction costs. However, 
income tax is not included in his analysis. Huang (2008) included a retirement account 
which can defer the tax payment into the portfolio optimization and concluded that 
“investors place highly taxed assets in the tax-deferred account to maximize the tax 
benefit, and adjust their taxable portfolios to achieve the optimal risk exposure”. 
Similarly, tax is also considered in the work of Stein and Garland (2008) on investment 
management. The importance of tax to investment management is explained from high-
level perspective. The thesis can be an addition to their work to explain the importance 
of tax by detailed analysis 
  
 
a. Estimation Risk 
The portfolio optimization literature discusses different approaches to measuring risk 
and uncertainty (Artzner et al., 1999). Goldfarb and Iyengar (2003), for example, 
propose a robust factor model to manage risk. Other authors use historical data of asset 
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returns to represent future risk (Bodnar and Schmid, 2007; Bonami and Lejeune, 2009; 
Lejeune, 2010) and assume that asset returns follow a normal distribution (Bodnar and 
Schmid, 2007).  
 The classic Markowitz framework relies on perfect knowledge of the expected 
returns of the assets and the variance-covariance matrix (variance risk) and assumes that 
there is no estimation error. However, the expected returns and covariance between 
assets are not known and not observable. It is difficult to estimate them accurately. 
Indeed, a lot of possible sources of error affect their estimation leading to so-called 
estimation risk (Bawa et al. 1979) in portfolio selection. As stated by Mulvey and Erkan 
(2003), these sources include the impossibility of obtaining enough samples of data, 
data instability, and investors’ differing estimates of future asset returns. Risk from 
estimation errors is a source of poor decisions because, as stated by Cornuejols and 
Tutuncu (2007) and Ceria and Stubbs (2006) , the optimal portfolio composition is 
highly sensitive to the covariance between asset returns and their expected returns, and 
small changes in the moments of the returns can result in very different optimal 
portfolios.  
Chopra and Ziemba (2011) and Broadie (1993) argue that portfolio estimation 
risk is mainly caused by errors in the estimation of asset returns but not to the same 
extent by the errors in estimating the variance of and covariance between asset returns 
(Ceria and Stubbs, 2006). Therefore, in Chapter 3, when investigating post-tax portfolio 
optimization, the main focus is on the estimation risk of expected returns (Bonami and 
Lejeune 2009) rather than the variance-covariance matrix (Lejeune and Samatlı-Pac 
2012). Since the algorithm proposed by Lejeune and Samatlı-Pac (2012) is based on the 
reformulation of estimation risk of the variance-covariance matrix, the change to 
estimation risk of expected returns makes their algorithm unsuitable for the problem at 
hand. The issue of algorithm development will be discussed further in Section 2.1.2. 
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The estimation risk of expected returns has attracted renewed interest in recent years, 
and several approaches to incorporate it into portfolio selection have been developed. 
Here, Roy’s safety first risk criterion (Roy, 1959; Bonami and Lejeune's, 2009) that 
identifies the optimal portfolio as being the one for which the probability of its return 
falling below a prescribed threshold is minimized, is used to assess the estimation risk 
of expected returns. 
 
2.1.2 Algorithm for MINLP 
As discussed above, to program tax and trading rules into a portfolio optimization 
model, probabilistic constraints are used with a large number of integer variables. The 
combination of integer variables and probabilistic constraints, results in mixed-integer 
nonlinear programming (MINLP) problems. These are challenging to solve, especially 
for large-scale problems such as the ones proposed (up to 288 assets and corresponding 
integer variables). Much work has been done on improving the efficiency of algorithms 
used to solve the mean-variance Markowtiz model under MINLP. For example, 
Bienstock (1996) presents computational experience with a branch-and-cut algorithm to 
solve quadratic mixed integer programming problems (QMIP). Such problems arise in 
financial applications. His algorithm solves the largest real-life problems in a few 
minutes of run-time. Jobst et al. (2001) also examine the effects of applying buy-in 
thresholds, cardinality constraints and transaction round-lot restrictions to the portfolio 
selection problem under QMIP. To solve this challenging problem, they also propose 
alternative approaches. However, their methods cannot solve problems with non-linear 
constraints. 
  Konno and Yamamoto (2005) consider portfolio optimization problems with 
integer constraints. Such problems include, among others, mean-risk problems with 
non-convex transaction cost, minimal transaction unit constraints and cardinality 
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constraints on the number of assets in a portfolio. These problems, though practically 
very important, have been considered intractable because they require the solution of 
MINLP problems for which there are no efficient algorithms. In their paper, they show 
that these problems can be solved by the state-of-the-art integer programming 
methodologies if absolute deviation is used as the measure of risk. But their algorithm 
limits the format of risk constraint in the optimization.  
 Discussion of efficient algorithms for large-scale MINLP for portfolio 
optimization has become popular in recent years (Corazza and Favaretto, 2007; Gondzio 
and Grothey, 2007; Bonami and Lejeune, 2009; and Lejeune and Samatlı-Pac, 2012). 
However, as mentioned above, their work exhibits one or more of the following features 
that limit the applicability of their proposed algorithms to the general post-tax portfolio 
problems that this thesis considers. First, many ignore the uncertainty in problem 
parameters (estimation risk) (Bienstock, 1996). Second, the objective function 
considered is specific (Bonami and Lejeune, 2009). Third, the trading rules considered 
are simplified (Lejeune and Samatlı-Pac, 2012). A new method is, therefore, required 
for more complex portfolio optimization problems.  
Previous work shows that branch and bound (henceforth B&B) methods, such as 
BONMIN, under most fractional branching rules exhibit higher precision for MINLP 
than approximating methods such as CPLEX (Bonami and Lejeune, 2009). However, 
since B&B methods search all possible solutions under a branching tree, it may require 
a large number of iterations to reach the optimal solution, and this reduces algorithm 
efficiency, particularly for large-scale MINLP.  
 
2.2 Impact of Tax on Global Markets 
This section reviews existing literature on the impact of tax at a macro level. The main 
focus is how to find market equilibrium (an optimal market portfolio) in the global 
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financial market under differential regional tax rules, and how a change in regional 
investment tax rules leads to market equilibrium and therefore a capital flow between 
regional markets.  
 
2.2.1 General Tax 
The existing literature on the macro-level impact of tax can be divided into two major 
categories - government tax revenues and international tax-driven capital flows.  
 
a. Government tax revenues  
Chang et al. (2002) use co-integration and vector auto-regression to assess the ‘Tax-
and-Spend’, ‘Spend-and-Tax’, and ‘Fiscal Synchronization’ hypotheses for ten 
countries using annual time-series data over the period 1951 to 1996. The test results 
suggest unidirectional causality running from revenues to spending, supporting the 
‘Tax-and-Spend’ hypothesis, for Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, UK, and the USA. The 
opposite relationship, supporting the ‘Spend-and-Tax’ hypothesis, holds only for 
Australia and South Africa.  
 Joulfaian and Mookerjee (1991) investigate the sources of growth in government 
revenues and expenditures in 22 OECD countries. A major conclusion is that reductions 
in spending are essential to reducing budget deficits and controlling government size.  
 Saunoris and Payneb (2010) estimate an asymmetric error correction model 
using a momentum threshold autoregressive approach and data from 1955 to 2009. 
Their analysis shows that government revenues are sensitive to short term changes in 
government expenditure and also to budgetary disequilibrium asymmetrically. 
Regarding the asymmetric adjustment, government revenues are more responsive to a 
worsening budget than they are to an improving budget. Creedy and Sanz-Sanzb (2011) 
investigate aggregate personal income tax revenue obtained from a multi-scheduler and 
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multi-regional personal income tax system, with revenue divided among central and 
regional governments. They conclude that aggregate income tax revenue can be 
expressed as a function of characteristics of the distribution of taxable income, making 
it possible to identify the sources of revenue differences among regions.  
 Creedy and Gemmell, (2006) demonstrate that it is important to find a reliable 
method to measure growth of tax revenues, for a tax system and also for its individual 
taxes, when designing tax policy. A change in tax parameter, such as income thresholds, 
tax rates, and allowances, is dependent on the expected automatic growth of tax revenue 
created from the tax system. It is so-called built-in flexibility, or revenue responsiveness, 
of the tax that generate these automatic revenue changes. In their book, this concept is 
approved by an invaluable review and synthesis of quantitative analysis. How this 
concept can be used to estimate revenue responsiveness across countries is 
demonstrated. 
 
b. Global tax-driven capital flows 
Papers in the second category often compare the two withholding tax systems: source- 
and residence-based taxes. Source-based taxation is justified on the basis that the 
country which provides the opportunity to generate income or profits should have the 
right to tax it. Thus, in a source-based tax system, all investments in a country will be 
taxed only by the government of that country no matter where the investor is from. 
Residence taxation, on the other hand, is based on the principle that people and firms 
should contribute to the public services provided for them by the country where they 
live, so they should be taxed on all their income, wherever it arises. Thus, in a 
residence-based tax system, all investments by an investor will be taxed only by the 
investor’s country of residence no matter where the investment is located.  
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The two tax systems can be compared by observing changes in the external 
current8 and financial account balance9. A country’s balance of payments consists of the 
financial account, financial account and the current account. In the current account, net 
factor income (income from overseas investments less payments to overseas investors), 
the balance of trade, and net cash transfers are the major components. A current account 
surplus increases a country's net foreign assets whereas a current account deficit reduces 
the country’s net foreign assets. 
 Bovenberg (1992) explores how residence- and source-based taxes on capital 
income affect the external current account in small open economies. This effect is 
examined indirectly using the identity between the external current account balance and 
the difference between domestic saving and domestic investment10. The same method is 
also employed by Summers (1988), Sinn (1985), Slemrod (1988), Murphy (1986), 
Engel and Kletzer (1989), and Bovenberg (1989) in their discussion of the two tax 
systems. Summers (1988) examines the interactions between tax policy, international 
capital mobility, and international competitiveness, and concludes that tax policies 
which stimulate national investment without affecting national savings must inevitably 
lead to deterioration in a country's trade balance in the short and intermediate run. Sinn 
(1985) investigates the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) of depreciation by 
the United States in the 1981 budgetary business tax cuts. This led to the US investment 
boom, the recent high world interest rates, the strength of the dollar, the US trade deficit 
and a massive redistribution of world capital towards the United States. Key stages in 
the process whereby the benefit for US corporations of a larger tax offset on 
                                                          
8 Current account: in the current account, net factor income (income from overseas investments less 
payments to overseas investors), the balance of trade, and net cash transfers are three main components.  
9 Financial account: the financial account reflects net change in ownership of national assets. 
10 The net capital outflow is the difference between domestic investment and domestic savings. It is 
calculated as the amount that local residents lend overseas minus the amount that foreigners lend to the 
home country. If this difference is positive, it means the economy is saving more than it’s investing. The 
excess is lent to foreigners. If the net capital outflow is negative, this means the economy is financing this 
extra investment by borrowing from abroad. 
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depreciation could lead to such changes are explained in their paper. Murphy (1986) 
considers the interaction of saving and investment in determining the current account 
for a small open economy subject to productivity shocks. The analysis highlights the 
crucial role of the real exchange rate in macroeconomic adjustment and demonstrates 
the importance of inter-temporal substitution for determining the response of investment 
to anticipated productivity disturbances. Engel and Kletzer (1989) “examine a model of 
a small open economy in which there is free international mobility of financial capital, 
investment in capital goods and a [non-traded] good”. They explain why, even without 
restrictions on asset trades, there may be a correlation between investment and saving, 
and also why a country with high saving may nevertheless borrow from foreigners to 
finance its investment.  Bovenberg (1989) uses “an intertemporal equilibrium model [to 
analyse] how lower source-based taxes on capital income impact trade performance and 
international competitiveness“. It shows that, depending on import shares and 
intertemporal and intratemporal substitution elasticities, capital accumulation may 
induce changes in the terms of trade and also real interest rates that increase domestic 
saving, even when financial capital can freely flow across borders. 
Analysis of the current account and financial account balances can help us to 
understand the general impact of the two tax systems on international capital flows but 
it is difficult to deduce their impact on consumption as opposed to investment. Little 
research has been done on the impact of the two tax systems on global consumption. 
Articles concerning consumption tax relates to other tax issues (Bradford, 1995; Walker 
and Bloomfield, 1987; Brashares, 1999; Gordon et al, 2004; Rousslang, 2002). Bradford 
(1995) uses the same rate for income and consumption taxes to demonstrate why the 
issue of taxing ‘old capital’ or ‘old savings’ arises in the movement from an income to a 
consumption base. This indicates the trade-offs that must be considered as a 
consequence of this issue when assessing how changes in the price level, with or 
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without a transition, change the gains/losses distribution. Gordon et al. (2004) 
investigates the U.S tax system which has returned to the situation of the mid-1980’s 
whereby its tax system raises little revenue from taxing investment income and capital 
gains. They conclude that, although the revenue from taxing investment income and 
capital gains is small, the benefits of a clean consumption tax have not been attained. 
There remain distortions to both saving and investment decisions, and distortions across 
capital assets, portfolios, corporate financing, and choice of organizational form under 
the patchwork of provisions that have been adopted. Rousslang (2002) disputes the 
conclusion of other authors “that a broad-based consumption tax would be more 
efficient if financial services to consumers, such as services for investment, loans and 
insurance, were exempted from the tax, even if taxing the financial services posed no 
special administrative burden. [He argues] that this conclusion rests on key assumptions 
and that alternative, equally plausible, assumptions support the conclusion that, [apart 
from] any special administrative burden, the tax rate on financial services to consumers 
should be at least as high as the tax rate on consumer goods”. 
Recently there has been work published on the comparison between source- and 
residence based taxes for investment, generally examining the differential impact of the 
two tax systems on the global capital allocation of real industry investments (Devereux 
et al., 2008; Devereux and Griffith, 2003; Fuest and Huber, 2004; Fuest et al., 2005). 
Devereux et al. (2008) test whether The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development “(OECD) countries compete with each other over corporate taxes in order 
to attract investment”. They conclude that countries compete over the effective average 
rate of tax and the statutory rate of tax, which reflects governments’ belief that 
international firms’ choices of location are discrete. Devereux and Griffith (2003) 
consider the impact of taxation when investors face the location choice of multinationals, 
which depends on an effective average tax rate. They use data from 1999 to assess the 
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benefits of harmonising the treatment of dividends and statutory rate of tax in the E.U. 
They conclude that these benefits are conditional on the mobile investments’ 
profitability. With low profitability, the effects of the co-ordination has no significant 
influence on the choice of effective tax rates across countries. Nevertheless, this effect 
is critical when the rate of profitability is high. As the choice of location is usually 
dependent on the decision of multinational companies with high profitability, the 
analysis indicates that this kind of co-ordination may have become more beneficial. 
 Fuest and Huber (2004) investigate the case that a lot of E.U. countries do not 
charge domestic tax on companies’ foreign profits. They argue that with double taxation 
agreements, where foreign profits are not subject to domestic corporate tax, 
governments may use income tax on shareholder dividends to tax these profits.  
Unfortunately, this tax on shareholder dividends encourages the sale of domestic firms 
to foreigners. However, if double taxation relief can be used for domestic profits, 
domestic ownership may be preserved. Their results suggest that tax policy on 
dividends could contribute to the observed ‘home bias’ in equity portfolio investment. 
Nevertheless, focusing on the impact on mergers and acquisitions together with 
Greenfield investments, Becher and Fuest (2011) reach a different conclusion. They 
claim that in previous work, the model considers Greenfield investment only and 
neglects the large part of international capital flows that take the form of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). Taking into account M&A investment leads to substantial changes 
in the efficiency properties of taxation. A similar conclusion is reached in other articles 
using different assumptions for the M&A market (Desai and Hines, 2004; Becker and 
Fuest, 2008, 2010).  
Financial market investments account for a large part of global investments and 
should also be considered when comparing the two tax systems, but this topic has not 
been fully investigated. There have been studies on the impact of tax on financial 
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markets but these concern other tax issues. Some consider general transaction tax 
(Campbell and Kenneth, 1994; Edwards 1992; Hubbard, 1993), and others “Tobin” tax 
(Tornell, 1990; Reinhart, 1991). 
 
2.2.2 Tobin Tax 
As discussed in section 1.3.2c, the idea of a Tobin tax was introduced by James Tobin 
in the early 1970s (Tobin, 1978). It has been controversial among economists and 
politicians ever since (e.g. Haq et al., 1996; Habermeier and Kirilenko, 2003; Weaver et 
al., 2003). In 2013, the European Commission officially announced that a tax on 
financial transactions out of or into 11 EU countries would be introduced in 2014. The 
countries involved are Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. However, this proposal is still under discussion 
and has been postponed. The discussions are concerned with two matters. The first is 
about the impact of Tobin tax on market efficiency (the deviation of asset price from its 
fair value which is usually measured as price volatility in articles on Tobin tax), and the 
other concerns the impact on trading volume. 
As regards market efficiency, some articles conclude that Tobin tax improves 
market efficiency by decreasing price volatility (Frankel, 1996; Pally, 1999; Ehrestein, 
2002; Westerhoff, 2003; Ehrenstein et al., 2005; Cipriani and Guarino, 2008) while 
others conclude that Tobin tax reduces market efficiency by increasing price volatility 
(Kupiec, 1995; Aliber et al. 2003). The results are mainly derived from heterogeneous 
research methods and tax settings, for example the type of investors (long-term or short-
term; speculators, fundamentalists or noise traders) and their motivation for trading. By 
experimental analysis on an artificial market with four types of traders, Mannaro et al. 
(2008) find that market efficiency decreases and price volatility increases. In contrast, 
Pally (1996) proposes a microeconomic model with two groups of risk-neutral traders 
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(fundamentalists and noise traders). He then uses the model to show that noise traders 
(speculators) create inefficiencies and higher costs for fundamentalists. He argues 
therefore that, although a Tobin tax would apply equally to noise traders and 
fundamentalists for a single trade, the overall impact is larger on noise traders as they 
trade more frequently. Consequently, noise trading would be reduced by a Tobin tax, 
and therefore market efficiency would be enhanced, which is contrary to the view 
expressed by Mannaro et al. (2008). So, there is no general agreement on the 
consequences of a Tobin tax on price volatility and market efficiency, although the 
work of Haberer (2006) may help to explain these apparent contradictions. In the work 
of Haberer (2006), a U-shaped relationship between market trading volume and price 
volatility is advocated. He concludes that market volume is reduced by a Tobin tax. But 
this new tax can have different impacts on price volatility, depending on the level of 
trading in the market.  
As regards work on trading volume, all articles conclude that the introduction of 
Tobin tax would reduce the trading volume by decreasing transactions carried out by 
speculators (Haq et al., 1996; Weaver et al., 2003; Mannaro et al., 2008; Hanke et al., 
2010). However, the analysis of Hanke et al. (2010) shows that, although a Tobin tax 
reduces market trading volume, the size of this reduction is heterogeneous and highly 
sensitive to the size of the market. In their work, they present an experiment with 
currency trading on two artificial markets, in which none, one, or both markets include a 
Tobin tax. Hanke et al. (2010) conclude that trading volume and trading activity are 
significantly affected if the Tobin tax is levied on the larger market, and the stronger 
influence of the tax on the larger market seems to be driven by drying up the hitherto 
very liquid large market. Some further questions arise from the work of Hanke et al. 
(2010). For example, is the impact of the Tobin tax on trading volume also sensitive to 
other external factors, such as market liquidity, market correlation, and investment tax 
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rules? In the literature, analysis of Tobin tax is isolated completely from other tax issues 
(e.g. income tax and capital gains tax). Is the impact of the Tobin tax on trading volume 
also sensitive to investment tax rules? When discussing Tobin tax, if investors are not 
free of income and capital gains tax, they should be included in the model to achieve the 
correct equilibria.  
 
2.3 Tax Arbitrage 
In this section, literature on tax arbitrage modelling and therefore post-tax asset pricing 
is presented. The expected pre-tax asset return and its risk are normally the main 
considerations in articles on portfolio management and asset pricing. In reality, however, 
heterogeneous taxation can significantly influence equilibrium prices. This 
heterogeneity may exist across different investors, securities and types of returns 
(capital gains or income). For example, some investors are subject to higher tax rates 
than others, derivative securities may follow a tax rule different from that of their 
underlying assets, and even the same asset may be subject to different taxation 
depending on the purpose for which it is held (e.g. retirement investing). All these 
features make the asymmetric treatment of taxes important in asset pricing but difficult 
to include in the mathematical programming. It is this complexity that makes most 
people decide to simplify asset pricing and portfolio management research by assuming 
constant tax rates. This problem is addressed by including tax heterogeneities in the 
model to establish the dynamic equilibrium of asset prices.  
On a pre-tax basis, no mispricing of assets guarantees no arbitrage opportunities 
and thus investors cannot expect to make a profit without taking on risk when going 
long in one asset and short in another asset. However, with the inclusion of taxation, 
even if there is no pre-tax mispricing, differential tax treatment can lead to the existence 
of both attractive and unattractive securities on an after-tax basis and a tax arbitrage 
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opportunity whereby investors purchase a low-taxed asset financed by selling a high-
taxed one. In this way, investors can reduce their tax bill or obtain an extra net positive 
profit without changing their current risk exposure (Basak and Croitorn, 2001). 
Regarding differential taxes across high-income investors and low-income 
investors, Samuelson (1964) demonstrates that high rate tax-payers could, at the time of 
the study, reduce tax by purchasing bonds standing at a discount from low rate tax-
payers at the expense of the government (lower tax income). Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1980), Dybvig and Ross (1986) and Ross (1987) show that the 
differential tax treatment on the rich and poor leads to a clientele effect on both quantity 
and price when purchasing assets, which increases complexity in determining 
equilibrium asset prices. Talmor (1989) also discusses the role of tax arbitrage in 
clientele effects on financial leverage. He argues that while total short sale constraints 
are often introduced to rule out tax arbitrage, such constraints are both unrealistic and 
conceptually problematic. Instead, milder constraints are advocated, which prevent tax 
arbitrage while still allowing short positions. It is demonstrated that a model with these 
constraints can support bond pricing as in the Miller equilibrium, although it leads to a 
richer set of tax clienteles.  
Regarding taxation and asset pricing, Brennan (1970(1)) was the first to consider 
the pricing of assets under differential taxation of incomes and capital gains, and shows 
that there is a significant effect on asset pricing. Elton and Gruber (1978) also consider 
the effect of this differential taxation on portfolio composition and show that the 
inclusion of income tax changes the market equilibrium significantly. The implication 
of asymmetric tax on capital gains and income is discussed in later research on both 
asset pricing and portfolio management (Dammon and Spatt 1996; Basak and 
Gallmeyer 2003; Osorio et al. 2002, 2004(1), 2004(2), 2008(1) and 2008(2)). Dammon 
and Spatt (1996) explore the pricing and optimal trading of assets with transaction costs 
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and asymmetric capital gains tax. They claim that for assets that have been held for long 
periods, all capital gains below a certain threshold are realized by investors, and for 
assets that have been held for a short period, all gains and sometimes small losses are 
deferred by investors. Deferral of short-term losses may be contrary to common 
intuition. However, even without transaction costs, it may be optimal to defer short-term 
losses. Tax timing value is significantly lower under the strategies previously analysed 
than under the optimal trading strategy.  Sialm (2009) also tried to find out if investors 
benefited from the tax burden of equities by observing data from 1913 to 2006, and its 
impact on asset pricing. They concluded that “an economically and statistically 
significant relation between before-tax abnormal asset returns and effective tax rates”. 
Basak and Gallmeyer (2003) consider a dynamic asset pricing model with 
asymmetric dividend taxation and a unique risky asset. They study the dynamics of 
equilibrium security prices when agents face differential dividend taxation, and 
conclude that under logarithmic preferences, risk is transferred from the higher-taxed to 
the lower-taxed agent, and the interest rate decreases to counteract extra precautionary 
savings against this sub-optimally shared risk. Numerical analysis reveals further tax 
rate, time-to-horizon, and dividend risk effects. For most wealth allocations, the stock 
return volatility is increased above the no-tax benchmark. Osorio et al. (2002, 2004(1), 
2004(2), 2008(1) and 2008(2)) try to include a differential personal investment tax 
constraint into portfolio optimization and conclude that the inclusion of tax leads to a 
significant change on the optimal portfolio composition. However, most of these papers 
ignore the tax effects of capital losses by assuming non-negative increases in market 
prices. This assumption ignores the long-term advantage of deferred tax and may lead to 
unrealistic conclusions.  
To investigate the role of heterogeneous tax across time, Constantinides (1983) 
assumes that tax rates are higher in the short term than in the long term, and concludes 
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that investors will take advantage by realizing losses in the short term but gains in the 
long term. Dammon and Spatt (1996) and Osorio et al. (2004(1)) reach a similar 
conclusion in a multi-period model.  
Finally, researchers have tried to determine equilibrium asset prices under 
heterogeneous tax brackets across investors. For instance, Dammon and Green (1987) 
implement a single-period model to reflect this heterogeneity in asset pricing. They 
consider the special case in which assets have static pay-offs, but are differentially taxed 
and conclude that the "no-tax arbitrage" condition simply requires that investors’ tax 
rates must intersect. But this conclusion is reached under the assumption that an asset’s 
capital gains are positive and its pre-tax pay-off is also positive. Jones and Milne (1992) 
conclude that equilibrium in the capital markets is not possible unless all countries 
adopt the same principle of international income taxation. Basak and Croitoru (2001) 
propose a time-continuous model to develop dynamic equilibria of asset prices between 
two heterogeneous agents when the presence of redundant, non-linearly taxed securities 
provides opportunities for tax arbitrage. Strobel (2001, 2005, 2012(a) and 2012(b)) 
programs heterogeneous income taxation for cross-country portfolio management to 
discover international tax arbitrage opportunities and proposes new tax-modified 
interest and put-call parity conditions. But when assets are assumed to be uncorrelated, 
authors usually adopt static but not continuous pay-offs to track possible arbitrage 
opportunities (Dammon and Green, 1987; Dammon and Spatt 1996; Strobel (2001, 
2005, 2012(a) and 2012(b)). Basak and Croitorn (2001) consider arbitrage opportunities 
between correlated assets with returns assumed to be continuous, but only income tax 
(not capital gains tax) is included. 
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Chapter 3 - Tax Effects on Investment Portfolios: Large-Scale 
Optimization under Stochastic and Integer Constraints 
 
This chapter investigates the effects of income tax and capital gains tax on large 
investment portfolios. An optimization model is proposed to return portfolios meeting 
or exceeding a prescribed return threshold with a high confidence level and satisfying 
buy-in threshold and diversification constraints. Complex tax trading rules with 
withdrawal features of investment bonds are also incorporated. To implement this 
Mixed Integer Non-linear Programming (MINLP) model on large scale applications, a 
solution based on Greedy heuristics with newly introduced dynamic ranking and integer 
evaluation rules is proposed. Performance comparisons with extant MINLP branch and 
bound and approximation method solvers show that, while the latter fair well for small-
scale MINLP problems of less than 72 asset classes, the proposed method retains good 
performance with up to 288 asset classes11. A study on individual portfolio composition 
using the proposed model and solution method finds substantial non-linear tax effects 
on riskier assets and enhanced effects of withdrawal tax only when tax rates are high. In 
practice, the developed framework better enables investors to react to tax changes, and 
tax policy-makers to quantify the influence of tax changes on private investment 
preferences. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Portfolio optimization has been studied using single and multistage stochastic 
programming with discrete asset choice constraints. An important issue relating to 
mean-variance optimization is the uncertainty in problem parameters or the so-called 
estimation risk or uncertainty in the estimation of expected returns. Bonami and Lejeune 
                                                          
11 In this work, income and capital gains of an asset class (e.g. U.K. Telecom Equity ) are calculated from 
historical data of a corresponding market index (e.g. U.K. Telecom Equity Index)   
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(2009) minimize portfolio variance while simultaneously considering uncertainty in 
expected returns (estimation risk) and trading restrictions modeled with integer 
constraints. They incorporate uncertainty in expected returns through a probabilistic 
constraint that follows Roy's (1952) safety first criterion. This identifies as optimal the 
portfolio for which the probability of its return falling below a prescribed threshold is 
minimized. The portfolio's expected return is above a prescribed minimum level with a 
high probability, typically [0.7, 1). They also consider the following three trading 
restrictions: diversification, which ensures investments in a number of industrial sectors; 
buy-in threshold, which prevents investors from holding small positions; and round-lot 
purchasing, which incorporates even-lot block trading behavior of institutional investors. 
Bonami and Lejeune (2009), however, ignore the substantial effects of taxation, which 
are important to investors. Their work is extended in this important direction by solving 
portfolio optimization problems that incorporate their three trading restrictions as well 
as income and capital gains tax under a realistic set of tax rules. 
Taxation complicates portfolio optimization problems, but can have significant 
and important effects on investor wealth (Feldstein 1976; Constantinides and Scholes 
1980; Constantinides 1983, 1984; Hubbard 1985; Dybvig and Koo 1996; Dammon et al. 
2001, 2004; De Miguel and Uppal 2005; Birge and Yang 2007). Most of this cited prior 
work, however, does not consider real-market variations in tax rules within different 
investment accounts and across different countries and regions. In reality, investment 
returns arise mainly in the form of income or capital gains and these are subject to 
different tax rates. Investors may withdraw funds as income either from returns or from 
initial invested capital. Tax rates also differ across investment accounts, investment 
assets and global regions. For example, to maximize tax advantage, some investment 
accounts have restrictions on the amount, timing and source of withdrawal from income 
or initial capital that investors can make. Further, some withdrawal limits increase over 
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the investment horizon, while others are constant, and some taxes are payable 
immediately upon encashment of a certain type of income, while others can be deferred 
to the end of the investment horizon. Moreover, tax rates and policies also vary across 
countries. These tax and withdrawal rules complicate portfolio optimization problems 
mainly by introducing constraints that may involve binary or integer variables, which 
require integer programming, and by causing an indirect mapping between the control 
variables (asset weights) and the portfolio optimization objective function. 
Recent papers on post-tax portfolio optimization improve long-term investment 
models by adding real-market features such as tax withdrawals (Osorio et al. 2002, 
2004a) and bank taper relief (Osorio et al. 2008b). These papers focus on the effect of 
taxes on portfolio allocation and deal with return uncertainty through scenario trees. 
Research on post-tax portfolio optimization can be extended further in five ways. First, 
a probabilistic constraint as in Bonami and Lejenue (2009) is included to consider return 
uncertainty and estimation risk simultaneously with integer and other constraints that 
incorporate taxation and withdrawal rules. Second, the diversification constraint of 
Osorio et al. (2004a) is enhanced by requiring a portfolio to maintain a minimum 
number of assets, which is a regulatory requirement for some institutional investors. 
Third, the framework of Osorio et al. (2004a,b) is also improved by introducing a buy-
in threshold constraint that avoids small investments in individual assets that are 
disallowed, cannot be purchased or are costly to maintain. Fourth, the withdrawal rules 
of Osorio et al. (2008b) is relaxed to allow for transactions between accounts, rather 
than within accounts only. Finally, as an extension to the study of Osorio et al. (2008b), 
the optimal portfolios under different tax rates (varying between 0 and 0.7) is obtained. 
The results present a non-linear relation between investor’s optimal weight on a risky 
asset class and tax rate applied to the asset class in a complex and realistic tax and 
trading environment. The extended study provides an example of how the proposed 
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model and solution method enables investors and policy-makers to estimate the effects 
of tax rate changes. 
The combination of integer and probabilistic constraints result in mixed-integer 
nonlinear programming (MINLP) problems. These are challenging to solve, especially 
for the considered large-scale problems. Much work has been done on improving the 
efficiency of algorithms used to solve the mean-variance Markowtiz model under 
MINLP (Bienstock 1996; Konno and Yamamoto 2005; Jobst et al. 2001; Corazza and 
Favaretto 2007; Gondzio and Grothey 2007; Bonami and Lejeune 2009; Lejeune and 
Samatlı-Paç 2012). However, certain features can limit the applicability of these 
proposed algorithms to my proposed post-tax portfolio problem. First, many ignore the 
uncertainty in problem parameters (estimation risk) (Bienstock 1996). Second, the 
objective function considered is specific (Bonami and Lejeune 2009). Third, the trading 
rules considered are simplified (Lejeune and Samatlı-Paç 2012). A new method is 
therefore required for my proposed portfolio optimization problems.  
Previous work shows that branch and bound (henceforth B&B) methods, such as 
BONMIN, under most fractional branching rules exhibits higher precision for MINLP 
than approximating methods such as CPLEX (Bonami and Lejeune 2009). However, the 
basic B&B method finds the optimal solution by ensuring that no other solutions can 
return a better result under a branching tree. To guarantee the optimality of returned 
solution, it may require a large number of iterations. This number will increase further 
exponentially as the number of integer variables rises. Therefore, for large-scale MINLP, 
the basic B&B cannot always return a valid solution within a given period of time. 
Improvements to the B&B method have been made to reduce its computing time but 
also make the new method specific to certain type of problems. For example, Bonami 
and Lejeune (2009) improve the B&B method by applying a new branching rule to 
largely reduce the required number of iterations when solving large-scale MINLP. 
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However, their new branching rule is only able to solve their proposed mean-variance 
model, where portfolio variance is minimized as the objective function while portfolio 
return is considered in the constraints. A new method based on Greedy heuristics by 
applying an improved ranking rule is proposed to find the optimal solution to each 
integer variable in sequence without a need to go back to previous steps. It makes the 
locally optimal choice for each integer variable approximate to a global optimum. The 
proposed method does not guarantee the optimality of solution to my proposed portfolio 
optimization problem, but it approximates a global optimal solution in a reasonable time 
with an acceptable optimality gap. In Section 3.4, experimental results show that the 
approximation returned by the proposed method is reliable in most cases, particularly 
for large-scale optimization problems. The classical Greedy heuristics (Chvatal, 1979), 
however, has its own disadvantages. In particular, its scope is limited to specific 
problems and its precision is highly dependent on the order of iteration. In response, a 
modification to Greedy is presented, and its performance is compared with that of 
BONMIN (the basic B&B method) and CPLEX (the approximating method).  
One of main contributions of this chapter is that the proposed framework is used 
to investigate tax effects on personal portfolio investments. Specifically, the effects of 
changes in tax rates across asset classes in optimal portfolios of personal investors are 
investigated. Three accounts that are subject to different tax and withdrawal rules are 
considered, namely, offshore bonds, onshore bonds and unit trusts.12  Total post-tax 
return is maximized subject to the constraints mentioned above. This will help investors 
to decide if they need change their portfolio after a new tax policy is released by the 
government. How big the impact of withdrawal tax on the optimal portfolio is also 
tested. This will help investors to assess whether it is worth considering withdrawal tax 
in the optimization process. 
                                                          
12 Investors can transfer money into an account and then use the money in the account to purchase 
financial assets. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the 
optimization problem and relevant settings for the micro level analysis. Section 3.3 
presents the objective functions and constraints of the model. Section 3.4 presents the 
modified Greedy heuristic and tests its performance. Section 3.5 presents the empirical 
analyses of tax effects. Section 3.6 summarizes and concludes.  
 
3.2 Post-tax Personal Investment Portfolio Optimization 
Tax effects are tested by optimizing personal portfolios over a single period and, for a 
given level of risk, maximizing return net of taxes, management fees, and transaction 
costs. Investors diversify by both allocating their wealth across risky asset classes and 
locating their wealth across three investment 'accounts' that follow different tax and 
cash withdrawal rules. These accounts are offshore investment bonds, onshore 
investment bonds and unit trusts. Offshore bonds is a generic umbrella account for 
investments that benefit from certain tax concessions such as deferment, while unit 
trusts are assumed to contain only equity investments. Different tax rates and rules 
apply to income, capital gains and withdrawals. The general UK tax framework of 
Osorio et al. (2004a,b, 2008a,b) is adopted, which is still used by UK insurance 
companies, such as Prudential.13 Although some years have passed since the research of 
Osorio et al was published, the tax treatment on investment bonds is still the same 
nowadays. In this Chapter, Osorio et al.’s constraints are enhanced in a number of ways 
and flexibility is added to allow this setup to be applicable in other countries. This is 
discussed in Section 3.3.  
Investors generally have two decisions to consider: initializing new portfolios or 
rebalancing existing portfolios. These are represented by two separate settings. First, on 
                                                          
13 Prudential plc is a British multinational life insurance and financial services company headquartered in 
London, United Kingdom. It was founded in London in May 1848. More details regarding tax treatment 
on investment bonds can be found at:  
http://www.pru.co.uk/investments/investment-articles/investments-and-tax/ 
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initializing new portfolios, investors are assumed to start with cash in hand, and the 
model's function is to optimize buying decisions in forming new risky asset portfolios 
within and across the three accounts. There is no demand for interim cash withdrawals 
and only new cumulative taxes need to be deducted from total return at the end of the 
period. Second, at rebalancing, investors are assumed to hold an existing portfolio that 
is bequeathed from the previous period with no cash in hand. Thus, the model’s 
function is to optimize buy and sell decisions. New cumulative taxes, as well as old 
taxes accumulated from previous periods, need to be deducted from end-of-period total 
return. 
In line with Osorio et al. (2004a), the tax structures for the three accounts are as 
follows: 
a. Offshore (investment) bonds 
 All taxes are cumulated and paid on total return at the end of the investment 
horizon. 
 Annual withdrawals up to 5% of the original investment are permitted, and 
associated taxes are deferred until the end of investment (encashment). Unused 
withdrawal allowances may be carried forward indefinitely. 
 Additional withdrawals beyond the annual 5% allowance limit may be made 
subject to an immediate tax payment at the encashment rate of 𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓. 
 Withdrawals from the original capital are permitted only when all positive 
returns have been withdrawn. These withdrawals are not taxed. 
b. Onshore (investment) bonds  
 Part of the tax on total return is cumulated to the end of the investment and the 
rest is paid annually at the end of each period.  
 Tax on withdrawal is the same as offshore bonds, except that the encashment 
(only) tax rate is 𝑡𝑜𝑛.  
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c. Unit trusts  
 Tax on capital gains is paid at the end of investment and this rate changes as its 
holding time increases. Thus, different assets in a portfolio may be subject to 
different tax rates depending on their time of purchase. 
 Tax on income (e.g., dividends) is paid annually at the end of each period. 
 Only return from the previous period is available for withdrawal at the 
beginning of the decision period. 
 Withdrawals from the last period’s income are not taxed at the encashment rate. 
 Withdrawals from last year’s capital gains are subject to an immediate tax at 
the encashment rate of 𝐶𝐺𝑇, where the optimizing period is counted as 𝑇 + 1. 
 Capital withdrawals follow the same rules as for offshore bonds.  
The notation adopted is defined in Table 3.1. 
  
 57 
 
Table 3. 1 Notation 
Input data 
𝟏 = (1,1, . . . ,1)′ 
𝒖′𝒗 = 𝑢1𝑣1 + 𝑢2𝑣2+. . . +𝑢𝑛𝑣𝑛 (Inner product) 
𝒖 ∘ 𝒗 = (𝑢1𝑣1, 𝑢2𝑣2, . . . , 𝑢𝑛𝑣𝑛)
′ (Hadamard product) 
𝒖./𝒗 = (𝑢1/𝑣1, 𝑢2/𝑣2, . . . , 𝑢𝑛/𝑣𝑛)′ 
𝑛𝑘 number of investment assets in account k 
𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛 minimum number of assets with non-zero wealth in portfolio 
𝐿 total amount of wealth at the beginning of investment 
𝐿𝑘 amount of wealth at the beginning of investment in account k 
𝑓𝑘 percentage paid in management fee for account k 
𝒅𝑗  sets of historical dividends or income returns of each asset in class j 
𝒈𝑗 sets of possible capital gains of each asset in class j 
?̅?𝑗 expected dividends or income returns in class j 
𝒈
𝑗
 expected capital gains in class j 
𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓 cumulative tax rate on gross returns of offshore bond 
𝑡𝑜𝑛 cumulative tax rate on gross returns of onshore bond 
𝑡𝑎𝑛 annual tax rate on gross returns from onshore bond 
𝒕𝑖𝑛 income tax rate paid on dividends or income 
𝐺𝑇 capital gains tax rate in period t (changing by time) 
𝑐 transaction cost 
𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓,𝑒 tax rate on gross returns of offshore bond when underlying is equity 
𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓,𝑏 tax rate on gross returns of offshore bond when underlying is bond 
𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓,𝑐 tax rate on gross returns of offshore bond when underlying is commodity 
𝑶𝑗𝑖 net income from each asset of class j in previous year in unit trust 
𝑶𝑗𝑔 net gain from each asset of class j in previous year in unit trust 
𝑅𝑘𝑗0 initial cumulative returns for account k of class j 
𝑋𝑘𝑗0 initial accumulated tax in account k of class j 
𝑊𝑘 accumulated first withdrawal from account k 
𝒘𝑘𝑗0 initial amount of money held in each asset in account k of class j 
𝑇 number of past years of current investment 
𝑤𝑚𝑖𝑛 minimum position for each holding asset 
𝑼𝑗 upper percentage bounds for asset j 
𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 minimum required return from investment 
𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 minimum required probability that real return exceeds required minimum 
level 
⅀ covariance of assets 
𝐶0 external funding at the beginning of period 
Variables 
𝑅𝑘𝑗1 cumulative returns for account k after withdrawal of class j 
𝑋𝑘𝑗2 final accumulated tax in account k of class j 
𝑉𝑘𝑗 net redemption value obtained from account k of class j 
𝒘𝑘𝑗1 amount of money held in each asset after rebalance in account k of class j 
𝒘𝑘𝑗2 final amount of money held in each asset in account k of class j 
𝒊𝑘𝑗
𝑏  amount of money spent to buy an asset in account k of class j 
𝒊𝑘𝑗
𝑠  amount of money obtained when selling an asset in account k of class j 
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Table 3.1 Notation (cont.) 
𝒉𝑘𝑗
1  first withdrawal from account k of class j 
𝒉𝑘𝑗
2  excess withdrawal from account k of class j 
𝒉𝑘𝑗
3  withdrawal taken from the original investment in account k of class j 
𝑰𝑘𝑗 money spent to buy an asset of class j in account k when using withdrawal 
𝑦𝑘 ∈ {0,1}, binary variable for account k, 
𝜹𝒌 ∈ {0,1}, binary variable for assets in account k 
 
3.3 Problem Constraints and Objective Functions 
 
3.3.1 Basic trading constraints 
 
a. Internal trading budget  
In the following sections, all asset classes in the equity markets are grouped together as 
a high-level asset class, called the equity asset class. Similarly, all asset classes in the 
bond markets are grouped together as a high-level asset class, called the bond asset class, 
and all asset classes in the commodity markets are grouped together as a high-level asset 
class, called the commodity asset class. An internal trading budget (balance) constraint 
ensures that for every account k =1,2,3 the total selling proceeds from all three high-
level asset classes j=1,2,314, 𝟏′𝒊𝑘𝑗
𝑠 , are equal to the total buying costs, 𝟏′𝒊𝑘𝑗
𝑏 , so that  
∑  (𝑗 𝟏
′𝒊𝑘𝑗
𝑏 − 𝟏′𝒊𝑘𝑗
𝑠 ) = 0,     ∀𝑘 = 1,2,3.                                                              (3.1) 
where 𝟏′ is (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, …), 𝒊𝑘𝑗
𝑠  is money received from the sale of assets in the high-
level asset class j and account k, and 𝒊𝑘𝑗
𝑏  is the money spent to purchase assets in high-
level asset class j and account k.   
 
b. Diversification 
                                                          
14 j=1 is the equity asset class; j=2 is the bonds asset class; j=3 is the commodities asset class. 
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The following constraint sets an upper bound on the total value of each asset in a 
portfolio: 
∑ 𝟏′3𝑘=1 𝒘𝑘𝑗1 ≤ 𝑼𝑗 ∑  
3
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝟏
′3
𝑘=1 𝒘𝑘𝑗1     ∀j = 1,2,3                                         (3.2) 
𝒘𝑘𝑗1 is the weight of asset class j in account k after rebalancing and 𝑼𝑗 is the upper 
percentage of asset j in the portfolio. Therefore 𝑼𝑗 ∑  
3
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝟏
′3
𝑘=1 𝒘𝑘𝑗1   is the upper 
bound and ∑ 𝟏′3𝑘=1 𝒘𝑘𝑗1 is the total wealth of each asset in all three accounts. By also 
setting a lower bound on the total number of assets in a portfolio, 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛, firm specific 
risk can be minimized in the portfolio, 
∑  3𝑗=1 ∑ 𝟏
′3
𝑘=1 𝛿𝒌𝒋 ≥ 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛,                                                                                          (3.3) 
where the sum of the binary variables, 𝛿𝒌𝒋 ∈ {0,1}, counts this number. More details 
about this binary variable are introduced in the following paragraph. In their 
diversification constraint, Osorio et al. (2004a) do not stipulate a minimum number of 
assets, which is a beneficial consideration to individual investors in portfolio 
management. Evans and Archer (1968) conclude that an investor needs to construct a 
portfolio containing as little as 15 randomly selected stocks before the benefits of 
diversification, as measured by the standard deviation, are largely exhausted. Recent 
studies provide strong support for limiting the number of stocks an investor needs to 
hold to reduce portfolio risk to an acceptable level. Campbell et al. (2001) find a greater 
need for diversification. This need, they discover, is caused by the increased volatility of 
individual stocks, not increased volatility of the market. That has led to decreased 
correlations among individual stocks. Declining correlations among equities implies 
that the benefits of portfolio diversification have increased over time. The authors find 
that while a portfolio of about 20 stocks was sufficient to reduce the excess standard 
deviation of a portfolio to 10 percent in the 1960s, by the turn of the century that figure 
had risen to 50 stocks.  
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c. Buy-in threshold  
This constraint requires a minimum purchasing volume for each asset, as small holdings 
are costly to maintain, disallowed or cannot be purchased. Thus, 
𝒘𝑘𝑗1 ≤ 𝜹𝒌𝒋 ∑  
3
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝟏
′𝒘𝑘𝑗1
3
𝑘=1     ∀𝑘 = 1,2,3; 𝑗 = 1,2,3                                      (3.4) 
𝑤𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜹𝒌𝒋 ≤ 𝒘𝑘𝑗1     ∀𝑘 = 1,2,3; 𝑗 = 1,2,3.                                                                  (3.5) 
If investors want to hold one asset in the new portfolio, the corresponding binary 
variable 𝜹𝒌𝒋  must be valued at 1. In (3.5), 𝑤𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜹𝒌𝒋  defines the buy-in threshold 
requirement. 𝑤𝑚𝑖𝑛  is the minimum weight that an asset can be hold in one account. 
This constraint does not feature in Osorio et al. (2004a,b, 2008a,b). The large number of 
integer variables introduced by constraints (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) (equal to the number of 
assets, which could be hundreds) contributes to the complexity of the problem and, 
together with the non-linear stochastic risk constraint discussed below in Section 3.3.3, 
necessitates a new algorithm to solve the large-scale MINLP. 
 
3.3.2 Taxation 
The total tax liability is built up by calculating the impact of different tax rules on 
cumulative returns, withdrawals and wealth.  
 
a. Cumulative returns  
The remaining returns available for withdrawal in each account are: 
𝑹𝟏 = 𝑹𝟎 − 𝒉 
1′𝟏 − (𝒉 
2′𝟏). (𝟏 − 𝒕 )⁄                                                                            (3.6) 
𝑹𝒊 = (𝑅11𝑖, 𝑅12𝑖, 𝑅13𝑖, 𝑅21𝑖, 𝑅22𝑖 , 𝑅23𝑖, 𝑅31𝑖, 𝑅32𝑖, 𝑅33𝑖)
′     ∀𝑖 = 0,1                          (3.7)                                                                              
𝒉 
𝑖 = (𝒉11
𝑖 , 𝒉12
𝑖 , 𝒉13
𝑖 , 𝒉21
𝑖 , 𝒉22
𝑖 , 𝒉23
𝑖 , 𝒉31
𝑖 , 𝒉32
𝑖 , 𝒉33
𝑖 )
 
      ∀𝑖 = 1,2,3                                (3.8) 
  𝒕 = (𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓,𝑒 , 𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓,𝑏 , 𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓,𝑐, 𝑡𝑜𝑛,𝑒 , 𝑡𝑜𝑛,𝑏 , 𝑡𝑜𝑛,𝑐, 𝐺𝑇,𝑒 , 𝐺𝑇,𝑏 , 𝐺𝑇,𝑐)′                                      (3.9) 
 61 
 
Here, both 𝒉 
1′𝟏 and 𝒉 
2′𝟏 , in equation (3.6), represent total amounts of cash withdrawal 
from each account and high-level asset class. 𝒉 
1′ and 𝒉 
2′ is the transposed matrix of 𝒉 
1 
and  𝒉 
2. The difference is that the cash in 𝒉 
1 is within the tax free allowance, while the 
cash in 𝒉 
2 is beyond the tax free allowance and is therefore subject to an immediate tax 
payment. Here, 𝒉 
2 is the net amount. By using 𝒉 
2′𝟏 divided by 𝟏 − 𝒕 , the amount of 
withdrawal beyond the tax free allowance before tax is returned. This amount plus the 
withdrawal within the tax free allowance is used to calculate the remaining cumulative 
return of the portfolio.  𝑅𝑘𝑗0 , in equation (3.7), is the total return of asset class j in 
account k available for withdrawal before rebalancing, while 𝑅𝑘𝑗1 is the total return of 
asset class j in account k available for further withdrawal after rebalancing. In addition, 
an upper bound on total withdrawals from asset returns is set by the constraint 𝑅𝑘𝑗1 ≥
0 (∀𝑘 = 1,2,3).  
 
b. Withdrawals  
There are two types of withdrawal: one from returns and the other from initial capital. 
For return withdrawals from investment bonds there are immediate tax and withdrawal 
allowance limits, which increase with the time horizon: 
∑  𝑗 𝒉𝑘𝑗
1 ′𝟏 ≤ 0.05 × 𝑇 × 𝐿𝑘 − 𝑊𝑘     ∀𝑘 = 1,2                                                         (3.10) 
where T is the number of past years of current investment, Lk is the amount of wealth at 
the beginning of the investment in account k, and 𝑊𝑘  is the accumulated first 
withdrawal from account k (i. e. 𝒉𝑘𝑗
1 ). Unlike investment bonds, withdrawals from the 
unit trust account are free from immediate tax and are only available from last year’s 
income, 𝑶𝑗𝑖.  
𝒉3𝑗
1 ≤ 𝑶𝑗𝑖      ∀𝑗 = 1,2,3                                                                                             (3.11) 
𝒉3𝑗
2 ≤ 𝑶𝑗𝑔     ∀𝑗 = 1,2,3                                                                                             (3.12) 
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Initial capital, however, is available for encashment if, and only if, all available returns 
have been used up. Binary variables, 𝑦𝑘 ∈ {0,1}, are subject to the following restrictions. 
∑  𝑗 𝒉𝑘𝑗
1 ′𝟏  − 𝐿 × 𝑦𝑘 ≤ 0     ∀𝑘 = 1,2,3                                                             (3.13) 
∑  𝑗 𝑅𝑘𝑗1 + 𝐿 × 𝑦𝑘 ≤ 𝐿     ∀𝑘 = 1,2,3                                                                        (3.14) 
𝒉𝑘𝑗
3  is withdrawal from initial capitals of asset j in account k which is free of tax but is 
allowed only after the asset’s returns are all withdrawn. L is the total amount of wealth 
at the beginning of the investment. According to (3.13) and (3.14), if investors wish to 
withdraw initial capital (𝒉𝑘𝑗
3  is positive), the binary variable 𝑦𝑘 will be 1, and 𝑅𝑘𝑗1 will 
then be equal to, or less than, 0. Thus, (3.13) and (3.14) introduce additional binary 
variables to the problem. 
 
c. Wealth and external trading budget  
The total wealth in each account after trading, and at the end of the period, are now 
calculated. In calculating the former, transactions both within and between accounts are 
counted. 
𝒘1 = 𝒘0 − [𝒉 
1 + 𝒉 
2. (𝟏 − 𝒕)⁄ + 𝒉 
3] + (1 − 𝑐)(𝒊 
𝑏 + 𝑰 ) − 𝒊 
𝑠                         (3.15) 
𝒘𝑖 = (𝒘11𝑖, 𝒘12𝑖, 𝒘13𝑖, 𝒘21𝑖, 𝒘22𝑖, 𝒘23𝑖, 𝒘31𝑖 , 𝒘32𝑖, 𝒘33𝑖)      ∀𝑖 = 0,1,2               (3.16)                                                                                      
𝒊 
𝑏 = (𝒊11
𝑏 , 𝒊12
𝑏 , 𝒊13
𝑏 , 𝒊21
𝑏 , 𝒊22
𝑏 , 𝒊23
𝑏 , 𝒊31
𝑏 , 𝒊32
𝑏 , 𝒊33
𝑏 )                                                               (3.17) 
𝒊 
𝑠 = (𝒊11
𝑠 , 𝒊12
𝑠 , 𝒊13
𝑠 , 𝒊21
𝑠 , 𝒊22
𝑠 , 𝒊23
𝑠 , 𝒊31
𝑠 , 𝒊32
𝑠 , 𝒊33
𝑠 )                                                                (3.18) 
𝑰 = (𝑰11, 𝑰12, 𝑰13, 𝑰21, 𝑰22, 𝑰23, 𝑰31, 𝑰32, 𝑰33)                                                               (3.19) 
𝐶0 + ∑  
3
𝑗=1 ∑ (𝟏
′𝒉𝑘𝑗
1 + 𝟏′𝒉𝑘𝑗
2 + 𝟏′𝒉𝑘𝑗
3 )3𝑘=1 = ∑  
3
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝟏′𝑰𝒌𝒋
3
𝑘=1                          (3.20) 
Apart from the balance for internal, within account, trading, there is a balance for 
external trading across accounts, as shown in (3.20). With regard to the trading budget 
constraints (3.15), Osorio et al. (2004a) assume that all withdrawals during subsequent 
periods are held in cash and no transactions are allowed between accounts (Eq. (18) in 
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their paper). In contrast, cross-account transactions and cash withdrawal re-investments 
are included in this work, which is more realistic. In calculating wealth at the end of the 
period, both expected capital gains and income are considered, and corresponding 
annual tax payments and management fees are deducted.  
𝒘112 = (1 − 𝑓1)[(𝟏 + 𝒅𝑒 + 𝒈𝑒) ∘ 𝒘111]                                                               (3.21a) 
𝒘122 = (1 − 𝑓1)[(𝟏 + 𝒅𝑏 + 𝒈𝑏) ∘ 𝒘121]                                                         (3.21b) 
𝒘132 = (1 − 𝑓1)[(𝟏 + 𝒅𝑐 + 𝒈𝑐) ∘ 𝒘131]                                             (3.21c) 
𝒘212 = (1 − 𝑓2) [(𝟏 + (1 − 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑒)(𝒅𝑒 + 𝒈𝑒)) ∘ 𝒘211] (3.22a) 
𝒘222 = (1 − 𝑓2) [(𝟏 + (1 − 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑏)(𝒅𝑏 + 𝒈𝑏)) ∘ 𝒘221] (3.22b) 
𝒘232 = (1 − 𝑓2) [(𝟏 + (1 − 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐)(𝒅𝑐 + 𝒈𝑐)) ∘ 𝒘231] (3.22c) 
𝒘312 = (1 − 𝑓3)[(𝟏 + (𝟏 − 𝒕𝑖𝑛𝑒) ∘ 𝒅𝑒 + 𝒈𝑒) ∘ 𝒘311] (3.23a) 
𝒘322 = (1 − 𝑓3)[(𝟏 + (𝟏 − 𝒕𝑖𝑛𝑏) ∘ 𝒅𝑏 + 𝒈𝑏) ∘ 𝒘321] (3.23b) 
𝒘332 = (1 − 𝑓3)[(𝟏 + (𝟏 − 𝒕𝑖𝑛𝑐) ∘ 𝒅𝑐 + 𝒈𝑐) ∘ 𝒘331] (3.23c) 
Furthermore, since the tax rate on unit trusts decreases with the holding period, a set of 
rates, 𝒕𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝒕𝑖𝑛𝑏, 𝒕𝑖𝑛𝑐, are used to account for this feature.  
 
d. Cumulative taxes 
Finally, the total tax liability is calculated by adding deferred tax from previous periods 
to that of the current period. 
𝑋112 = 𝑋110 + 𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒(1 − 𝑓1)[(𝒅𝑒 + 𝒈𝑒)
′𝒘111]  − {𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒/(1 − 𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒)}𝟏
′𝒉11
2        (3.24a) 
𝑋122 = 𝑋120 + 𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑏(1 − 𝑓1)[(𝒅𝑏 + 𝒈𝑏)
′𝒘121]  − {𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑏/(1 − 𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑏)}𝟏
′𝒉12
2       (3.24b) 
𝑋132 = 𝑋130 + 𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑐(1 − 𝑓1)[(𝒅𝑐 + 𝒈𝑐)
′𝒘131] − {𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑐/(1 − 𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑐)}𝟏
′𝒉13
2         (3.24c) 
𝑋212 = 𝑋210 + 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒(1 − 𝑓2)[(𝒅𝑒 + 𝒈𝑒)
′𝒘211] − {𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒/(1 − 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒)}𝟏
′𝒉21
2            (3.25a) 
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𝑋222 = 𝑋220 + 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑏(1 − 𝑓2)[(𝒅𝑏 + 𝒈𝑏)
′𝒘221] − {𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑏/(1 − 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑏)}𝟏
′𝒉22
2            (3.25b) 
𝑋232 = 𝑋230 + 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑐(1 − 𝑓2)[(𝒅𝑐 + 𝒈𝑐)
′𝒘231] − {𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑐/(1 − 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑐)}𝟏
′𝒉23
2            (3.25c) 
𝑋312 = 𝑋310 + 𝐺𝑇+1𝑒(1 − 𝑓3)[𝒈𝑒
′
𝒘311] − {𝐺𝑇+1𝑒 (1 − 𝐺𝑇𝑒)⁄ }𝟏
′𝒉31
2            (3.26a) 
𝑋322 = 𝑋320 + 𝐺𝑇+1𝑏(1 − 𝑓3)[𝒈𝑏
′
𝒘321] − {𝐺𝑇+1𝑏 (1 − 𝐺𝑇𝑏⁄ )}𝟏
′𝒉32
2            (3.26b) 
𝑋332 = 𝑋330 + 𝐺𝑇+1𝑐(1 − 𝑓3)[𝒈𝑐
′
𝒘331] − {𝐺𝑇+1𝑐 (1 − 𝐺𝑇𝑐⁄ }𝟏
′𝒉33
2          (3.26c) 
For unit trusts, the tax rate changes over time. Therefore separate rates are assumed for 
cumulative and immediate taxes, 𝐺𝑇+1 and 𝐺𝑇, and calculate the final net return of each 
account by subtracting all deferred tax liabilities from account wealth.  
𝑉𝑘𝑗 = 𝟏
′𝒘𝑘𝑗2 − 𝑋𝑘𝑗2     ∀𝑘 = 1,2,3; 𝑗 = 1,2,3                                                          (3.27) 
Here, 𝑉𝑘𝑗 is total net return from all asset classes in high-level asset class j and account 
k. 
 
3.3.3 Estimation (stochastic) risk constraint 
The portfolio optimization literature discusses different approaches to measuring risk 
and uncertainty (Artzner et al., 1999). Goldfarb and Iyengar (2003), for example, 
propose a robust factor model to manage risk. Others use historical data of asset returns 
to represent future risk (Bonami and Lejeune 2009; Lejeune 2010) and assume that asset 
returns follow a normal distribution (Bodnar and Schmid 2007). In this analysis, the risk 
measurement falls within the Markowitz mean-variance framework. Bonami and 
Lejeune (2009) state that the classic Markowitz framework relies on perfect knowledge 
of expected returns and the variance-covariance matrix of the assets. This assumes that 
there is no estimation error. However, expected returns and variance-covariance 
matrices are unobservable and unknown. Obtaining accurate estimates of them is a 
challenge. Indeed, many possible sources of errors (e.g., impossibility of obtaining a 
sufficient number of data observations, instability of data and differing personal views 
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of decision-makers on future returns) affect estimation and lead to the so-called 
estimation risk in portfolio selection (Mulvey and Erkan 2003; Bawa et al. 1979). 
Estimation risk has been shown to be the source of erroneous decisions. As pointed out 
in Ceria and Stubbs (2006) and Cornuejóls and Tütüncü (2007), the composition of the 
optimal portfolio is very sensitive to estimates of the moments of the return distribution, 
and minor perturbations in these estimates can result in the construction of different 
portfolios.  
Broadie (1993), Chopra and Ziemba (2011) and Ceria and Stubbs (2006) show 
that estimation risk is due mainly to errors in estimating the mean of the return 
distribution. Hence, the focus of this analysis is the estimation risk of expected returns 
(as in Bonami and Lejeune, 2009) rather than the variance-covariance matrix of returns 
(as in Lejeune and Samatlı-Paç, 2012). This makes the algorithm proposed by Lejeune 
and Samatlı-Paç (2012), which is based on the reformulation of estimation risk of the 
variance-covariance matrix, unsuitable for the problem under consideration. This issue 
will be discussed further in Section 3.4. The error in estimating expected returns has 
attracted renewed interest, and several approaches to incorporating it into portfolio 
selection have recently been developed. As in Bonami and Lejeune (2009), I adopt 
Roy’s (1959) safety first risk criterion, which identifies as optimal the portfolio for 
which the probability of its return falling below a prescribed threshold is minimized, to 
incorporate the estimation risk of expected returns.  
𝑃(∑  
3
𝑗=1
∑ 𝝃𝒌𝒋
′𝒘𝑘𝑗1 ≥ 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛) ≥ 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛
3
𝑘=1
 
The constraint ensures that total expected return, ∑  3𝑗=1 ∑ 𝝃𝒌𝒋
′𝒘𝑘𝑗1
3
𝑘=1 , exceeds a 
prescribed minimal level 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛  with a minimal probability 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 . The account returns 
(income and capital gains), 𝝃𝒌𝟏 = 𝒅𝑒 + 𝒈𝑒, 𝝃𝒌𝟐 = 𝒅𝑏 + 𝒈𝑏, 𝝃𝒌𝟑 = 𝒅𝑐 + 𝒈𝑐, which are 
multiplied by the decision variables 𝒘, are stochastic and not necessarily independent 
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across accounts. The constraint, however, requires transformation prior to incorporation 
in the model. First, for simplicity, the assumption of Bodnar and Schmid (2007) that the 
gross return follows a normal distribution, 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎2), where 𝜇 is expected value and 𝜎2 
is variance, is used. However, other, perhaps skewed, distributions are also possible 
(Bonami and Lejeune 2009). Second, since ∑  3𝑗=1 ∑ 𝝁𝒌𝒋
′3
𝑘=1 𝒘𝑘𝑗1 is the average return, 
𝜇, and 𝒘1
′ ∑ 𝒘1 is equal to the variance 𝜎
2, where w1 is a vector (w111, w211, w311, w121, 
w221, w321, w131, w231, w331) of all asset weights at period 1, and ∑  is variance-covariance 
matrix of all assets’ rate of return, the normalized portfolio returns can be calculated as 
𝜑 ≡ (∑  
3
𝑗=1
∑ 𝝃𝒌𝒋
′𝒘𝑘𝑗1
3
𝑘=1
− ∑  
3
𝑗=1
∑ 𝝁𝒌𝒋
′𝒘𝑘𝑗1
3
𝑘=1
)/√𝒘1′ ∑ 𝒘1 
where 𝝁𝒌𝟏 = 𝒅𝑒 + 𝒈𝑒, 𝝁𝒌𝟐 = 𝒅𝑏 + 𝒈𝑏 and 𝝁𝒌𝟑 = 𝒅𝑐 + 𝒈𝑐. It follows that 
𝑃(∑  
3
𝑗=1
∑ 𝝃𝒌𝒋
′𝒘𝑘𝑗1 ≥ 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛) =
3
𝑘=1
𝑃(𝜑)
≥ 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 − ∑  
3
𝑗=1
∑ 𝝁𝒌𝒋
′𝒘𝑘𝑗1
3
𝑘=1
√𝒘1′ ∑ 𝒘1⁄ ) 
= 1 − 𝐹(𝑤)
 (𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 − ∑  
3
𝑗=1
∑ 𝝁𝒌𝒋
′𝒘𝑘𝑗1
3
𝑘=1
√𝒘1′ ∑ 𝒘1⁄ ) 
where 𝐹(𝑤)
  is the cumulative probability distribution of the normalized portfolio return 
and 𝐹(𝑤)
−1  is its inverse. The probabilistic constraint is thus transformed into the 
following deterministic equivalent: 
1 − 𝐹(𝑤)
 (𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 − ∑  
3
𝑗=1
∑ 𝝁𝒌𝒋
′𝒘𝑘𝑗1
3
𝑘=1
√𝒘1′ ∑ 𝒘1⁄ ) ≥ 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 
⇔   𝐹(𝑤)
 (𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 − ∑  
3
𝑗=1
∑ 𝝁𝒌𝒋
′𝒘𝑘𝑗1
3
𝑘=1
√𝒘1′ ∑ 𝒘1⁄ ) ≤ 1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 
⇔  ∑  3𝑗=1 ∑ 𝝁𝒌𝒋
′𝒘𝑘𝑗1
3
𝑘=1 + 𝐹(𝑤)
−1 (1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛)√𝒘1′ ∑ 𝒘1 ≥ 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛       (3.28) 
Note that constraint (3.28) also incorporates the variance and, hence, can be used to 
replace the basic variance risk constraint in the portfolio optimization model. 
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In the applications, 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑅𝑓, the risk-free rate, is set. Confidence level, 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, is 
then set to control the estimation risk to being below a certain level. In other words, the 
probability that actual return of the asset is below the estimated one is controlled 
under 1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛.  This confidence level can then be modified according to the individual 
investor’s risk preference. Further, as only extreme poor performance needs to be 
considered, a one-tail test is used. For instance, if 95% confidence is required, then 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 
is set at 0.95 and 𝐹(𝑤)
−1 (1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛)  = -1.65. Osorio et al. (2004a) incorporate return 
uncertainty through a scenario tree, but do not explicitly minimize risk, and this may 
lead to risky trading strategies. Osorio et al. (2004b, 2008a,b), however, explicitly 
minimize risk, but in stochastic quadratic programming problems. In this chapter, 
estimation risk rather than the basic variance risk is controlled by the probabilistic 
constraint to remain under a certain level. Note that (3.28) can also be interpreted as a 
constraint that imposes a pre-specified risk-return tradeoff, where the (negative) term 
𝐹(𝑤)
−1 (1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛) measures this tradeoff in a manner similar to 'risk tolerance' of a utility 
function in mean-variance space. Specifically, it is the marginal rate of substitution 
between risk and return, and is allowed to vary according to the risk tolerance of the 
investor.  
 
3.3.4 Single-period MINLP optimization 
In contrast to the model of Bonami and Lejeune (2009), which minimizes variance, my 
objective is to maximize portfolio net (of tax) terminal wealth while holding estimation 
risk below a given level. This objective function resonates more clearly with investors 
who want to earn as much risk-adjusted net returns as possible while holding estimation 
risk below a certain level. It is important to mention that in Bonami and Lejeune (2009) 
and Lejeune and Samatlı-Paç (2012), portfolio variance risk is also set as the objective 
function. This is a convex function of the control variables (asset weights), and 
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perturbations in these variables map directly to the objective function (i.e., variances 
and covariances do not change with asset weights). With taxation, however, this direct 
mapping breaks down, and the objective function of terminal wealth has to be re-
evaluated every time the control variables are perturbed, since tax liabilities differ for 
different asset weights. As a result, the method developed in Bonami and Lejeune (2009) 
and Lejeune and Samatlı-Paç (2012) is not applicable to my proposed optimization 
problem. This is expanded upon in Section 3.4.  
The estimation risk constraint (with normally-distributed returns) provides an 
upper bound on portfolio risk. This bound will be lower (higher) when the required 
confidence level, 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, is higher (lower). The proposed model will return the portfolio 
at the intersection of the boundary and the efficient frontier. In addition, the change of 
the objective function increases the sensitivity of portfolios to changes in tax rates. This 
enables us to better investigate the effects of tax on investment portfolios.  
Combining all constraints, the optimization model for individual investors is 
formulated as the following MINLP problem:  
Maximize w  ∑  3𝑗=1 ∑ 𝑉𝑘𝑗
3
𝑘=1   
Subject to  constraints (3.1)–(3.28);  
 𝑉𝑘𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝑘, 𝑗 = 1,2,3;  
 𝑋𝑘𝑗2, 𝑅𝑘𝑗1 ≥ 0, 𝑘, 𝑗 = 1,2,3;  
 𝒘𝑘𝑗1, 𝒊𝑘𝑗
𝑏 , 𝒊𝑘𝑗
𝑠 , 𝑰𝑘𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝑘, 𝑗 = 1,2,3;  
 𝒉𝑘𝑗
1 , 𝒉𝑘𝑗
2 , 𝒉𝑘𝑗
3 ≥ 0, 𝑘, 𝑗 = 1,2,3;  
 𝑦𝑘𝑗 , 𝜹𝒌𝒋 ∈ {0,1}, 𝑘, 𝑗 = 1,2,3;  
 
3.4 Solution Method 
Initially, a non-linear B&B (BONMIN version 1.5) solver in OptiToolbox v.1.34, 
MATLAB version) is used to solve the MINLP problem in Section 3.4. This, however, 
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is found to take a prohibitive amount of time, with no solution returned in over ten 
hours. Algorithms for solving MINLP problems are often based on relaxation schemes. 
For the standard mean-variance portfolio problem, different approaches based on 
nonlinear B&B algorithms (Bonami et al. 2008; Bonami and Lejeune 2009) and outer 
approximations (Lejeune and Samatlı-Paç 2012) have been proposed. However, the 
increased complexity of my optimization problems due to the inclusion of taxes, 
together with probabilistic returns and the large number of assets (up to 288), limits the 
use of these algorithms. The tax withdrawal rules necessitate the re-evaluation of the 
entire objective function and its constraints (3.1)–(3.28) at every iteration in which the 
control variables, 𝒘1, are perturbed, or integrality restrictions on the integer variables 
restored. In Bonami and Lejeune (2009), portfolio variance is the objective function, 
and their integer variable scoring process depends on a function of the specific 
contribution of each variable to the overall risk of the portfolio. This is estimated 
through the Lagrangian function, and for their simple variance-minimizing objective 
function there is a direct link (mapping) between the control variables (asset weights) 
and the objective function (portfolio variance). This allows them to calculate the effect 
of a small change to the control variables with two simple equations (22 in their paper). 
In my model, however, this is not possible since a change in the control variables does 
not map directly to the objective function. Changes in asset weights lead to complex 
changes in tax and this in turn changes the total post-tax return used in the objective 
function. Consequently, an extension to the proposed solution of Bonami and Lejeune 
(2009) is required to make it applicable to the proposed large scale MINLP problem in 
this chapter. A further study on how sensitive an investor’s optimal portfolio is to tax 
rates then can be completed.   
 A solution method based on Greedy heuristics with a new evaluation and ranking 
procedure is introduced. More details on this new procedure are given later in this 
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section. As optimality is not guaranteed with Greedy heuristics, a comparison is carried 
out and the optimality gaps against BONMIN (B&B) and CPLEX (approximation 
method) are reported.  
In theory, the basic B&B algorithm (BONMIN) always returns the global optimal 
solution for all MINLP problems. However, in experiments, it is time consuming and 
has to be terminated before completion, returning an upper bound on the optimality gap, 
particularly for large-scale applications. One of the objectives of the proposed new 
solution method is to reduce the computing time for large-scale portfolio optimization 
to find an approximated solution that, in most cases, has an optimality gap no more than 
2% against the solution returned by applying the basic B&B algorithm. Another 
objective is for this method to be flexible enough to solve large-scale post-tax portfolio 
optimization problems, not only the proposed model of Bonami and Lejeune (2009) but 
also the proposed model of this work. 
First, the proposed MINLP problem in Section 3.3.4 is decomposed into two 
independent sub-problems, an integer programming problem and a non-linear 
programming problem, by non-linear relaxation. The non-linear component of the 
probabilistic constraint (3.28) is relaxed (removed). 
∑  3𝑗=1 ∑ 𝝁𝒌𝒋
′𝒘𝑘𝑗1
3
𝑘=1 ≥ 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛                                                                                    (3.29) 
The proposed new solution method based on the Greedy heuristics is used to solve the 
integer component and the interior point solver Ipopt (Gondzio and Grothey 2007) is 
used to solve the non-linear component. 
The classical [basic] Greedy heuristic is an algorithm that makes the locally 
optimal choice at each stage approximate to the global optimum (Cormen et al., 1990). 
This method is applicable to the proposed portfolio optimization problem. The main 
difficulty in solving the problem is the large number of binary variables in constraints 
(3.3) – (3.5) and (3.13) – (3.14). By implementing Greedy heuristics, the sensitivity of 
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the objective function to each binary variable is evaluated and ranked, choosing the one 
with the highest sensitivity for valuation (giving the binary variable a value of 0 or 1) 
and then removing the binary variable from subsequent iterations. The algorithm repeats 
this process until all binary variables are removed and an optimal integer solution is 
returned. 
As the optimal solution to each smaller instance of integer programming problem 
will provide an immediate output, the proposed algorithm doesn’t consider the larger 
problem as a whole. 15  Once a decision has been made, it is never reconsidered. 
Consequently, it reduces the number of iterations and therefore the computing time. 
However, it makes choices dependent only on choices made so far and not on future 
choices (non-anticipatory). It iteratively makes one greedy choice after another, 
reducing each given problem into a smaller one. This property makes the quality of 
solution highly sensitive to the ranking process. In fact, the order of allocation that 
depends on the ranking process determines whether the algorithm can return a global 
optimal solution. A proper ranking process is, therefore, required. This is the first major 
issue that needs to be solved. Further, to implement the Greedy heuristics for the 
proposed MINLP problem, the iterating process needs to be reprogrammed to make it 
suitable for the portfolio optimization problem, to deal with non-linear relaxation and to 
solve special cases when enumeration is pruned (stopped) by infeasibility. Solutions to 
these issues are described below.   
 
3.4.1 Improved Greedy for portfolio optimization 
The main Improved Greedy (IG) program is described in pseudo code in Table 3.2. The 
description focuses on the iteration and ranking processes (inserted comments are 
                                                          
15 In each iteration, only one binary variable is considered and solved, which is a smaller instance of the 
original integer programming problem. 
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preceded by the percentage sign, '%'). 16  The program starts by relaxing integer 
constraints only, thus reformulating the problem as a non-linear optimization (NonOpt). 
It then also relaxes the non-linear constraints and reformulates the problem as a linear 
optimization (LinOpt). LinOpt is solved first, returning an optimal objective function 
value (LinObj) of the linear problem (pseudo code line 03 in Table 3.2).17 All integer 
variables are then gathered into an 'Unsolved' set (line 04, Table 3.2). The program then 
calculates an 'impact score' (explained in the next paragraph) for each 'Unsolved' integer 
variable and selects the variable with the highest impact score (lines 05-12, Table 3.2). 
This is the variable that would be selected for integer restoration at this iteration. LinOpt 
is then solved twice, once when this selected variable is assigned an integer value of 0, 
and once when it is assigned an integer value of 1. The integer value that returns a 
higher solution is then assigned to the variable as its integer restoration at this iteration 
(lines 13-17, Table 3.2). The variable is then deemed 'Solved' and is removed from 
'Unsolved'. Fig. 3.1 is a graphical depiction of the integer restoration process of lines 
04-20 of Table 3.2. The program then moves forward to the next iteration and picks 
another 'Unsolved' variable for integer restoration (line 19, Table 3.2). This process is 
repeated until all 'Unsolved' integer variables are 'Solved' and their integer restrictions 
restored (line 20, Table 3.2). All integer solutions 'Solved' are then fed into the original 
MINLP problem and a final optimal solution is obtained by the interior point optimizer 
(Ipopt) in MATLAB v.7 (line 21, Table 3.2).   
                                                          
16 As the exact code in MATLAB v.7 is too long, only the pseudo code of the major idea is presented in 
Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. Investors can apply it in MATLAB with minor changes. 
17 For linear optimization we use lp_solve in OPTI Toolbox v.1.34 on MATLAB. 
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Table 3. 2 Main code of algorithm 
01  Relax integer constraints only and record as "NonOpt" 
02  Relax both non-linear and integer constraints and record as "LinOpt" 
03  LinObj=Opti(LinOpt)                        
% return optimal solution of LinOpt 
04  Group all integer variables into set "Unsolved" 
05  iteration=1 
06  While iteration<=N 
07  for i=1:N 
08   if i∈Unsolved 
09    Impact(i)=Gains(Var(i), Solved, LinOpt) 
% compute the impact of integer restoration of variable i 
10   end 
11   end 
12  j=find(Max(Impact))  
% return the variable with the highest impact 
13  if Opti(LinOpt, Solved, Var(j)=1)<=Opti(LinOpt, Solved, Var(j)=0) 
14   Solved(j)=0 
15  else 
16   Solved(j)=1 
17  end 
18  Remove j from Unsolved 
19  iteration=iteration+1 
20  end 
21  Obj=Opti(NonOpt, Solved)  
% return final solution with given integer values 
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Figure 3. 1 Process of integer allocation 
 
 
In ranking 'Unsolved' integer variables for selection (lines 08-10, Table 3.2) a 
formula similar to that used by Linderoth and Savelsbergh (1999) is adopted to evaluate 
how the restoration of the integrality condition impacts (decreases) the objective 
function of the portfolio optimization problem. This formula is 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝑖) =
(𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑏𝑗 − 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑖)) + 2 ∗ (𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑏𝑗 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑖)), where Max(i) is the higher of two LP 
solutions of LinOpt obtained when the unsolved integer variable is assigned a value of 0 
or 1. Min(i) is the second (lower-value) solution.  
 
3.4.2 Improved Greedy for infeasibility (Improved Greedy) 
In theory, if no Impact(i) could be returned for some variables, then the iterations would 
stop. This may occur when the integer restoration (at 0 or 1) for some integer variables 
renders the remaining LP problem infeasible. This issue affects the evaluating and 
ranking process and reduces the algorithm’s precision and efficiency. To deal with it, a 
supplementary code is added for the two possible cases of infeasibility: one-sided and 
two-sided. One-sided infeasibility occurs when only one of the integers (0 or 1) 
assigned to an integer variable renders the remaining LP problem infeasible. Two-sided 
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infeasibility is rare and would occur if both integers (0 and 1) that could be assigned to a 
certain integer variable render the problem infeasible. 
One-sided infeasibility is dealt with by switching the integer value for the 
problematic variable. If the LP problem is feasible when the variable is valued at 1 (or 0) 
but infeasible if it is valued at 0 (or 1), then the variable is integer valued at 1 (or 0) 
directly before the ranking process. This variable is then recorded as 'Solved' and 
removed from 'Unsolved'. The algorithm then continues the current iteration by 
evaluating and ranking all other 'Unsolved' variables. In this manner no more future 
iteration is required for this variable, and the resulting reduction in the total number of 
iterations improves the algorithm's efficiency. Table 3.3 describes the supplementary 
pseudo code and Fig. 3.2 provides an example of this process.18 Fig. 3.2 shows that 
while restoring the integrality restriction for a selected variable 2 in the first iteration, 
the algorithm finds variable 5 to be infeasible at the integer value of 1 but feasible at 0. 
It therefore chooses to evaluate variable 5 at 0 and moves it to 'Solved'. This is 
considered as a solution to an 'iteration' that takes precedence and is, thus, recorded as 
iteration 1. The algorithm then continues to solve the integrality restriction of variable 2 
as iteration 2. 
  
                                                          
18 The digits on the left hand side of Table 3.3 are code line numbers relating to those in Table 3.2. For 
example, line 08.01 is line 01 of supplementary code to be inserted after line 08 in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3. 3 Additional code for one-sided infeasibility 
08.01  inf=0 
08.02  if Opti(LinOpt, Solved, Var(i)=1)==infeasible 
      % Check whether the selected variable is feasible at 1 for linear problem 
08.03    solved(i)=0 
08.04    inf=inf+1 
08.05  end 
08.06  if Opti(LinOpt, Solved, Var(i)=0)==infeasible 
      % Check whether the selected variable is feasible at 0 for linear problem 
08.07    solved(i)=1 
08.08    inf=inf+1 
08.09  end 
08.10  if inf==0  
      % Two-sided feasibility 
09.01  elseif inf==1  
% One-sided infeasibility only 
09.02  iteration=iteration+1 
09.03    Remove i from Unsolved 
09.04  end 
 
Figure 3. 2 Process for one-sided infeasibility (inf: infeasible; fea: feasible) 
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A more involved procedure is adopted to deal with two-sided infeasibility. If in 
the evaluation process the algorithm finds a variable infeasible at both 0 and 1, it reverts 
to the prior iteration (to the previous 'Solved' variable). It then switches the integer 
restoration of that iteration's variable to 0 (or 1) if it had been previously 'Solved' or 
restored to 1 (or 0) and treats the integer 1 (or 0) as 'cancelled' for this variable. If, 
however, the algorithm attempts to switch the integer to an already 'cancelled' value, it 
then reverts further back one iteration and repeats the check on the variable of that 
iteration. This process continues until an integer restoration is found to solve the 
infeasibility. All integer allocations and references to subsequent iterations will then be 
cleaned, and the algorithm is allowed to resume its iterations. In the extreme case where 
all previous iterations have 'cancelled' integers due to infeasibility, an error will be 
returned by the algorithm and the original MINLP problem is considered infeasible. 
Table 3.4 presents the relevant supplementary pseudo code, and Fig. 3.3 depicts an 
example of this idea. In Fig. 3.3, variable 6 at iteration 4 is found to be infeasible at both 
0 and 1 (two-sided infeasibility). The algorithm clears this iteration and reverts back to 
the preceding iteration, 3. It switches the integer solution of variable 1 but finds the 
variable infeasible with this switch. The algorithm then clears this iteration and reverts 
back to iteration 2. It finds variable 4 not previously tested at integer 0 (as it had been 
previously 'Solved' at 1). It changes the integer restoration of this variable to 0 and 
refers to the previous solution of 1 as 'cancelled'. The algorithm then resumes the 
'forward' iteration process. This improves the algorithm’s precision by preventing it 
from returning an incorrect solution that the model is infeasible.  
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Table 3. 4 Additional code for two-sided infeasibility 
09.03.01  elseif inf==2  
          % Two-sided infeasibility 
09.03.02   Revert back to the closest iteration which has no record of cancellation 
09.03.03   Turn back to the status at the end of that iteration 
09.03.04   Assign the opposite integer value to the variable of that iteration 
09.03.05   Record this cancellation 
09.03.06   Clean all records subsequent to this iteration 
09.03.07   Terminate current iteration 
 
Figure 3. 3 Process for two-sided infeasibility 
 
 
3.4.3 Improved Greedy with precision (Improved Precision) 
In addition, the effectiveness of the proposed solution may be affected by the initial 
non-linear relaxation imposed when searching for integer solutions. The relaxation used 
in the proposed algorithm is simple, and the two sub-problems, integer and non-linear 
relaxations, are separated completely. However, the gap between these two separate 
steps leads to some errors in integer valuation, especially when an extremely high 
confidence level (pmin ≥99.5%) is set to control risk. As these errors may downgrade the 
algorithm’s performance, a more advanced relaxation method is applied to combine 
these two sub-problems and to improve precision. 
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This is carried out by adding a new test in the code whenever the variable with the 
highest impact is found. This test checks whether the integer solution obtained from a 
certain iteration is feasible and optimal with non-linear restoration. In the test, at the end 
of each ranking process, the top-ranked variable with non-linear, rather than linearized, 
constraints is re-optimized to ensure the variable is integer valued properly. In other 
words, the second evaluation stage within each iteration is carried out using an NLP 
rather than the LP of the improved Greedy described above. Thus, ranking is carried out 
by LP and integer evaluation is carried out by NLP. Table 3.5 shows the relevant code. 
The infeasibility test in the previous section is copied while changing the examined 
problem from "LinOpt" to "NonOpt". This code is used to eliminate the gap between 
integer and non-linear programming. Although the coding here is not complicated, this 
new relaxation method improves the algorithm’s quality even though the repeated non-
linearity test doubles the computing time.  
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Table 3. 5 Additional and replacement code to improve precision 
12.01  inf=0 
12.02  if Opti(NonOpt, Solved, Var(j)=1)==infeasible 
          %Check whether selected variable is feasible for non-linear problem at 1 
12.03    solved(j)=0 
12.04    inf=inf+1 
12.05  end 
12.06  if Opti(NonOpt, Solved, Var(j)=0)==infeasible 
          %Check whether selected variable is feasible for non-linear problem at 0 
12.07    solved(j)=1 
12.08    inf=inf+1 
12.09  end 
12.10  if inf==2 
12.11    Follow the same action as in the case of two-sided infeasibility 
12.12    elseif inf==0 
13.    if Opti(NonOpt, Solved, Var(j)=1)<=Opti(NonOpt, Solved, Var(j)=0) 
17.01  end 
 
3.4.4 Computational results 
Similar to the work of Bonami and Lejeune (2009), the two new methods, the Improved 
Greedy and the Improved Precision, are compared with BONMIN B&B v.1.5, which is 
a NLP-based branch-and-bound algorithm from MATLAB/OPTI Toolbox v.1.34, and 
TOMLAB/CPLEX v.12.1, which is an approximation branch-and-bound approach that 
utilizes an interior point algorithm to solve second-order cone optimization problems. A 
similar structure of comparison among all four algorithms is used. For NLP problems, 
the two new algorithms use the interior point optimizer Ipopt v.3.10 in MATLAB/OPTI 
Toolbox v.1.34. All empirical work is performed on an IBM X201 with Intel Dual-Core 
i5 2.4GHz CPU, 3GB of RAM, and running Windows 7 and MATLAB 7. 
The investigation on the effect of taxes in Section 3.5 uses actual financial market 
data sourced from DataStream. More detail on the data is provided in Section 3.5. The 
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performance comparison of algorithms conducted in this section, however, is carried out 
by constructing a test bed that uses simulated data to ensure that extreme cases that may 
not be present in the actual data are considered. The test bed itself consists of 108 
portfolio optimization experiments/portfolios/instances divided into 6 size groups by 
number of assets: 18 instances/portfolios with 9 assets each, 18 instances with 18 assets 
each, 18 with 36, 18 with 72, 18 with 144, and 18 with 288. In each instance the 
prescribed minimum return level, Rmin, is set equal to 5%, the tax rates for assets are all 
set equal to 40% or 60%, and the prescribed reliability level, pmin, is set between 60% 
and 99%. For simplicity, asset returns are assumed to follow a normal distribution.19 All 
problem instances are modeled using the AMPL modeling language. Table 3.6 presents 
problem statistics of the six portfolio groups. The largest problem considered contains 
288 assets, 2604 variables, of which 291 are binary, and 4814 total constraints, of which 
874 are non-linear inequalities and 589 are non-linear equalities (linear constraints with 
binary variables are classified as non-linear). 
Table 3. 6 Problem statistics 
Total 
Assets  
Total 
Variables  
Total  
Constraints  
Binary 
Variables  
Non-linear 
Inequality  
Non-linear 
Equality  
9  93  191  12  37  31  
18  174  341  21  64  49  
36  336  641  39  118  85  
72  660  1241  75  226  157  
144  1308  2441  147  442  301  
288  2604  4814  291  874  589  
 
The comparison is conducted on both efficiency and precision, based on 
computing time and solution’s quality, respectively. Bonami and Lejeune’s procedure is 
adopted. The main results are given in Table 3.7. The 'Name' column lists the portfolio 
                                                          
19 This assumption can be relaxed to perhaps include positively-skewed distributions without altering the 
nature of the problem (see Bonami and Lejeune, 2009). 
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instances where one or more algorithm exhibits an optimality gap (digits to the left of 
the underscore denote the number of assets in a problem instance, and digits to the right 
denote the number, out of 18, of that portfolio instance). In each problem instance, four 
optimal solutions are returned by four algorithms. One solution to a particular problem 
instance is defined as 'high quality' if it is not worse than any of other three solutions. 
For these high quality solutions, there is a zero optimality gap (recorded as “*” in the 
columns of Table 3.7 entitled “Optimality Gap”). So, a solution to a particular problem 
instance is defined as 'low quality' if it exhibits a non-zero optimality gap relative to the 
high-quality solution of that problem instance. In Table 3.7 these are reported as a 
percentage, or denoted by 'NS' or 'INF'. A reported percentage figure measures how 
much lower the optimal objective function value of a low quality solution is relative to 
that obtained by a high quality solution. 'NS' denotes no solution returned within 9 
hours, and 'INF' denotes an infeasible problem. Fig. 3.4 provides a summary of the 
algorithms solution quality reported in Table 3.8. The vertical axis is the proportion of 
experiments in which each respective algorithm returns a high-quality solution, and the 
horizontal axis is the number of assets in every set of experiments. BONMIN and 
CPLEX return high quality solutions in all experiments with 36 assets or less, while my 
two new algorithms return a high quality solution for around 81% of experiments of this 
size. The Improved Greedy exhibits a maximum optimality gap of 8% and an average of 
only 3.3% and when pmin of the stochastic opportunity constraint is set at a high level of 
95% (Table 3.7). It returns an INF only in cases when pmin is set at the extremely high 
level of 99%. Such a high confidence level for stochastic risk enlarges the gap between 
integer and non-linear programming under linear relaxation and the algorithm will 
provide a wrong solution. In these two cases, the Improved Precision outperforms the 
Improved Greedy but still underperforms BONMIN and CPLEX. But when the number 
of assets increases beyond 36, a sudden decline is observed in the relative performance 
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of BONMIN and CPLEX. With 72 assets, the Improved Greedy retains its performance 
at 81%. BONMIN and CPLEX match this performance, but the Improved Precision 
outperforms all three algorithms, returning a high quality solution in 100% of cases. 
With 144 assets BONMIN's and CPLEX's performance decline to 43% and 61%, 
respectively, while the Improved Greedy performs at 89% and the Improved Precision 
performs at 81%. With 288 assets, only the Improved Greedy returns solutions, and it 
does so at its consistent level of performance of above 89%. 
 
Figure 3. 4 Solution quality: percentage of instances in which a high-quality solution is returned 
within nine hours 
 
 
Thus, although the Improved Greedy does not attain the quality of BONMIN and 
CPLEX for small portfolio problems, it consistently provides high quality solutions, 
even for large portfolio problems, in over 81% of cases. Similar to Bonami and Lejeune 
(2009) and Lejeune and Samatlı-Paç (2012), my results show that neither BONMIN's 
B&B nor CPLEX are efficient for large-scale portfolio optimizations. The solution 
quality of the former decreases sharply from 100% to 0% as the number of assets 
increases from 36 to 288, mainly because time requirements terminate its iterating 
process before convergence, and no solution is returned. The solution quality of CPLEX 
9 18 36 72 144 288
BONMIN 100% 100% 100% 81% 43% 0%
Improved Greedy 81% 81% 81% 81% 89% 89%
Improved Precision 81% 81% 88% 100% 81% 0%
CPLEX 12.1 100% 100% 100% 81% 61% 0%
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also decreases with increasing number of assets. This is because the general 
approximation method can only return a local optimal solution in a reasonable period of 
time as the number of integers increase. This holds an optimality gap from the solution 
found by the new algorithm. 
Table 3.7 summarizes the quality of all solutions against number of assets for the 
six groups of experiments. Fig. 3.5 presents the average computing time expended in 
finding a high quality solution (only). An upper bound on computing time is set at 
32400 seconds (9 hours). The figure shows that all four algorithms return a high-quality 
solution in a reasonably short time when no more than 72 assets are considered in the 
optimization. When this number doubles to 144, however, differences between the 
algorithms become apparent. Improved Greedy retains its efficiency while the time for 
the other three methods, particularly for BONMIN's B&B, increases dramatically. 
When the number of assets is increased to 288, only the Improved Greedy is able to 
return a solution and with an average computing time of 12,129.88 seconds (3.4 hours), 
which would normally be acceptable for a tax or a portfolio balancing exercise. None of 
the other algorithms could return a solution within an extended upper limit of 72,000 
seconds (20 hours).  
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Figure 3. 5 Speed and scalability: average computing time for a high-quality solution 
 
 
In summary, similar to the conclusion reached by Bonami and Lejeune (2009), a 
dynamic iterating process can solve large-scale portfolio optimizations under MINLP 
more efficiently than general B&B and approximation methods. The dynamic process is 
redesigned in a Greedy framework and tailored to more complex post-tax portfolio 
optimization problems. The computational results lead to the conclusion that the new 
solution method, Improved Greedy, is more reliable and efficient than BONMIN's B&B 
and CPLEX for the large-scale portfolio problems. Investors can obtain a high-quality 
solution within a reasonable period of time in most instances using PCs.  
9 18 36 72 144 288
BONMIN 13.72 170.72 710.23 2243.68 65210.45
Improved Greedy 3.04 8.46 29.50 105.81 891.35 12129.88
Improved Precision 11.04 132.04 509.19 1525.90 25430.24
CPLEX 12.1 6.78 72.03 360.13 1203.11 28213.23
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Table 3. 7 Computational results for instances showing an optimality gap 
   BONMIN 
B&B 
CPLEX 
12.1 
Improved  
Greedy 
Improved 
 Precision 
   BONMIN 
B&B 
CPLEX  
12.1 
Improved  
Greedy 
Improved 
Precision 
Name Confidence 
Level 
 (pmin, %) 
Tax 
Rate (%) 
Optimality 
Gap (%) 
Optimality 
Gap (%) 
Optimality 
Gap (%) 
Optimality 
Gap (%) 
Name Confidence 
Level 
 (pmin, %) 
Tax 
Rate (%) 
Optimality 
Gap (%) 
Optimality 
Gap (%) 
Optimality 
Gap (%) 
Optimality 
Gap (%) 
9_15 95 40 * * 7.1 4.2 144_16 95 60 NS NS * NS 
9_16 95 60 * * 8.0 6.3 144_17 99 40 NS NS INF NS 
9_17 99 40 * * INF 9.8 144_18 99 60 NS NS INF NS 
9_18 99 60 * * INF 15.1 288_01 60 40 NS NS * NS 
18_15 95 40 * * 2.5 0.5 288_02 60 60 NS NS * NS 
18_16 95 60 * * 4.1 0.9 288_03 65 40 NS NS * NS 
18_17 99 40 * * INF 6.5 288_04 65 60 NS NS * NS 
18_18 99 60 * * INF 9.1 288_05 70 40 NS NS * NS 
36_15 95 40 * * 1.4 * 288_06 70 60 NS NS * NS 
36_16 95 60 * * 1.8 * 288_07 75 40 NS NS * NS 
36_17 99 40 * * INF 5.0 288_08 75 60 NS NS * NS 
36_18 99 60 * * INF 5.8 288_09 80 40 NS NS * NS 
72_15 95 40 * 11.3 0.7 * 288_10 80 60 NS NS * NS 
72_16 95 60 * 8.6 1.1 * 288_11 85 40 NS NS * NS 
72_17 99 40 NS 15.2 INF * 288_12 85 60 NS NS * NS 
72_18 99 60 NS 6.8 INF * 288_13 90 40 NS NS * NS 
144_11 85 40 NS 9.9 * * 288_14 90 60 NS NS * NS 
144_12 85 60 NS * * * 288_15 95 40 NS NS * NS 
144_13 90 40 NS 15.3 * * 288_16 95 60 NS NS * NS 
144_14 90 60 NS 8.8 * * 288_17 99 40 NS NS INF NS 
144_15 95 40 NS NS * NS 288_18 99 60 NS NS INF NS 
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3.5 Influence of Taxation on Personal Portfolio Management 
In this section, influences of tax policy are examined under the set-up outlined in 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Market data are obtained from Thomson Reuters DataStream for 
these investigations.  
 
3.5.1 Personal portfolio: data 
Each of the high-level asset classes, equity, bond (corporate) and commodity segment 
of the U.K. market, is divided into subclasses. Equities are categorized by industry 
sector. All corporate bonds currently active in the market are divided into two groups 
first: investment grade and high yield. Each group is further divided into industrial 
subclasses (airline, technology, telecommunications … etc.). Commodities are 
categorized by product type (e.g., oil, gold, copper, corn … etc.). This generates 30 
classes of U.K. shares, 7 of corporate bonds and 18 of commodities for each account 
(onshore investment bond, offshore investment bond and unit trust). All these 
subclasses are represented by a corresponding market index. Historical annual income 
(yield for bonds and dividend for equities) and capital gains of the market indexes are 
obtained from Datastream for the period 1990 through 2011. Bond market data (yield 
and capital gains) are from Barclay’s bond index. Equity data (dividend and capital 
gains) are from FTSE for the U.K., US-DS Price Index for the U.S., and FTSEUR1ST 
300 for the E.U. Data of commodities (capital gains) is from S&P commodity index. 
These are then used to calculate average returns and the covariance of related assets 
within their respective asset classes. All the relevant settings of the parameters in the 
model are presented in Table 3.8.   
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Table 3. 8 Investment settings for portfolio management 
Taxation  
 
Amount (%)  
Offshore  𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓 40 
Onshore  𝑡𝑎𝑛 22 
Onshore  𝑡𝑜𝑛 18 
unit trust  𝒕𝑖𝑛 40 
unit trust  𝐺𝑇 40 
unit trust  𝐺𝑇+1 38 
Fees  
 
Amount (%)  
Annual Fees  𝑚1(Offshore) 1 
 
𝑚2(Onshore) 2 
 
𝑚3(Unit trust) 3 
Transaction Costs                     𝑐 1 
Initial Wealth  
 
Amount (%)  
New Investment  𝒘10, 𝒘20, 𝒘30(Portfolio) 0 
 
𝐶0(Cash) 100 
Rebalance  𝒘10, 𝒘20, 𝒘30(Portfolio) 100 (equally distributed)  
 
𝐶0(Cash) 0 
Note: 𝒕𝑖𝑛 is a vector of tax rates applied to different underlying asset in the account 
3.5.2 Personal portfolio: results 
Initially, all tax rates are kept the same as specified in the initial settings. Each tax rate 
is then gradually varied in each round in order to test its effect on overall portfolio 
composition. 
Figs. 3.6–3.8 show the resulting weights (change in wealth) at different tax rates 
for equities, corporate bonds and commodities, respectively. Figs. 3.10–3.12 show the 
resulting weights (change in wealth) at different tax rates for offshore bonds, onshore 
bonds and unit trusts, respectively. The horizontal dotted lines show the cases when 
optimization ignores taxes. The word 'new' denotes a set of applications with initial 
(beginning-of-period) wealth being held in cash and a new portfolio constructed by the 
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investor through optimization. In Fig. 3.9, the word 'existing' denotes a bequest portfolio 
that requires rebalancing at the beginning of the investment horizon. 
Some important observations can be made from Figs. 3.6–3.8. First, the inclusion 
of taxes in portfolio optimization has a large effect, on average, on portfolio 
composition (asset weights). This general finding is consistent with previous research. 
What this analysis adds, however, is that when the effective tax rate is similar across 
assets (e.g., 40%), little or no difference is observed between the results of post-tax and 
pre-tax optimizations, but this difference changes dramatically when taxes for different 
products vary around 40%. Accordingly, the optimal investment strategy is sensitive to 
different tax rates across products. For example, in the setting when the corresponding 
tax decreases to 20%, investments in corporate bonds and commodities increase far 
more rapidly than those in equities. When taxes decrease further to 0%, it is the 
investments in equities instead, that increase more rapidly. Further, from the shape of 
the curve in Figs. 3.6-3.8, it is proved that the variation across different tax rates in the 
optimal weights for commodities is higher than that for corporate bonds and equities. 
This is a direct result of their relatively higher, on average, return and risk.  
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Figure 3. 6 Influence of tax on equities 
 
Figure 3. 7 Influence of tax on corporate bonds 
 
Figure 3. 8 Influence of tax on commodities 
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Second, Fig. 3.9 shows the difference in optimal portfolio composition between new 
and rebalanced investments. This represents the difference in weights of the three asset 
classes between the 'new' and 'existing' portfolios at different tax rates. One main 
observation from the figure is that the difference is small.  
Figure 3. 9 Difference between new and existing portfolio 
 
Finally, Figs. 3.10-3.12 show that the inclusion of different tax rules through 
investment accounts (onshore and offshore investment bonds and unit trusts) has a very 
limited effect on this single period portfolio optimization. As the tax rates on asset 
classes change (in analysis it is assumed that both income and capital gains tax rates on 
an asset class in each account are perturbed in equal increments), the total investment in 
each account remains almost the same. For example, in Fig. 3.11 the total investment in 
the onshore investment bond account remains around 35% no matter how the tax rate on 
equities changes.  
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Figure 3. 10 Influence of equity tax on investment account 
 
Figure 3. 11 Influence of corporate bond tax on investment account 
 
Figure 3. 12 Influence of commodity tax on investment account 
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3.5.3 Personal portfolio: implications 
Some implications can be inferred from the empirical results. First, the weights at 
different tax rates (Figs. 3.6-3.8), show that taxation plays a more critical role in 
portfolio optimization for riskier investment assets (e.g. commodities). Second, a 
decrease in tax rates usually increases the optimal weights of assets, but this relationship 
is neither linear nor perfectly convex over the entire range of possible tax rates. The 
implication is that earlier studies that assume a perfectly convex relationship between 
tax rates and portfolio weights by simplifying tax rules impose simplistic tax 
consequences and err in their consideration of the true effect of taxes (e.g., Elton and 
Gruber, 1978). 
Further, from Fig. 3.9, given that the two main factors that distinguish these two 
investments are transaction fees and withdrawal tax, it can be concluded that neither of 
these factors has a large effect on the final investment strategy. However, a difference 
exists at high tax rates and rises (especially for corporate bonds and commodities) as tax 
rates increase. Thus, even in a single-period model, there is a potential loss from instant 
withdrawal tax when the rate of this tax is high. 
Finally, from Figs. 3.10-3.12, it is clear that in a single period optimization (new 
or rebalance), the long-term advantages of tax rules in onshore and offshore investment 
bond accounts are ignored. Thus, as the tax rates change for all three asset classes, only 
the portfolio composition in each account changes, while the total investment in each 
account remains more or less the same. In conclusion, long-term investors who use 
multi-stage optimization should consider investment accounts with different tax 
treatments, but short-term investors who use single-stage optimization can safely 
exclude them to simplify the model. 
In summary, there is evidence that taxation plays a significant role in portfolio 
management, particularly when tax rates differ across products. Further, the relationship 
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between tax and optimal portfolio composition is neither linear nor convex. Thus, 
mathematical programming methods have an obvious advantage over theoretical 
methods in this area. In addition, withdrawal tax should not be ignored when related tax 
rates are high, even in a single-period investment horizon. Finally, investors’ preference 
for certain assets is significantly influenced by its tax rate. Accordingly, tax policy 
setters can use the framework presented to estimate quantitative effects of the change of 
tax policy to avoid excessive capital outflow of, or excessive demand for, relevant 
financial products. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
A post-tax portfolio optimization model is developed with integer-based trading 
constraints. In order to examine the real influence of income tax on portfolio 
management, a number of realistic trading constraints are incorporated. These include: 
the need for diversification, requirements on both the number of assets in a portfolio and 
the maximum holdings in single assets, round-lot buying, and taxation on cash 
withdrawals peculiar to the specific personal investments considered (the last two are 
modeled with integer variables). Bonami and Lejeune’s (2009) model is used to account 
for the risk in estimating expected asset returns through a stochastic constraint that 
ensures the expected return of the portfolio exceeds a pre-specified threshold with a 
high confidence level. I am unaware of other research that considers so broad a range of 
trading rules for post-tax portfolio optimization in a single model. Hence, this is a more 
realistic simulation than prior work, and quantifies better the influence of tax on 
personal investments.  
One key contribution of this chapter is that it innovates on the basic Greedy 
heuristic, making it available for post-tax portfolio optimization problems in which 
stochastic risk and realistic market restrictions modeled with integer constraints are 
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simultaneously considered. The combination of integer and nonlinear constraints 
explains the complexity involved in solving such problems under large-scale 
applications for which very few solvers are efficient. The efficacy of the approach on 
more than 50 problems containing up to 288 assets is evaluated, and the computational 
results provide evidence of its efficiency in two aspects: precision of solution and 
required computing time.  
Regarding the role of tax in financial markets, it is found that income tax has an 
obvious impact on portfolio optimization for investors, which supports the conclusion 
of existing theoretical work. The mathematical programming in this chapter shows that 
realistic trading constraints, tax rates and portfolio composition have a complex 
relationship that is neither linear nor convex. Convexity assumptions often made in the 
literature to guarantee optimality, therefore, are not only unrealistic but also erroneous 
simplifications. This is the main advantage of this work over prior theoretical research 
on post-tax portfolio optimization. In addition, in the investigation on effects of 
withdrawal tax, it is found that for single-period optimization, this factor has a limited 
influence. Investors can simplify the optimization model by ignoring withdrawal tax 
without changing the optimal solution significantly. Finally, the analysis shows that 
investors’ preference for a certain asset is significantly influenced by its tax rate. The 
model is, therefore, useful to tax policy setters.  
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Chapter 4 - Quantitative Effects of Differential Tobin and Withholding 
Tax on Global Financial Markets 
 
This chapter investigates the quantitative effects of investment taxes and Tobin tax on 
capital flows between regional markets. An optimization model is proposed to 
maximize the expected net Sharpe ratio and find the optimal risky portfolio across tax 
jurisdictions. Complex trading and tax rules are considered. To examine the effects of 
different investment and transaction tax rules, a comparison of four tax settings is 
presented; namely, source only, residence only, mixed with credit, and mixed with 
double taxation. The experimental results show that a source only tax union has more 
capital transits between regional markets than a residence only tax union, and its 
optimal market portfolio is more sensitive to regional tax policy. In a mixed tax system, 
double taxation between residence- and source-taxed jurisdictions significantly reduces 
the attraction of the latter, while its attraction is maintained with the credit method. 
Tobin tax can reduce market volatility but the effect varies with its rate, certain market 
specifications (e.g., expected returns and correlations with overseas markets), and 
investment tax rules. This effect does not depend on which side of the capital flow 
(inflow or outflow) is subject to Tobin tax. Finally, an agreement between countries on 
a Tobin tax rate (policy) can significantly reduce the negative effect of Tobin tax on 
capital flows while retaining its positive effect on market stability in comparison to 
heterogeneous Tobin tax rates. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As explained in 2.2.1, the extant literature on the macro-level impact of tax can be 
divided into two main categories. One is the analysis of government tax revenues 
(Saunoris and Payneb, 2010; Creedy and Sanz-Sanzb, 2011). The other, to which this 
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chapter relates, concerns international tax-driven capital flows, and often compares the 
two main withholding tax systems: source-based and residence-based. In a source-based 
tax system, all investments in a country are taxed only by the government of that 
country, regardless of the residency of the investor. In a residence-based tax system, all 
investments are taxed only by the investor’s country of residence regardless of the 
investment location.  
A comparison between these two tax systems can be made by observing the 
change in the two components of a country’s balance of payments, namely the external 
current account and the financial account. 20  A current account surplus increases a 
country's net foreign assets whereas a current account deficit reduces them. Bovenberg 
(1992) explores how residence- and source-based taxes on income affect the external 
current account in small open economies.  
Most research on the impact of tax employs statistical methods (Bovenberg, 1992, 
1986; Becher and Fuest, 2008, 2010, 2011; Summers, 1988; Desai and Hines, 2004; 
Liption and Sachs, 1983; Mutti and Grubert, 1985; Goulder and Eichengreen, 1989; 
Bovenberg and Goulder, 1989; and Keuschnigg, 1991), although some work adopts 
analytical methods, the so-called theoretical research (Becher and Fuest, 2011; Desai 
and Hines, 2004; Becker and Fuest, 2008; Becker and Fuest, 2010). The statistical 
method usually assumes a constant correlation coefficient between the investment 
decision and the corresponding tax factor. This assumption, however, does not always 
apply in the real world, particularly in a complex tax environment. For example, the 
results in Chapter 3 show that an increase in tax rate (e.g. 0.1) may lead to a quite 
different effect on investors’ optimal portfolio with different initial rate (e.g. 0.4 to 0.5 
and 0.5 to 0.6) even if all other factors are held constant. This proves that two identical 
                                                          
20Current account: the current account consists of the balance of trade, net factor income (earnings on 
foreign investments minus payments made to foreign investors) and net cash transfers. Financial account: 
the financial account reflects net change in ownership of national assets. 
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changes in the tax rate (both increase by 0.1) of an asset class will not lead to the same 
change on its weight in the optimal portfolio if the initial tax rate is not the same. 
Therefore the correlation coefficient between the optimal weight on an asset class and 
the corresponding tax factor (tax rate) is not constant. Furthermore, although the 
theoretical research is better able to examine the variable sensitivity of investment 
decisions to the corresponding tax rules, it does not usually employ real market data. 
Chapter 4 uses a simulation method, mathematical programming. This research method 
is more appropriate than statistical and analytical methods for many investigations. In 
the mathematical programming approach, for example, the variable sensitivity of 
investment decisions to the corresponding tax settings can be investigated. And the 
mathematical work can use real market data.  
In Chapter 4, an optimization model is first constructed to simulate the investment 
process of investors with different tax brackets, and the change in the aggregate demand 
of an asset class when its tax rate is cut or enhanced. The model is then used to compare 
the two withholding tax systems (residence- and source-based) by observing their 
differential tax-driven capital flows. In contrast to the literature on real industry 
investments, this thesis focuses on the capital flow for financial market investments. 
How a source-based tax system influences the volatility of global financial markets is 
investigated. The thesis also investigates whether a country applying source-based tax 
would benefit from joining an international tax union with other countries applying 
residence-based tax and if so, to what extent. Furthermore, whether a change from a 
pure residence-based tax union to a pure source-based tax union for developed countries 
would enhance the globalization of financial markets is also investigated. 
Tobin tax has been a controversial topic among economists and politicians (e.g., 
Habermeier and Kirilenko, 2003).   Researchers disagree on the consequences of a 
Tobin-style tax for price volatility and market efficiency. Some argue that such a tax 
 99 
 
would improve market efficiency by decreasing price volatility (Ehrenstein et al., 2005; 
Cipriani and Guarino, 2008) while others argue that it would be detrimental to market 
efficiency by increasing price volatility (Aliber et al., 2003; Mannaro et al., 2008). 
Haberer (2006), however, presents a U-shaped relationship between price volatility and 
market trading volume. The likely reduction in market volume due to the introduction 
of a Tobin-style tax has different consequences for price volatility depending on relative 
market volume. 
The majority of articles on trading volume conclude that the introduction of a 
Tobin tax would reduce trading volume by decreasing transactions carried out by 
speculators (Mannaro et al., 2008; Hanke et al., 2010). However, Hanke et al. (2010) 
show that the size of this reduction is highly sensitive to market capitalization.  
A question which arises from the work of Hanke et al. (2010) is whether the 
impact of a Tobin tax on trading volume is sensitive to investment tax rules. In the 
extant literature, the impact of a Tobin tax is considered in isolation, completely 
separate from other taxes including income tax and capital gains tax. An improved 
model is proposed to investigate the economic impact of a Tobin tax. The work shows 
whether the implementation of a Tobin tax will impose an obvious capital locking effect 
on regional markets. It also shows whether this effect is the same for all countries. Does 
the effect vary with withholding tax rules (source-based or residence-based), market 
features (trending market or volatile market), the rate of Tobin tax (consistent or 
heterogeneous Tobin tax rate globally) and the way that Tobin tax is applied (tax on 
capital inflows only, capital outflows only or both)? In the simulation, realistic market 
settings are made by integrating the Tobin tax with other tax issues, such as income tax, 
capital gains tax and withholding tax. 
Similar to the work by Mannaro et al. (2008), an artificial global financial market 
is set up in chapter 4 to integrate Tobin tax with other tax rules (both income tax and 
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capital gains tax), which is a significant improvement to the existing literature. The 
artificial market includes three regional sub-markets, E.U., U.K. and U.S., which are 
now in an international residence-based tax union, and all tax rates are set to be variable 
(the rate of the Tobin tax is set in a range of 0% to 1% while the rate of the investment 
tax21 is set in a range of 10% and 70%). The model is then used to test the differential 
effects of source- and residence-based tax systems on financial market investment. In 
this way, keeping all else the same, whether a change from source-based tax to 
residence-based tax and joining the international tax union would benefit a developing 
country which is currently applying source-based tax system can be investigated. 
Furthermore, whether a change from a residence-based tax union to a source-based tax 
union would improve the efficiency of global markets for developed countries is also 
investigated. The differential impact of the Tobin tax under heterogeneous investment 
tax rules (both tax rates and withholding tax applications) can also be tested.  
In the future, as globalization progresses further, investors may change their 
residence more frequently than nowadays, and therefore source-based international tax 
systems will be more convenient (no need to assess an investor's country of residence 
for tax purposes). For example, under residence-based tax system, if an investor makes 
an investment in the U.S. market when living there and then becomes a U.K. resident, 
the investment would be taxed by U.S. government first and then taxed by the U.K. 
government after the investor moves to the U.K. The change of taxation increases the 
administrative workload and the complexity of global taxation, particularly when the 
investor changes his country of residence relatively frequently. Under source-based tax, 
however, no matter how often the investor changes his country of residence, the 
investment will always be taxed by the U.S. government, which simplifies global 
taxation and makes it easier to operate. It is therefore possible that in the future, even 
                                                          
21 Investment tax includes income tax and capital gains tax. In experiments, the effective rates of income 
tax and capital gains tax are always changed simultaneously and referred to as the investment tax rate.  
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developed countries (e.g. the U.S. or the U.K.) might use a source-based tax system 
rather than a residence-based tax system to simplify global taxation. 
 
4.2 Capital Asset Pricing Model with Heterogeneous Tax Rules 
Trauring (1979) develops a three-fund separation theorem leading to a three-term 
Capital Asset Pricing formula. The investor’s optimal risky portfolio is a linear 
combination of three identified risky portfolios, G, D, and E, which are independent of 
investors, their utility function, and tax brackets.22 This independence does not, however, 
extend to the weights for each identified risky portfolio. These weights are functions of 
investor i’s income tax and capital gains tax brackets, and will be denoted by ai, bi, and 
ci. As a result, investors with different tax brackets will have different optimal risky 
portfolios, Yi. Trauring presents the following formula to calculate the market portfolio 
with tax: 
-1 -1 -1
1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a
n n n n
i i i i
i i i i
M G D EX b c
   
                                                              (4.1) 
where M is the so-called market portfolio, Xi is optimal portfolio for investor group i, 
  is the a matrix whose kjth element is the ratio of covariance between asset k and j to 
variance of market, and n is the number of investor groups. He further proves that the 
capitalization-weighted sum of all investors’ optimal risky portfolios provides the 
market equilibrium condition. In Trauring (1979), however, the taxation process is still 
highly simplified. An asset’s net return is calculated as (1-t)*r where only fixed tax rates 
(t) are considered while complex tax rules (annual income tax, deferred capital gains tax, 
withholding tax on foreign investment, and transaction tax) are not considered. In this 
chapter, Trauring’s work is improved by including more complex and realistic tax 
settings under mathematical programming.   
                                                          
22 Detailed definition of these three independent risk portfolios can be found in Trauring (1979). 
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An optimization model is proposed to consider heterogeneous tax rules across 
investors. To keep the model tractable, all investors are divided into only three 
residence groups: U.K., Eurozone and U.S. Investors in the same group are assumed to 
be subject to the same tax rules and hold the same optimal risky portfolio. To determine 
the market portfolio under taxation, the capitalization-weighted sum of the three local 
optimal risky portfolios is calculated. Thus:  
i i
Market
i
Capitalization Portfolio
Portfolio
Capitalization



                                                           (4.2) 
In equation (4.2), iCapitalization  is the total market capitalization of regional 
market i.  iPortfolio is the local optimal risky portfolio for regional market i. The total 
regional market capitalizations are then used as weights to calculate the weighted 
average optimal portfolio for the global market.  
As in Trauring (1979), the market portfolio M is not a unique portfolio that all 
investors hold. In fact, it is a weighted sum of the optimal portfolios Xi of different 
investor groups. Nevertheless, it can still be used to provide the composition of the 
global risky financial market if all investors with different tax brackets hold their own 
optimal portfolio and are included in the calculation of the aggregated market portfolio. 
 
4.3. Tax Rules 
This section outlines the tax setup adopted. Basic investment tax (i.e., annual income 
tax and tax on realized capital gains) is introduced together with heterogeneous Tobin 
tax and foreign investment (withholding) tax rules.  
First, the basic investment tax rules are set out. Each asset class (bonds, equities 
and commodities) in each country or region (U.K., U.S. and Eurozone, treating the 
Eurozone as a single country) is subject to an independent income tax rate and capital 
gains tax rate, which may differ across asset classes and countries. With regards to 
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income tax for bonds and equities, all income is assumed to be paid and taxed annually, 
and all net income is received in cash and can be used to purchase assets freely. Income 
tax is calculated and paid by asset, not by account.23 With regard to capital gains tax for 
bonds, equities and commodities, a single-period model is used. All capital gains tax 
can be deferred if the holding assets are not sold or ‘disposed of,’ and withdrawals from 
a holding asset are subject to an instant capital gains tax payment (withdrawal tax) 
during the rebalancing process.24 However, these deferred taxes will be calculated and 
deducted from total return to get net return at the end of the period in the model. The 
calculation is in respect of each individual asset, not for the whole account. All the tax 
rates are initially set at 40%, the middle of the range (also the average tax rate 
historically for individuals in the U.K. and the U.S.; see KPMG’s website), but are 
allowed to vary between 0% and 100%.25 All returns from the risk-free asset (i.e., 3-
month treasury bills), whether in the form of income or capital gains, are assumed to be 
free of tax. 
As introduced in Section 1.3.2, source-based taxation is justified on the grounds 
that the country which provides the opportunity to generate income or profits should 
have the right to tax it. Residence-based taxation is justified on the grounds that people 
and firms should contribute towards the public services provided by the country where 
they live, on all their income regardless of the location of its source.  
Consider two countries in a mixed international tax environment, one adopting a 
residence-based tax system and the other adopting a source-based tax system. Two 
different methods are required to calculate the effective tax rate: the credit method and 
the double taxation method.  
                                                          
23Account: all assets subject to the same tax rules are put in one group (named as account) and are subject 
to the same tax constraints, e.g., U.K. bonds, U.S. equities, .., etc. 
24 In this work, the withdrawal tax is the same as capital gains tax. All withdrawals from the sale of assets 
are subject to capital gains tax. 
25 Accessible at http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/pages/individual-
income-tax-rates-table.aspx. 
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In the experiments, all three regions (U.K., U.S. and E.U.) are initially assumed to 
be a residence-based tax system, which conforms to the present situation. However, 
some of them are then replaced by a source-based tax system to investigate the impact 
of heterogeneous withholding tax on market performance.  
Finally, when capital moves from one country to another, a Tobin tax may be 
payable. All transfers within one country are not subject to the Tobin tax. In the model, 
three different Tobin tax rules are investigated: ‘inflow tax only’ whereby investors are 
required to pay the Tobin tax to the country if and only if they transfer capital into it; 
‘outflow tax only’ whereby investors are required to pay the Tobin tax to the country if 
and only if they transfer capital out of it; and ‘two-side tax’ whereby investors are 
required to pay the Tobin tax to the country if they transfer capital either into it or out of 
it. Some other assumptions are also applied.26 
 
4.4. Problem Constraints and Objective Functions 
 
4.4.1. Basic trading constraints 
All the notation used in the following exposition is explained in Table 4.1 
  
                                                          
26The following are also assumed: all investors have the same available international asset classes; there is 
no exchange rate risk; total global wealth is constant; the regional supply of asset units is constant (i.e., 
there are no stock splits, rights issues or other new issues); an asset’s demand increases if its weight in the 
aggregated market portfolio is higher; and the asset supply is inelastic so a percentage change in asset 
weights corresponds to the percentage change in capitalization; international tax is simplified (ignoring 
annual exemption allowances); ‘Eurozone bond’ is index of French and German corporate and 
government bonds; ‘Eurozone’ uses one tax rate for one asset class; no capital flow restriction or friction; 
single period model; only consider risky assets; ‘assets’ are not securities but investible asset classes.   
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Table 4. 1 Notation 
𝟏 = (1,1, . . . ,1)′ 
𝒖′𝒗 = 𝑢1𝑣1 + 𝑢2𝑣2+. . . +𝑢𝑛𝑣𝑛 (inner product) 
𝒖 ∘ 𝒗 = (𝑢1𝑣1, 𝑢2𝑣2, . . . , 𝑢𝑛𝑣𝑛)
′ (Hadamard product) 
𝑛𝑘 number of investment assets in account k  
𝑓𝑘𝑗 percentage paid in management fees for the account of class k and country j  
?̅?𝑘𝑗 expected dividends or income returns for the account of class k and country j  
𝒈
𝑘𝑗
 expected capital gains for the account of class k and country j  
𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗
 capital gains tax for the account of class k and country j  
𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗𝑚
 capital gains tax for the account of class k and country j for group m 
𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗𝑚
 annual income tax for the account of class k and country j for group m 
𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗
 annual income tax for the account of class k and country j 
𝑡𝑗
𝑖𝑛 Tobin tax on capital inflows to the country j  
𝑡𝑗
𝑜𝑢𝑡 Tobin tax on capital outflows from the country j 
𝑹 𝒌𝟎
𝒋𝒎
 initial cumulative capital gains for the account of class k and country j for 
group m 𝑇𝑘0
𝑗𝑚
 initial accumulated tax in the account of class k and country j for group m 
𝒘𝑘0
𝑗𝑚
 initial amount of wealth held in each asset for group m 
⅀ covariance of assets  
𝐶0𝑗𝑚 External funding for local investment at the beginning of the period 
𝐶0𝑚 external funding for overseas investment at the beginning of the period  
𝑹𝑘1
𝑗𝑚
 cumulative returns for the account of class k and country j after withdrawals  
𝑇𝑘2
𝑗𝑚
 final accumulated tax for the account of class k and country j  
𝑇𝑅𝑘𝑗𝑚
  net redemption value obtained from the account of class k and country j  
𝒘𝑘1
𝑗𝑚
 amount of money held in each asset after rebalancing 
𝒘𝑘2
𝑗𝑚
 final amount of money held in each asset  
𝒍𝑘𝑗𝑚
𝑏  amount of money spent to buy an asset locally 
𝒊𝑘𝑗𝑚
𝑏  amount of money spent to buy an asset internationally 
𝒍𝑘𝑗𝑚
𝑠  amount of money obtained when selling an asset locally 
𝒊𝑘𝑗𝑚
𝑠  amount of money obtained when selling an asset internationally 
𝒙𝑘𝑗𝑚
2  withdrawal from capital gains of assets for international transits 
𝒙𝑘𝑗𝑚
3  withdrawal taken from the initial capital international transits 
𝑿𝑘𝑗𝑚
2  withdrawal from capital gains of assets for local transits 
𝑿𝑘𝑗𝑚
3  withdrawal taken from the initial capital local transits 
𝜹𝒌𝒋𝒎 ∈ [0,1], variable for assets 
𝐶2𝑚 income return at the end of the period  
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a. Local trading budget 
A local trading budget (balance) constraint ensures that for all accounts, k=1, 2, 3 (note: 
1 represents commodities, 2 represents bonds and 3 represents equities), in the same 
country j, j=1, 2, 3 (note: 1 represents the U.K., 2 represents the U.S. and 3 represents 
the Eurozone), the total selling proceeds from the local market, 𝟏′𝒍𝑘𝑗𝑚
𝑠 , and the total 
external funding for the local investments, C0, are equal to the total buying costs within 
the local market, 𝟏′𝒍𝑘𝑗𝑚
𝑏 , so that:27  
∑  
𝑘
𝟏′𝒍𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝒃 = ∑  
𝑘
𝟏′𝒍𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝒔 + 𝐶0𝑗𝑚;    j, m = 1, 2, 3       (4.3) 
All local transits within the same country or region are not subject to a Tobin tax. ‘m’ 
represents the group of investors who have the same country of residence (note: 1 
represents U.K. residents, 2 represents U.S. residents and 3 represents Eurozone 
residents). 
 
b. International trading budget 
An international trading budget (balance) constraint ensures that for all accounts in all 
countries, the total international selling proceeds, 𝟏′𝒊𝑘𝑗𝑚
𝑠 , and the total external funding 
for international transits, C0m, are equal to the total international buying costs, 𝟏′𝒊𝑘𝑗𝑚
𝑏 , 
so that  
∑  
𝑘,𝑗
𝟏′𝒊𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝒃 = ∑  
𝑘,𝑗
𝟏′𝒊𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝒔 + 𝐶0𝑚;  m = 1, 2, 3 (4.4) 
All international transits between different countries are subject to Tobin tax.28 
 
c. Diversification and maximum holdings 
                                                          
27This budget includes all rebalancing activity within a single country, and we assume different asset 
classes are traded within different accounts. 
28This budget includes all rebalancing activities across countries, rebalancing investments from one 
country to another. 
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A diversification constraint is formulated by setting an upper bound on the value of 
each asset in a portfolio. Thus, 
𝒘𝒌𝟏
𝒋𝒎
≤ 𝑈 ∗ 𝜹𝒌𝒋𝒎     ∀𝑘, 𝑗, 𝑚 = 1,2,3, (4.5) 
0.0001 ∗ 𝜹𝒌𝒋𝒎 ≤ 𝒘𝒌𝟏
𝒋𝒎
     ∀𝑘, 𝑗, 𝑚 = 1,2,3, (4.6) 
where 𝑈  is the maximum holding weight for a single asset and is set equal to 0.05 in the 
optimization. If investors do not want to hold an asset in the new portfolio, the 
corresponding variable, 𝜹𝒌𝒋𝒎 ∈ [0,1] in (4.6) must be equal to zero. If investors want to 
hold an asset in the new portfolio, the corresponding variable 𝜹𝒌𝒋𝒎 in (4.5) will be non-
zero. By also setting a lower bound on the total number of assets in a portfolio, 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛, 
the firm-specific (or industry-specific) risk can be minimized in the market portfolio,  
∑ 𝟏′ 𝑘,𝑗 𝜹𝒌𝒋𝒎 ≥ 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛, m=1, 2, 3, (4.7) 
where the sum of the variables, 𝛿𝒌𝒋𝒎 ∈ [0,1], counts this number. 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛 is set at 20 in 
this work. 
 
4.4.2. Taxation 
The total tax liability is built up by calculating the impact of different tax rules on the 
cumulative returns, withdrawals and wealth.  
 
a. Source- and residence-based tax systems 
In a residence-based tax union, all investments are taxed by the country j in which the 
investment is made first, at rate 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗  on capital gains and 𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗
 on incomes. If the investor 
is resident in a different country m with higher rates of tax 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑚 and 𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑚, the gap will be 
taxed later. So the effective rate of tax on asset k in country j for an investor from 
country m is always the higher rate in the two countries on asset k. 
𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗𝑚 = max{𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗 , 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑚}, 𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗𝑚 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗 , 𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑚}     (4.8) 
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In a source-based tax union, all investments are taxed by the invested country only. 
So the effective rate of tax is always the rate in the invested country. 
𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗𝑚 = 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗
, 𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗𝑚 = 𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗
          (4.9) 
In a mixed tax system, the taxation between two countries, both under residence-
based tax system, remains the same as previously. However, there are two different 
methods for calculating taxation between countries under different tax systems. 
 
i. Credit method 
The country with a source-based tax system is assumed to have a tax agreement with the 
other two countries. So if the country in which the investment is made (the ‘invested’ 
country) implements a source-based tax system while the investor is from a different 
country with residence-based tax system, the effective tax rate is:  
𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗𝑚 = max{𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗 , 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑚},       𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗𝑚 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗 , 𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑚}        (4.10) 
Where 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑚 is capital gains tax rate for account of class k and residence country of group 
m, while 𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑚 is annual income tax rate for account of class k and residence country of 
group m. If the invested country implements a residence-based tax system while the 
investor is from a different country with a source-based tax system, the effective tax rate 
is: 
𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗𝑚 = 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗 , 𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗𝑚 = 𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗
        (4.11) 
  
ii. Double tax method 
The country with a source-based tax system is assumed to have no tax agreement with 
the other two countries. So if the invested country implements a source-based tax 
system while the investor is from a different country with a residence-based tax system, 
the investment is taxed by both countries.  
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 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗𝑚 = 1 − (1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗)(1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑚), 𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗𝑚 = 1 − (1 − 𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗)(1 − 𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗) (4.12) 
In equation (4.12), (1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗)(1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑚) is the remaining rate of capital gains after tax 
payment by both countries. Then the effective tax rate for capital gains  𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗𝑚
 is 
calculated as 1 minus this remaining rate. A similar method is applied to get the 
effective tax rate for income. 
If the invested country implements a residence-based tax system while the 
investor is from a different country with a source-based tax system, the effective tax rate 
is: 
𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗𝑚 = 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗 , 𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗𝑚 = 𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗
          (4.13) 
 
b. Cumulative capital gains 
The remaining capital gains available for withdrawal in each account are calculated as:  
𝑹𝟏𝟏
𝒋𝒎
= 𝑹𝟏𝟎
𝒋𝒎
−
𝒙𝟏𝒋𝒎
𝟐
1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
1𝑗𝑚
− 𝑿𝟏𝒋𝒎
𝟐 /(1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
1𝑗𝑚) (4.14) 
𝑹𝟐𝟏
𝒋𝒎
= 𝑹𝟐𝟎
𝒋𝒎
−
𝒙𝟐𝒋𝒎
𝟐
1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
2𝑗𝑚
− 𝑿𝟐𝒋𝒎
𝟐 /(1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
2𝑗𝑚) (4.15) 
𝑹𝟑𝟏
𝒋𝒎
= 𝑹𝟑𝟎
𝒋𝒎
−
𝒙𝟑𝒋𝒎
𝟐
1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
3𝑗𝑚
− 𝑿𝟑𝒋𝒎
𝟐 /(1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
3𝑗𝑚) (4.16) 
Here, 𝒙𝑘𝑗𝑚
2  represents the net amounts of cash withdrawal from the capital gains of each 
asset for international transits, while 𝑿𝑘𝑗𝑚
2  represents the net amounts of cash 
withdrawal from the capital gains of each asset for local transits. There are two sources 
of withdrawal: capital gains and initial capital. The difference represents the cash from 
the initial capital 𝒙𝑘𝑗𝑚
3  and 𝑿𝑘𝑗𝑚
3 , which is free of tax at encashment, while the cash in 
𝒙𝑘𝑗𝑚
2  and 𝑿𝑘𝑗𝑚
2  are subject to an immediate tax payment. In addition, 𝑹𝒌𝟎
𝒋𝒎
 is the 
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previously cumulated unrealized capital gains, and an upper bound on the total 
withdrawals is set at 𝑹𝒌𝟏
𝒋𝒎
≥ 0 (∀𝑘, 𝑗, 𝑚 = 1,2,3). 
 
c. Withdrawals 
When an asset is sold (or withdrawn), the gross amount from unrealized capital gains 
(𝒙𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝟐 , 𝑿𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝟐 ), which is proportional to the total gross amount (𝒊𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝒔 (1 − 𝑡𝑗
𝑜𝑢𝑡)⁄ , 𝒍𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝒔  ), 
needs to be calculated first so that withdrawal tax on this amount can be calculated. 
∀𝑘 = 1,2,3; ∀𝑗 = 1,2,3 
𝒙𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝟐 = ((1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗𝑚)𝑹𝒌𝟎
𝒋𝒎
/(𝒘𝒌𝟎
𝒋𝒎
− 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗𝑚 ∗ 𝑹𝒌𝟎
𝒋𝒎
)) ∘ 𝒊𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝒔   /(1 − 𝑡𝑗
𝑜𝑢𝑡)   (4.17) 
𝒙𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝟑 = 𝒊𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝒔 /(1 − 𝑡𝑗
𝑜𝑢𝑡) − 𝒙𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝟐       (4.18) 
𝑿𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝟐 = ((1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗𝑚)𝑹𝒌𝟎
𝒋𝒎
/(𝒘𝒌𝟎
𝒋𝒎
− 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗𝑚 ∗ 𝑹𝒌𝟎
𝒋𝒎
)) ∘ 𝒍𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝒔      (4.19) 
𝒙𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝟑 = 𝒍𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝒔 − 𝑿𝒌𝒋𝒎
𝟐       (4.20) 
Since withdrawals for local transits are all exempt from Tobin tax, the term (1-𝑡𝑗
𝑜𝑢𝑡) is 
not present in constraints (4.19) and (4.20). 
 
d. Wealth 
Next, the total wealth is calculated in each account after trading and at the end of the 
period. In calculating the former, the transactions between assets are considered.  
𝒘𝟏𝟏
𝒋𝒎
= 𝒘𝟏𝟎
𝒋𝒎
− (
𝒙𝟏𝒋𝒎
𝟐
1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
1𝑗𝑚
+ 𝒙𝟏𝒋𝒎
𝟑 ) − (
𝑿𝟏𝒋𝒎
𝟐
1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
1𝑗𝑚
+ 𝑿𝟏𝒋𝒎
𝟑 ) + (1 − 𝑡𝑗
𝑖𝑛
 
)𝒊𝟏𝒋𝒎
𝒃
+ 𝒍𝟏𝒋𝒎
𝒃  
(4.21) 
𝒘𝟐𝟏
𝒋𝒎
= 𝒘𝟐𝟎
𝒋𝒎
− (
𝒙𝟐𝒋𝒎
𝟐
1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
2𝑗𝑚
+ 𝒙𝟐𝒋𝒎
𝟑 ) − (
𝑿𝟐𝒋𝒎
𝟐
1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
2𝑗𝑚
+ 𝑿𝟐𝒋𝒎
𝟑 ) + (1 − 𝑡𝑗
𝑖𝑛
 
)𝒊𝟐𝒋𝒎
𝒃
+ 𝒍𝟐𝒋𝒎
𝒃  
(4.22) 
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𝒘𝟑𝟏
𝒋𝒎
= 𝒘𝟑𝟎
𝒋𝒎
− (
𝒙𝟑𝒋𝒎
𝟐
1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
3𝑗𝑚
+ 𝒙𝟑𝒋𝒎
𝟑 ) − (
𝑿𝟑𝒋𝒎
𝟐
1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
3𝑗𝑚
+ 𝑿𝟑𝒋𝒎
𝟑 ) + (1 − 𝑡𝑗
𝑖𝑛
 
)𝒊𝟑𝒋𝒎
𝒃
+ 𝒍𝟑𝒋𝒎
𝒃  
(4.23) 
A transit within the same country is distinguished from a transit between two countries. 
Tobin tax is applied to the latter transit only. In calculating wealth at the end of the 
period, both capital gains and incomes are considered, and the corresponding annual 
income tax payments and management fees are deducted (management fees are set as a 
parameter which can be either zero or positive).  
𝒘𝟏𝟐
𝒋𝒎
= (1 − 𝑓1𝑗)[(1 + 𝒈𝟏𝒋) ∘ 𝒘𝟏𝟏
𝒋𝒎
] (4.24) 
𝒘𝟐𝟐
𝒋𝒎
= (1 − 𝑓2𝑗)[(1 + 𝒈𝟐𝒋) ∘ 𝒘𝟐𝟏
𝒋𝒎
] (4.25) 
𝒘𝟑𝟐
𝒋𝒎
= (1 − 𝑓3𝑗)[(1 + 𝒈𝟑𝒋) ∘ 𝒘𝟑𝟏
𝒋𝒎
] (4.26) 
The income return should also be calculated and included in the total wealth. 
𝐶2𝑚 = ∑(1 − 𝑓𝑘𝑗)[(1 − 𝑡𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑗𝑚)(𝒅𝒌𝒋′𝒘𝒌𝟏
𝒋𝒎
)]
𝑘,𝑗
 (4.27) 
Here, k=2, 3 only since there is no income from commodities. 
 
e. Cumulative capital gains tax 
Finally, the total tax liability is calculated by adding deferred tax from previous periods 
to that of the current period. Since this is a single-period model, all previous tax 
liabilities will have already been determined.  
𝑇12
𝑗𝑚 = 𝑇10
𝑗𝑚 + 𝑡𝑐𝑔
1𝑗𝑚(1 − 𝑓1𝑗) (𝒈𝟏𝒋 
′𝒘𝟏𝟏
𝒋𝒎
) − {𝑡𝑐𝑔
1𝑗𝑚 (1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
1𝑗𝑚)⁄ }𝟏′𝒙𝟏𝒋𝒎
𝟐  
−{𝑡𝑐𝑔
1𝑗𝑚/(1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
1𝑗𝑚)}𝟏′𝑿𝟏𝒋𝒎
𝟐  
(4.28) 
𝑇22
𝑗𝑚 = 𝑇20
𝑗𝑚 + 𝑡𝑐𝑔
2𝑗𝑚(1 − 𝑓2𝑗) (𝒈𝟐𝒋 
′𝒘𝟐𝟏
𝒋𝒎
) − {𝑡𝑐𝑔
2𝑗𝑚 (1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
2𝑗𝑚)⁄ }𝟏′𝒙𝟐𝒋𝒎
𝟐  
−{𝑡𝑐𝑔
2𝑗𝑚/(1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
2𝑗𝑚)}𝟏′𝑿𝟐𝒋𝒎
𝟐  
(4.29) 
 112 
 
𝑇32
𝑗𝑚 = 𝑇30
𝑗𝑚 + 𝑡𝑐𝑔
3𝑗𝑚(1 − 𝑓3𝑗) (𝒈𝟑𝒋
′
𝒘𝟑𝟏
𝒋𝒎
) − {𝑡𝑐𝑔
3𝑗𝑚 (1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
3𝑗𝑚)⁄ }𝟏′𝒙𝟑𝒋𝒎
𝟐  
−{𝑡𝑐𝑔
3𝑗𝑚/(1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
3𝑗𝑚)}𝟏′𝑿𝟑𝒋𝒎
𝟐  
(4.30) 
𝑇𝑘0
𝑗𝑚 = (𝟏′𝑹𝒌𝟎
𝒋𝒎
) 𝑡𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝑗𝑚
 (4.31) 
 
In equation (4.28), 𝑡𝑐𝑔
1𝑗𝑚(1 − 𝑓1𝑗) (𝒈𝟏𝒋 
′𝒘𝟏𝟏
𝒋𝒎
) is the tax on the capital gains for the 
current period after management fees. This amount is then added to total cumulative tax, 
𝑇10
𝑗𝑚
. As 𝟏′𝒙𝟏𝒋𝒎
𝟐  is the net amount after tax, the expression {𝑡𝑐𝑔
1𝑗𝑚 (1 − 𝑡𝑐𝑔
1𝑗𝑚)⁄ }𝟏′𝒙𝟏𝒋𝒎
𝟐  is 
used to calculate the tax payment towards withdrawal for international transits. A 
similar method is used to calculate the tax payment towards withdrawals for local 
transits. 
The final net return for each account by subtracting all the contingent capital 
gains tax from the account is calculated.  
𝑇𝑅𝑘𝑗𝑚 = 𝟏
′𝒘𝒌𝟐
𝒋𝒎
− 𝑇𝑘2
𝑗𝑚     ∀𝑘, 𝑗, 𝑚 = 1,2,3 (4.32) 
   
4.4.3. After-tax market portfolio 
In the CAPM, it is assumed that all investors are rational and are expected to hold the 
same market portfolio of risky assets (usually proxied by a comprehensive ‘Index’), 
which maximizes the portfolio expected excess return over a risk-free rate per unit of 
portfolio risk (i.e., the Sharpe ratio). In this chapter, the objective function is the after-
tax Sharpe ratio. For each group of investors, m=1,2,3, an independent risk-free rate of 
return on an after tax basis is introduced. This is because investors from different 
countries have access to different risk-free rates of return. The optimization models are 
used to find the optimal risky portfolio for each group of investors who have the same 
country of residence. For group m=1, 2, 3, 
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Maximize w (∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑘𝑗𝑚
 
𝑘,𝑗 + 𝐶2𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓
𝑚)/√𝒘𝟏𝒎′ ∑ 𝒘𝟏𝒎  
Subject to  If residence-based (4.3)–(4.8), (4.14)-(4.32);  
 If source-based (4.3)-(4.7),(4.9),(4.14)-(4.32); 
 If mixed credit method (4.3)-(4.7),(4.10)-(4.11),(4.14)-(4.32); 
 If mixed double taxation (3)-(7),(12)-(32); 
 𝑇𝑅𝑘𝑗𝑚 ≥ 0, 𝑘 = 1,2,3, 𝑗 = 1,2,3; 𝑇𝑘2
𝑗𝑚, 𝑹𝒌𝟐
𝒋𝒎
≥ 0, 𝑘 =
1,2,3, 𝑗 = 1,2,3;   
 𝑤𝑘1
𝑗𝑚, 𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑚
𝑏 , 𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑚
𝑠 , 𝑙𝑘𝑗𝑚
𝑏 , 𝑙𝑘𝑗𝑚
𝑠 ≥ 0, 𝑘 = 1,2,3, 𝑗 = 1,2,3;  
 𝑥𝑘𝑗𝑚
2 , 𝑥𝑘𝑗𝑚
3 , 𝑋𝑘𝑗𝑚
2 , 𝑋𝑘𝑗𝑚
3 ≥ 0, 𝑘 = 1,2,3, 𝑗 = 1,2,3;  
 𝛿𝑘𝑗𝑚 ∈ [0,1], 𝑘 = 1,2,3, 𝑗 = 1,2,3;  
where 𝑅𝑓 is the expected total wealth from investing in the risk-free asset. 𝑤1𝑚
′ ∑ 𝑤1𝑚, 
where w1 is a vector (w
1m
11, w
2m
11, w
3m
11, w
1m
21, w
2m
21, w
3m
21,, w
1m
31, w
2m
31, w
3m
31) of all 
the asset weights in period 1 (end of rebalancing), is equal to the variance 𝜎2 of the 
portfolio. 
After obtaining the local optimal risky portfolio for each group of investors, the 
market portfolio is calculated using the following formula: 
m m
Market
m
Capitalization Portfolio
Portfolio
Capitalization




 
(Note: In the following work, the weight for Eurozone and U.S. investors is assumed to 
be 0.4 respectively, and the weight for U.K. investors is 0.2.) 29 
 
4.5. Influence of Taxation on Portfolio Management 
 
                                                          
29The weight for the E.U. investors here is the ratio of the total capital held by investors from the E.U. to 
the total capital held by all investors. The weight for the U.K. and the U.S. investors is derived in the 
same way. 
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4.5.1. Data, figures and experimental method 
In the optimization, each equity, bond and commodity segment of the targeted market is 
divided into several subclasses. Commodities are based in all three markets (Eurozone, 
U.K. and U.S.) and are categorized by product type (e.g., oil, gold, copper, corn, … etc.). 
All bonds currently available in the market are first divided into two groups: investment 
grade and high yield.30 Each group is further divided into industrial subclasses (airline, 
technology, telecommunications … etc.). Equities are also categorized by industry 
sector in all three markets. This generates 18 classes of U.K. commodities, 20 of U.S. 
commodities, 20 of Eurozone commodities, 7 of U.K. bonds, 24 of U.S. bonds, 24 of 
Eurozone bonds (mainly German and French bonds), 30 of U.K. shares, 40 of U.S. 
shares and 30 of Eurozone shares.31 All the historical annual dividends and capital gains 
of the asset classes are obtained from Datastream for the period 1990 to 2011. Data for 
bonds are from Barclay’s bond index, including both government and corporate bonds. 
Data for equities are from the FTSE for the U.K., US-DS Price Index for the U.S., and 
the FTSEUR1ST 300 for the E.U. Data for commodities are from the S&P commodity 
index. Capital gains for each asset class are calculated as the change of index prices and 
adjusted by excluding corresponding income. After obtaining the optimal portfolio, 
investors can then invest in the corresponding index by purchasing index futures or 
holding the assets in each index directly. 
 
4.5.2. Residence-based and source-based tax systems 
In the experiments, investment tax rates for all asset classes are set initially at 40%. 
Then, in turn, each is changed incrementally from 10% to 70% so that the change of the 
                                                          
30 Given that U.S. government bonds are often tax-free, they are not included in this work.` 
31The same commodity asset should have the same price globally. Otherwise an arbitrage opportunity will 
exist. In this paper, commodities are grouped by country to show heterogeneous tax rules. For example, 
U.K. commodities represent commodities traded in the U.K. market and taxed by U.K. government. But 
the same returns of commodities are used in all three countries, U.K., U.S. and Eurozone. In reality, 
investors can use derivative contract or fund (e.g. ETFs) to invest in commodities indirectly. Investors are 
able to choose where to buy and therefore which country’s tax to pay. 
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optimal portfolio, and therefore, the capital flow due to the change of tax rates, can be 
observed. In addition, it is assumed that the U.K., the U.S. and the Eurozone investors 
represent 100% of global markets. The proportion of total wealth of U.K. investors is 
taken to be 20%, while the proportion of total wealth of both Eurozone and U.S. 
investors is taken to be 40%.  
In Fig.4.1, a = jm
ko
jm
k wR /0  . This is ratio of cumulative return to total asset weights. 
A higher ratio here means more capital gains tax remaining for the payment at 
encashment, and therefore requires higher expected return to rebalance the portfolio. 
The three charts show how the optimal weight of the local market varies with the local 
investment tax rate under different withholding tax systems. In each chart, the curve 
‘Residence Only’ is obtained when all three regions apply residence-based withholding 
tax and are in an international tax union. Both ‘Mixed (Credit Method)’ and ‘Mixed 
(Double Taxation)’ curves are obtained when the Eurozone and the U.K. apply 
residence-based withholding tax while the U.S. applies source-based withholding tax. 
However, the former assumes all three regions are still in an international tax union 
(Credit Method) while the latter assumes only the Eurozone and the U.K. are in a tax 
union (Double Taxation). The ‘Source Only’ curve is obtained when all three regions 
apply a source-based investment tax. In this tax system, all income is subject to a tax 
payment only in the country in which it is generated. 
 
a. Residence only tax system 
It can be seen from all three charts in Fig.1 that, for all three regional markets (Eurozone, 
U.K. and U.S.), the change of the market weight with the ‘Residence Only’ tax system 
is usually the smallest in comparison to the other three tax systems: ‘Source Only’, 
‘Mixed (Credit Method)’ and ‘Mixed (Double Taxation)’. From the second chart, the 
weight of the U.K. market only changes from 60% to 62% as its investment tax rate is 
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cut from 40% to 30% with the ‘Residence-Only’ tax systems. This is much smaller than 
the changes with other tax systems, which are from 60% to 76% for ‘Source Only’, 
from 60% to 79% for ‘Mixed (Credit Method)’ and from 70% to 90% for ‘Mixed 
(Double Taxation)’. In addition, the difference in the change of market weight is usually 
obvious for ‘Residence Only’ tax, particularly in comparison to ‘Source Only’ tax. 
From the first chart in Fig.4.1, as the tax rate is cut from 40% to 10%, the weight of the 
Eurozone market increases from 30% to over 90% with ‘Source-Only’, while the weight 
increases only to 58% with ‘Residence Only’.  
The experimental results also show that with ‘Residence Only’ tax, the change as 
the tax rate is cut is usually smaller than the change as the tax rate is increased. For 
example, from the third chart in Fig.4.1, the weight of the U.S. market rises from 21% 
to just 30% as the tax rate is cut to 10% while the weight decreases to almost 0% as the 
rate is increased to 70%. This is because with ‘Residence Only’ tax, the change in 
market weight is mainly due to rebalancing by local investors32 only when the rate falls 
below 40% while the change is due to rebalancing by overseas investors33 as the rate 
increases above 40%. Under a ‘Residence Only’ tax system, when a regional market’s 
tax rate is cut below the other markets’ tax rate, only the local investor’s local 
investment34 obtains the relatively low tax rate35. As a result, such a tax cut will only 
benefit local investors and leads to a capital inflow to the local market due to 
rebalancing by local investors. In contrast, when the local market increases the tax rate 
above 0.4, local investors will always be taxed at the higher rate wherever they invest. 
So the local investors are not motivated to rebalance. 
                                                          
32 Local investor: the investor whose country of residence is the country we are discussing (or so-called 
focused market) 
33  Overseas investor: the investor whose country of residence is different from the country we are 
discussing 
34 Local investment: an investment allocated to the focused market 
35 For example, when the Eurozone market’s tax rate is cut to 0.1 while the rate for the other two markets 
is still 0.4, only Eurozone investors’ investment in Eurozone assets are taxed at 0.1; all other investors’ 
investments are still taxed at 0.4.   
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b. Source only tax system 
With a ‘Source Only’ tax union, changes in the local market weight are much larger 
than changes in the other three tax systems (‘Residence Only’, ‘Mixed (Credit Method)’ 
and ‘Mixed (Double Taxation)’). This higher sensitivity leads to greater volatility of 
markets when a regional market changes its tax rules. This is because with a source-
based tax system, the change of tax in the local market will affect all investors’ 
investments in the local market and will lead to a large amount of rebalancing globally. 
On the other hand, this feature enables the regional government to intervene in the local 
market in extreme cases. 
 
c. Mixed (Credit Method) tax system 
The U.S. market is assumed to apply source-based taxation while the other two markets 
still apply a residence-based tax. This setting is applied to test how a local tax change 
would affect global capital flow when heterogeneous withholding tax rules are used. In 
a ‘Mixed (Credit Method)’ tax system, it is assumed that the U.S. market is still in a tax 
union with the other two markets and double taxation is effectively eliminated. It can be 
seen from the first two charts in Fig.4.1 that when the tax rate is cut below 40%, the 
change of market weight is usually larger in a ‘Mixed (Credit Method)’ tax system than 
in a ‘Residence Only’ tax system for the Eurozone and the U.K. markets. For example, 
from the second chart in Fig.4.1, the ‘Mixed (Credit Method)’ curve always stands 
above the curve for ‘Residence Only’ as the tax rate is cut below 40%. In other words, 
the market will be more sensitive if a regional market with a source-based tax system is 
added to a ‘Residence Only’ tax union. This extra sensitivity is due to rebalancing by 
U.S. investors whose country of residence is assumed to apply a source-based tax 
system.  
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Consider a tax cut in the Eurozone and the U.K. markets, which are assumed to 
charge taxes based on investors’ country of residence in both ‘Residence Only’ and 
‘Mixed (Credit Method)’ tax systems. In a ‘Residence Only’ tax union, as the tax rate is 
cut, as mentioned previously, only local investors’ local investments will be affected. In 
contrast, in a ‘Mixed (Credit Method)’ tax system, a tax rate cut in the Eurozone or the 
U.K. market will affect not only local investors but also U.S. investors. In a ‘Mixed 
(Credit Method)’ tax system, the U.S. market is assumed to use a source-based tax, and 
therefore the U.S. investors’ investment in the Eurozone or the U.K. market is only 
taxed at the Eurozone or the U.K. tax rate. So such a tax cut in a ‘Mixed (Credit 
Method)’ tax system will lead to a larger rebalance for US investors when they hold 
assets in the other two markets. This implies a larger capital flow (from US to Eurozone 
and the U.K.) in global markets relative to the same cut in a ‘Residence Only’ tax 
system.  
With regard to a tax increase in the Eurozone and the U.K. market, when the tax 
rate is set above 40% in the Eurozone or the U.K. market, the change of investment tax 
rate in a ‘Mixed (Credit Method)’ tax system will impose a similar effect on global 
markets as in a ‘Residence Only’ tax system. This is because the higher tax rate in a 
market using a residence-based tax system will increase the effective tax rate on the 
investment in that market to all investors regardless of whether it is in a ‘Residence 
Only’ tax system or a ‘Mixed (Credit Method)’ tax system. So markets will have the 
same sensitivity to the tax rate change in both tax systems. 
In addition, a tax rate change in the U.S. market, which uses a residence-based tax 
in a ‘Residence Only’ system rather than a source-based tax in a ‘Mixed (Credit 
Method)’ tax system is observed. It is found that a tax cut (from 40% to a lower rate) in 
the U.S. market will lead to the same rebalancing for U.S. investors (holding more U.S. 
assets) regardless of whether it is in a ‘Residence Only’ tax system or a ‘Mixed (Credit 
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Method)’ tax system. On the other hand, a tax increase (from 40% to a higher rate) will 
lead to a greater rebalancing (holding more Eurozone and U.K. assets) and therefore 
larger capital flows (from the U.S. market to the other two markets) in a ‘Mixed (Credit 
Method)’ tax system rather than in a ‘Residence Only’ tax system.  
In summary, if a market applies a source-based tax, it will be more sensitive to a 
tax increase than a tax cut. In contrast, if a market applies a residence-based tax, it will 
be more sensitive to a tax cut than a tax increase. These results will be of interest to both 
government and investors. 
 
d. Mixed (Double Taxation) tax system 
Again, the U.S. market applies a source-based taxation while the other two markets still 
apply a residence-based taxation. It can test whether a local tax change will affect global 
capital flows if heterogeneous withholding tax rules are used, and countries with 
different tax rules are not in a tax union. In Fig.4.1, the horizontal axis for all three 
charts is the investment tax rate (both income tax and capital gains tax) of the particular 
market and the vertical axis is the weight (or percentage) of that market to the global 
market in the obtained market portfolio. For example, if the weight for the Eurozone 
market in chart one is 20%, it means that the total summed weight of all assets the 
Eurozone assets in the obtained market portfolio is 20%. The three charts in Fig.4.1 
show that in a ‘Mixed (Double Taxation)’ tax system, on average, the weight on the 
Eurozone and the U.K. markets is higher (the curves stand above the curve of the U.S. 
market) while the weight on the U.S. market is lower throughout the whole tax rate 
range in comparison to ‘Residence Only’ and ‘Mixed (Credit Method)’ tax systems. 
This is because in a ‘Mixed (Double Taxation)’ tax system there is double taxation on 
investments in the U.S. market from overseas investors (Eurozone and U.K. investors) 
and, therefore, its effective tax rate is always higher than that in ‘Residence Only’ and 
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‘Mixed (Credit Method)’ tax systems. Double taxation will roughly lead to a 40% 
decrease in the initial U.S. market weight, which largely reduces the attractiveness of 
the market with source-based tax. Apart from the lower initial market weight, the shape 
of the ‘Mixed (Double Taxation)’ curves is more or less the same as that for the ‘Mixed 
(Credit Method)’ in Fig. 4.1. 
Figure 4. 1 Residence-based vs. Source-based Investment Tax (a=0.2) 36 
  
 
                                                          
36 In Fig.4.1, the three charts show the comparison of four withholding tax systems without Tobin tax: 
Residence Only, Mixed (Credit Method), Mixed (Double Taxation) and Source Only. The title of each 
chart is the focused regional market.. 
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Another set of experiments are now carried out by doubling the initial unrealized 
capital gains amount in the global market portfolio (i.e. the parameter a=𝑹𝒌𝟎
𝒋𝒎
/𝒘𝒌𝟎
𝒋𝒎
  is 
changed from 0.2 to 0.4). First, the unrealized capital gains are doubled in only one 
market to obtain the first chart in Fig. 4.2. Next, the unrealized capital gains in all 
markets are doubled, and the second chart in Fig. 4.2 is obtained. The two charts of Fig. 
4.2 show the differential impact of Residence Only withholding tax on global markets 
with two distinct unrealized capital gains amount, ‘a’. In detail, in the first chart, we 
assume only one regional market’s ‘a’ is changed from 0.2 to 0.4. In the second chart, 
we assume all three regional markets’ ‘a’ is changed from 0.2 to 0.4. The horizontal axis 
of these two charts is still the investment tax rate while the vertical axis is the ratio of 
the regional market’s weight with a=0.4 to its weight with a=0.2. In summary, when the 
tax rate is cut from 0.4 to 0.3, a vertical axis value below 100% means a reduced 
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amount of capital flowing into the particular market. Conversely, when the tax rate is 
raised from 0.4 to 0.5, a vertical axis value above 100% means a reduced amount of 
capital flowing out of that market. The two charts in Fig. 4.2 show that when the 
unrealized capital gains make up a higher proportion of the holding assets’ value, 
keeping all else the same, the rebalancing amount is reduced. The second chart in Fig. 
4.2 shows that as the tax rate is cut, the local market’s weight decreases more when 
a=0.4 than when a=0.2. 37 This means that increased unrealized capital gains in foreign 
markets would lead to lower capital flows into the local market with the same tax cut 
and reduces the ability of governments to intervene in their local market using tax 
policy. On the other hand, it also shows that if an asset’s expected net return increases, 
more unrealized capital gains in the market reduces the rebalancing activity and 
therefore the volatility (trading volume) of the market. In addition, when only one 
market’s unrealized capital gains are doubled, the inflow of capital to this market will 
not be affected but the outflow of capital will be largely reduced (see the first chart in 
Fig. 4.2). In contrast, when all markets’ unrealized capital gains are doubled, both the 
inflow and outflow of capital will be significantly reduced (roughly 50% on average, 
see the second chart in Fig. 4.2). A trending market (i.e., the real value of the asset in 
the market increases in the long term) usually creates more unrealized capital gains than 
a volatile but non-trending market (i.e., the real value of the asset in the market remains 
the same in the long term, but its price moves around its constant real value). These 
results lead to the conclusion that in the long-term, increasingly more capital will flow 
from the volatile market to the trending market, and the volatile market must offer a 
higher return to maintain investment capital. This conclusion is consistent with rational 
investors who would require higher returns in riskier (volatile) environments. 
                                                          
37 The market of which tax rate is cut. 
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Figure 4. 2 Residence-based Investment Tax (a=0.2 or a=0.4)
 38
 
 
 
4.5.3. Tobin tax 
The rate of investment tax is now changed to simulate a change in the asset’s expected 
net return, and an investigation is carried out into how the introduction of heterogeneous 
                                                          
38 In Fig.4.2, the two charts show the differential impact of Residence Only withholding tax on global 
markets with two distinct unrealized capital gains amount, ‘a’. The parameter ‘a’ is the assumed 
proportion of assets’ unrealized capital gains in each regional market38. In the first chart, we assume only 
one regional market’s ‘a’ is changed from 0.2 to 0.4. In the second chart, we assume all three regional 
markets’ ‘a’ is changed from 0.2 to 0.4. The horizontal axis of these two charts are still the investment tax 
rate while the vertical axis is the ratio of the regional market’s weight with a=0.4 to its weight with a=0.2. 
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Tobin tax affects the rebalancing of investors and therefore capital flows between 
regional markets. From the nine charts in Figs. 4.3 to 4.5, we can see that, regardless of 
the withholding tax system, when the investment tax rate increases above 40%, the 
introduction of Tobin tax has a positive effect (i.e., it leads to an increase in the optimal 
market weight by reducing capital outflows). In contrast, when the tax rate is cut below 
40%, Tobin tax has a negative effect (reduction in the optimal market weight by 
preventing capital inflows). For example, in the first chart of Fig. 4.3, for the 
‘Tin&Tout=1%’ where both inflows and outflows of capital are Tobin tax charged, the 
curve increases above 100% as the investment tax rate is increased to 50% but decreases 
below 100% as the investment tax rate is cut to 30%.39 In addition, whether using a 
consistent Tobin tax rate globally ‘Tin=0.5%’ improves market efficiency more than 
when using different Tobin tax rates in different regions ‘Tin=0;0.5%;1%’ is 
investigated.40  
                                                          
39 The charge of the Tobin tax is divided into three groups: Tobin tax on capital inflows only ‘Tin’, Tobin 
tax on capital outflows only ‘Tout’, and Tobin tax on both capital inflows and outflows ‘Tin&Tout’.  
40 U.K.: Tin=0; U.S.: Tin=0.5%; E.U.: Tin=1%. 
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Figure 4. 3 Tobin tax in residence-based only (a=0.2)
 41
 
                                                          
41 In Fig.4.3, the three charts show the comparison of different Tobin tax rules with a Residence Only 
withholding tax system. The title of each chart is the focused regional market. The horizontal axis is the 
investment tax rate while the vertical axis is the ratio of the focused market’s weight with Tobin tax to its 
weight without Tobin tax. 
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From Fig. 4.3, it can be seen that with the same change in asset expected returns, 
investors’ rebalancing strategy, and consequently capital flows between markets, are 
highly sensitive to Tobin tax. The third chart in Fig. 4.3 shows that for the 
‘Tin&Tout=0.5%’ curve, Tobin tax can reduce the flow from the rebalancing process by 
20%-40%. In extreme cases, the Tobin tax can even reduce the flow by up to 44% (see 
the ‘Tin&Tout=1%’ curve in the third chart of Fig. 4.3). This capital-lock effect is 
heterogeneous across different markets and different tax rate changes.42 For example, in 
the first chart of Fig. 4.3, as the investment tax rate is cut from 40% to 30%, Tobin tax 
‘Tin&Tout=1%’ reduces the total capital inflows by 66% for the U.K. market (the 
optimal weight of the U.K. market is only 60% of the weight as Tin&Tout is changed 
from 0 to 1%). In contrast, in the second chart of Fig. 4.3, as the investment tax rate is 
                                                          
42 Reduce the amount of capital from both inflow and outflow. 
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cut from 40% to 30%, the same Tobin tax ‘Tin&Tout=1%’ reduces the total capital 
inflows by only 20% for the Eurozone market.  
Fig. 4.3 shows that the market capital flow will usually be much more sensitive to 
Tobin tax with a small change in tax rate (e.g., a change from 40% to 50% or a change 
from 40% to 30% leads to greater rebalancing activity than larger changes). For 
example, in the first chart of Fig. 4.3, both the ‘Tin&Tout=1%’ and ‘Tin&Tout=0.5%’ 
curves reach their peak value as the investment tax rate is increased from 40% to 50%. 
This is because a small change in the investment tax rate, and consequently a small 
change in an asset’s expected return, will give investors little motivation to rebalance. 
When the motivation is small, the cost of Tobin tax is a major concern and may exceed 
the extra return (benefit) obtained from rebalancing, so a Tobin tax will be important to 
investors’ optimal portfolios. In contrast, when the motivation is large, the cost of Tobin 
tax is relatively small and rebalancing is beneficial. Charging a Tobin tax in this 
situation will, therefore, have little influence on investors’ optimal portfolios. In 
conclusion, the market will be more sensitive to the implementation of Tobin tax when 
asset returns are relatively stable and change only slowly and diminutively (a trending 
market) compared to a market in which asset returns change quickly and significantly (a 
volatile market). From the government’s point of view, the Tobin tax will reduce its 
ability to intervene in the market. This reduction (up to more than 50%) varies by the 
investment tax rules (Resident Only, Source Only or others) applied by the governments. 
Therefore, the introduction of Tobin tax hinders economic policy changes. 
Fig. 4.3 shows that if the effective Tobin tax rate is similar, such as 
‘Tin&Tout=0.5%’ and ‘Tin=1%’, taxing both capital inflows and outflows and taxing 
only capital inflows or only capital outflows will have similar impact on markets. Thus, 
the impact of Tobin tax depends only on its effective rate but not on the flow of capital 
which is taxed. In detail, if major countries around the world decide to build a Tobin tax 
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union, an agreement on the effective rate of Tobin tax will suffice. Individual countries 
can then tailor their own Tobin tax rules (charging on inflows or outflows or both) to 
their individual circumstances. 
Comparing the three withholding tax settings: ‘Residence Only’, ‘Mixed (Credit 
Method)’, and ‘Source Only’ (Figs. 4.3 to 4.5), it is clear that if the same Tobin tax rule 
is applied, the shape of the curves for each regional market remains roughly the same no 
matter which withholding tax system is used. However, the peak value (or the volatility) 
of the curves is not the same. So the impact of Tobin tax on markets is also dependent 
on other tax rules, such as withholding tax rules. As a result, when a government tries to 
predict the market response to the introduction of Tobin tax, taxes other than Tobin tax 
must also be considered. Ignoring investment taxes or withholding tax in an 
investigation of Tobin tax will lead to an inaccurate prediction of its impact. 
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Figure 4. 4 Tobin tax in credit method (a=0.2)
 43
 
 
                                                          
43 In Fig.4.4, the three charts show the comparison of different Tobin tax rules with Mixed (Credit 
Method) withholding tax system. 
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Figure 4. 5 Tobin tax in source-based only (a=0.2)
 44
 
 
                                                          
44 In Fig.4.5, the three charts show the comparison of different Tobin tax rules with source-only 
withholding tax system. Other settings of these three figures are the same as Fig.4.3. 
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The impact of a Tobin tax is predicted with different amounts of unrealized 
capital gains in the market. Similar to the experiment in section 4.5.2, the parameter ‘a’ 
is changed from 0.2 to 0.4 and obtain Fig. 4.6. It is also assumed that the ‘Residence 
Only’ withholding tax system is being used. It is further assumed that Tobin tax is 
charged when capital flows into a country’s market (capital inflows), and the rate is set 
at 1%. In Fig. 4.6, the vertical axis is the ratio of the local market weight when ‘a’ is 0.2 
to the weight when ‘a’ is 0.4. With less unrealized capital gains (a=0.2), Tobin tax has a 
larger effect on rebalancing and therefore capital flows. But this difference is smaller 
when there is a large change in tax rate and therefore a large change in asset expected 
returns are made. So if asset expected returns change by a small amount, investors’ 
rebalancing will be more sensitive to Tobin tax in a volatile market (with small 
unrealized capital gains), and the Tobin tax will greatly reduce the trading volume 
between markets. In contrast, in a trending market (with large unrealized capital gains), 
investors will be more concerned about the current portfolio’s unrealized capital gains 
and their tax cost if redeemed, than the cost of Tobin tax. However, if asset expected 
returns change by a large amount, neither unrealized capital gains nor Tobin tax will be 
a major part of investors’ rebalancing considerations. 
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Figure 4. 6 Tobin tax in residence-based only (a=0.2 or a=0.4)
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Finally, in Fig. 4.7, a comparison is made between using a consistent Tobin tax 
rate globally (‘Tin=0.5%’ and ‘Tin&Tout=0.5%’) and using heterogeneous Tobin tax 
rates globally (‘Tin=0;0.5%;1%’ and ‘Tin&Tout=0;0.5%;1%’).46 It is assumed that a 
‘Residence Only’ withholding tax system is being used. The vertical axis is the ratio of 
the percentage change in a target market (Eurozone or U.K. market) weight to the 
percentage change in the U.S. market weight when the investment tax rate is cut or 
increased. First, it is assumed that only capital inflows are subject to Tobin tax (the first 
chart of Fig. 4.7). It shows that when the U.S. investment tax rate is cut, there will be 
capital outflow from the Eurozone and the U.K. markets and into the U.S. market. 
However, since only the inflow will be taxed, the capital flow will be subject to the U.S. 
Tobin tax only. The effective tax rate should be the same regardless of whether 
                                                          
45 Fig.4.6 shows the differential impact of Tobin tax on global markets with two distinct unrealized 
capital gains amount, ‘a’. The parameter ‘a’ is changed from 0.2 to 0.4 in all three regional markets. The 
horizontal axis is the investment tax rate while the vertical axis is the ratio of the focused regional 
market’s weight with a=0.2 to its weight with a=0.4. 
46 Here means the Tobin tax rate in the Eurozone is 0, the Tobin tax rate in the U.K. is 0.005 and the 
Tobin tax rate in the U.S. is 0.01 
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homogenous or heterogeneous Tobin tax rates are used globally. Thus, there will be no 
effect on the performance of markets.  
Figure 4. 7 Tobin tax in residence-based only (t=0.005 vs t=0;0.005;0.01)
 47
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 Fig.4.7 shows the comparison of consistent and heterogeneous Tobin tax rules. In the consistent Tobin 
tax, all regional markets charge 0.5% on an international transit of wealth. In the heterogeneous Tobin tax, 
the U.K. market charges no Tobin tax, the U.S. market charges 0.5%, and the Eurozone market charges 
1%. The first chart assumes only transits into a regional market will be charged a Tobin tax for that 
market while the second chart assumes both transits into or out of a regional market will be charged a 
Tobin tax for that market. The horizontal axis is the investment tax rate of the U.S. market while the 
vertical axis the ratio of the percentage change on the target market (the Eurozone or U.K. market) weight 
to the percentage change on U.S. market weight when investment tax rate is cut or increased. 
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
350%
0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 3 0 . 4 0 . 5 0 . 6 0 . 7
INFLOW  T OB IN T AX:  ALL 0 .0 0 5  V .S  MIXED)
0.005 EU/US (US tax) 0.005 UK/US (US tax) Mixed EU/US (US tax) Mixed UK/US (US tax)
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
350%
0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 3 0 . 4 0 . 5 0 . 6 0 . 7
INFLOW&OUT FLOW T OBIN T AX:  ALL 0 .005  V.S  MIXED)
0.005 EU/US (US tax) 0.005 UK/US (US tax) Mixed EU/US (US tax) Mixed UK/US (US tax)
 135 
 
In contrast, when the U.S. investment tax rate is increased, leading to a capital 
outflow from the U.S. market, heterogeneous Tobin tax rates will mean that all capital 
flowing into the U.K. market will be taxed at zero while capital flowing into the 
Eurozone market will be taxed at 1%. This difference in Tobin tax treatment will lead to 
increasingly more flow of capital into the U.K. market rather than into the Eurozone 
market, and consequently largely reduces the ability of the Eurozone market to attract 
overseas investment in the long-term. It can be seen from the first chart of Fig. 4.7 that 
when the tax rate is increased, on average, 300% more capital will flow into the U.K. 
market when heterogeneous Tobin tax rates are used. Furthermore, if both outflows and 
inflows of capital are subject to Tobin tax, the result will be different (see the second 
chart of Fig. 4.7). This difference occurs mainly when the U.S. investment tax rate is cut.  
From the second chart in Fig. 4.7, when the U.S. tax rate is cut, the rebalancing 
amount is different from that using a consistent Tobin tax rate. More capital will flow 
out of the U.K. market and less capital will flow out of the Eurozone market if 
heterogeneous investment tax rates are used. As a result, heterogeneous Tobin tax rates 
will lead to higher volatility and trading volume in a low Tobin-taxed market (U.K) and 
lower volatility and trading volume in a highly Tobin-taxed market (Eurozone). This 
significantly reduces the ability of governments to intervene in the markets when 
necessary and reduces the ability to attract overseas investment. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the quantitative effects of investment taxes and Tobin tax on 
capital flows between regional markets. A post-tax portfolio optimization model is 
developed with non-linear trading constraints and objective function. To undertake a 
quantitative examination of the influence of heterogeneous withholding and Tobin taxes 
on international financial markets, a broad range of the real-world trading constraints 
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are incorporated. So investor behaviour can be simulated more realistically than using a 
model with simplified trading constraints, and this influence is quantified by observing 
the rebalancing activities of rational investors under different tax settings.  
On comparing residence- and source-based taxes on global investments, it is 
found that the global optimal portfolio is highly sensitive to a change in regional 
investment tax rates. This sensitivity depends on the size of the tax rate change, market 
specifications, and the international investment tax environment (Residence Only, 
Source Only, or Mixed). In a uniform tax policy across countries, a source only tax 
union will, on average, have more capital transits in international markets than would be 
the case with a Residence Only tax union, and its optimal market portfolio will be more 
sensitive to regional tax policy changes. In a mixed tax system, Mixed (Double 
Taxation) between residence- and source-taxed markets will significantly reduce the 
attractiveness of the latter to investors, while the Mixed (Credit Method) will perform 
much better (increasing the attractiveness of the market with a source-based tax by up to 
20%-  see the third chart in Fig. 4.1). The experimental results also suggest that volatile 
markets, which are usually accompanied by low unrealized capital gains, are more 
sensitive to a government's tax policy than trending markets. 
Trading volume from rebalancing activities of rational investors (who seek to 
maximize the net Sharpe ratio) is highly sensitive to the implementation of a Tobin tax. 
This sensitivity varies with both market specifications and investment tax rules. A 
volatile market in a ‘Mixed (Credit Method)’ tax environment will be more sensitive to 
Tobin tax than a trending market in a ‘Mixed (Double Taxation)’ tax environment. 
Furthermore, the experiments show that the capital locking effects of Tobin tax is 
mainly dependent on its effective rate but not the taxation on the capital flow (taxing 
inflow only or outflow only), if a consistent Tobin tax rule is applied to all countries. 
When heterogeneous rules are used across regional markets, for a market with relatively 
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high Tobin tax rate, the inflow Tobin tax will have a much higher capital lock-out effect, 
and the outflow Tobin tax will have a much higher capital lock-in effect, in comparison 
to a consistent Tobin tax system. In other words, the capital locking effect of Tobin tax 
is enlarged significantly when heterogeneous Tobin tax rates are applied. As a result, it 
will be helpful if all countries reach an agreement on the implementation of Tobin tax. 
Otherwise, a relatively high Tobin tax will significantly reduce the appeal of local 
markets to foreign investors. 
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Chapter 5 - Dynamic Tax Arbitrage for Perfectly Correlated and Non-
perfectly Correlated Assets 
 
Continuous time optimization models are developed with heterogeneous taxation 
between investors programmed with continuous rather than static income and capital 
gains (or losses). It is proved analytically that tax arbitrage opportunities exist for both 
perfectly correlated and non-perfectly correlated assets. However, these opportunities 
are very sensitive to asset price changes and investment tax rules, and therefore difficult 
to track. For perfectly correlated assets, it is proved that tax arbitrage may exist, with the 
investor’s top tax rate and some static asset parameters determining the existence of 
arbitrage opportunities. It is also proved that many of the equilibriums obtained under 
income tax only are not different from those incorporating capital gains tax if investors 
are subject to capital gains tax. For non-perfectly correlated assets, however, it is the 
market price of cap and floor options on assets’ returns that determine the existence of 
tax arbitrage. In the government fixed-income bond market, tax arbitrage between 
investors is difficult to eliminate unless investors are all subject to the same tax rates. 
But the return from this arbitrage can be limited if the government applies the same top 
tax rate to all investors.  
 
5.1. Introduction 
The expected pre-tax asset return and its risk are normally the main considerations in 
research on portfolio management and asset pricing. In reality, however, heterogeneous 
taxation can significantly influence equilibrium prices (Basak and Croitoru, 2001). This 
heterogeneity may exist across different investors, securities and types of return (capital 
gains or income). Some investors, for example, are subject to higher tax rates than 
others; derivative securities may be subject to tax rules different from those applied to 
 139 
 
their underlying assets; and even the same asset may be subject to different taxation 
depending on the purpose for which it is held (e.g., investing for retirement). These 
features make the asymmetric treatment of taxes important in asset pricing but 
challenging to include in mathematical programming. Mainly due to this complexity, 
researchers generally simplify work on asset pricing and portfolio management by 
assuming constant tax rates. In this chapter, I relax this assumption by including tax 
heterogeneities in determining the dynamic equilibrium of asset prices.  
To investigate the role of heterogeneous tax over time, Constantinides (1983) 
assumes that tax rates are higher in the short term than in the long term. He shows that 
investors will take advantage by realizing losses in the short term but gains in the long 
term. Dammon and Spatt (1996) and Osorio et al. (2004) also show that the value of tax 
timing is significant to investors. Dammon and Spatt (1996), however, prove that even 
if there are no transaction costs, sometimes investors may also defer small losses when 
asymmetric capital gain tax rules are applied in the optimization.  
Researchers have worked on finding equilibrium asset prices with heterogeneous 
tax brackets across investors. Basak and Croitoru (2001) propose a time-continuous 
model to develop dynamic equilibriums of asset prices between two heterogeneous 
agents when the presence of redundant, non-linearly taxed securities provides 
opportunities for tax arbitrage. They consider arbitrage opportunities between perfectly 
correlated assets with continuous returns but only income tax (not capital gains tax) is 
included (Basak and Croitoru 2001, Dammon and Green 1987, Dammon and Spatt 1996, 
Strobel 2005, Zuckerman 1989).  
In this chapter, both capital gains and losses are considered, and continuous-time 
models with continuous returns are developed for both perfectly correlated and non-
perfectly correlated assets. This enables many of the deficiencies in previous work to be 
corrected. For example, Basak and Croitorn discuss tax arbitrage opportunities when 
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assuming no capital gains or losses from the underlying assets. The work of Basak and 
Croitorn (2001) for perfectly correlated assets is extended by including capital gains tax 
and relaxing some of the assumptions. Capital gains tax is considered as part of total 
asset return tax while Basak and Croitorn assume there are no capital gains taxes. In 
their analysis of market equilibrium they assume that the existence of tax arbitrage is 
limited to an upper bound of the total amount of profit. In other words, any discovered 
tax arbitrage opportunity will disappear as more and more profit is secured as the 
arbitrage portfolio increases. The market equilibrium is reached when all arbitrage profit 
is realized and no more tax arbitrage profits can be found by investors. In this chapter, 
tax arbitrage which is limited by an upper bound is defined as a local tax arbitrage. In 
contrast, if there are mathematical constraints on tax rates and asset parameters (i.e. 
asset prices, expected returns and variance) which enable investors to generate profits 
not limited to any upper bound given enough liquidity in the market, this kind of 
arbitrage is defined as a global tax arbitrage opportunity. Since income must be positive 
while capital gains could be either positive or negative, it is more difficult to prove the 
existence of arbitrage opportunities when considering both capital gains tax and income 
tax rather than just income tax alone. This improvement increases the complexity but is 
necessary in considering tax arbitrage opportunities.  
It is proved analytically in this chapter that arbitrage opportunities exist, but they 
are very sensitive to asset prices, tax rates and other parameters, and do not exist 
consistently. When no arbitrage opportunity exists, equilibrium can be achieved when 
the sum of aggregate market capital gains tax payments and income tax payments are 
minimized. It is also proved mathematically that when considering market equilibrium 
on an after-tax basis and investors are subject to capital gains tax, many equilibriums 
obtained under income tax only would not be attained after incorporating capital gains 
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tax. It is therefore necessary to incorporate capital gains tax when considering tax 
arbitrage opportunities and market equilibrium. 
For non-perfectly correlated assets, caps and floors are included in the model. The 
cap is a call option that sets a maximum future return for an underlying asset. The floor 
is a put option that sets a minimum future return for an underlying asset. Three new 
continuous-time optimization models are proposed to find conditions for the existence 
of local, global and restricted global arbitrage opportunities48. These opportunities are 
further divided into two categories, type A and type B, depending on whether a strictly 
positive or only non-negative future net (after-tax) return will be realised for certain 
without an outflow of funds at any time. Further, given a set of tax rates and asset 
parameters, a new function, which requires asset holdings as inputs, is proposed to 
calculate an asset’s marginal cap and floor for its total net return. It is proved that the 
existence of tax arbitrage opportunities between non-perfectly correlated assets simply 
depends on the difference between assets’ marginal caps and floors.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the 
model for investors to optimize dynamic portfolio return under heterogeneous taxation. 
Section 5.3 analyses tax arbitrage and equilibrium for perfectly correlated assets. 
Section 5.4 discusses tax arbitrage and equilibrium for non-perfectly correlated assets 
with caps and floors and Section 5.5 concludes. Appendices A and B provide relevant 
definitions and proofs.  
 
5.2. Tax Arbitrage Optimization 
 
                                                          
48 Restricted tax arbitrage profit is not limited by an upper bound but limited to a minimum purchase of 
the selected assets. More details will be introduced in Section 4. 
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5.2.1. Model for Perfectly Correlated Assets 
A new continuous-time optimization model for perfectly correlated assets based on the 
work of Basak and Croitorn (2001) is proposed. As in their work, heterogeneous 
taxation across investors and assets, and asymmetric tax treatment of long and short 
positions are considered in the model. However, to extend their work further, capital 
gains taxes are also included in the optimization.  
 
Table 5. 1 Notation
49
 
( )B t   price of locally riskless "bond" at time t   
( )r t   instantaneous interest rate of "bond" at time t   
( )S t   price of the risky security with positive net supply of one share at time t   
( )P t   price of the risky security P at time t    
*( )S t   dynamic capital gain of security S at time t   
*( )P t   dynamic capital gain of security P at time t   
( )i t   income of risky security i at time t   
( )j t   average total return of security j at time t   
( )j t   total volatility of security j at time t   
( )
j
t   average income from security j at time t   
( )
j
t   income volatility of security j at time t   
( )cj t   average capital gains of security j at time t   
( )
j
c t   capital gains volatility of security j at time t   
( )ij t   agent i ’s holding (in units) of security j at time t   
( )iT    the function of agent i ’s tax bill on income  
( )iCGT    the function of agent i ’s tax bill on capital gains  
*( )iT t   agent i ’s marginal tax rate on income  
*( )iCGT t   agent i ’s marginal tax rate on capital gains  
( )ijt    the function of agent i ’s taxable income from security j ’s income  
( )ijcgt    the function of agent i ’s taxable income from security j ’s capital gains  
*( )ijt    agent i ’s marginal tax rate on security j ’s income  
*( )ijcgt    agent i ’s marginal tax rate on security j ’s capital gains  
i
j    agent i ’s contribution rateto taxable incomefrom security j ’s income for 
short positions  
i
jcg    agent i ’s contribution rate to taxable capital change from security j ’s  
capital losses  
                                                          
49The table explains the meaning of every symbol used in the model 
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i
j    agent i ’s contribution rate to taxable capital change from security j ’s income 
for long positions  
i
jcg    agent i ’s contribution rate to taxable income from security j ’s capital gains  
( )S P t   mispricing between two risky securities  
( )iX t   total wealth of agent i   
( )i t   risk exposure for agent i   
( )jA t  asset price of asset j at time t 
( )BjA t  
 
asset price with bound of asset j at time t 
( )
j
B
A t  
income with bound of asset j at time t 
Aj
taxFlo  
effective floor of income of asset j after tax 
Aj
Flo  
effective floor of income of asset j before tax 
Aj
taxCap  
effective cap of income of asset j after tax 
Aj
Cap  
effective cap of income of asset j before tax 
j
  to calculate a sum 
, ( )i jW t  Brownian motion for income of asset j at time t 
, ( )c jW t  Brownian motion for capital gains of asset j at time t 
SG  capital gains of asset S 
 
a. Continuous Time Model 
 
i. Dynamic incomes ( S  and P ) and prices (P and S)  
A continuous market is assumed, as in Basak and Croitorn (2001). Uncertainty is 
represented by a filtered probability space ( )tF {F }     within which a one-
dimensional Brownian motion W is defined. It is assumed that all investors are 
homogeneous in their information (represented by tF ) and beliefs (represented by ρ); all 
stochastic processes introduced are subject to tF ; all calculations with random variables 
hold ρ-a.s.; and all stochastic differential equations have a solution. Further, in the 
discussion of perfectly correlated assets, investors are assumed to trade three assets: a 
locally riskless ‘bond’ with price B returning an instantaneous interest rate r, and two 
risky assets with prices S and P paying dynamic incomes S  and P . The underlying 
dynamics are governed by the following processes: 
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( ) ( ) ( )dB t B t r t dt                       (5.1) 
( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( )]
S SS S
d t t t dt t dW t       (5.2) 
( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( )]
P PP P
d t t t dt t dW t       (5.3) 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( )]S S SdS t t dt S t t dt t dW t      (5.4) 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( )]P P PdP t t dt P t t dt t dW t      (5.5) 
where the processes r , S , P , S , P  are determined endogenously (given the 
parameters) in equilibrium. Investor i ’s holding (in a unit) of asset j at time t is denoted 
by ( )ij t   j {S P}  .  
 
ii. Correlation  
Brownian motion W is employed to generate both assets' dynamic incomes and capital 
gains. The processes guarantee that the two risky assets’ correlation coefficient equals 
one and income is correlated with capital gains (the same process is used in Basak and 
Croitorn (2001)). 
 
iii. Tax on income  
Investor i is taxed on income received from the two risky assets. At time t, he or she 
pays the instantaneous amount   
( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))i i i i iS S S P P PT t t t t t t     (5.6) 
where ( )iT  , ( )iSt   and ( )
i
Pt   are functions of income tax. The argument of the tax bill 
( )iT   is referred to as investor i’s total taxable income, and the argument of the taxable 
income 
j ( )
it   is referred to as total income from asset j. In addition, the formula for the 
marginal tax rate will be )()(),( ***** iP
ii
S
ii tTtTPST  . For convenience, investor i ’s 
income tax bill at time t  is denoted by ( )iT t , taxable income from asset j at time t by 
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( )ijt t , and their derivatives (marginal tax rate) by 
*( )iT t  （or *iT ） and *( )ijt t  (or 
*i
jt ). 
As a result, the effective marginal tax rates can be calculated as )()( **** iP
ii
S
i tTtT ， . For 
example, if the marginal tax rate is 40% on asset S and 28% on asset P, we can set 
*( )iT t  to be 40%, *( )iSt t  to be 100% and 
*( )iPt t  to be 70%, so that the effective tax rate 
* *( ) ( )i ijT t t t  is 40% for asset S and 28% for asset P. This effective marginal tax rate can 
then be used to calculate tax payment by multiplying incomes from the asset. 
 
iv. Heterogeneous income tax on long and short positions  
Following the work of Basak and Croitorn, the heterogeneous treatment of long and 
short positions is considered in the model using the following equation:  
( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))i i i i i ij j j j j j j j jt t t t t t t       
 
    (5.7) 
In equation (5.7), the total income tax from holding ( )ij t  units of asset j for investor i 
is equal to the sum of the tax on both long and short positions. The long positions 
( ( ) ( ))ij jt t 
  are taxed at long-position tax rate i
j  , and short positions ( ( ) ( ))
i
j jt t 
  
are taxed at short-position tax rate i
j  . This setting may cause the taxation function to 
be non-differentiable at zero income. Apart from this special case, all functions ( )iT  , 
( )iSt   and ( )
i
Pt   are assumed to be continuously differentiable.  
 
v. Capital gains  
The Basak and Croitorn (2001) model is improved by including taxes on capital gains. 
All capital gains functions are assumed to be continuously differentiable and are defined 
as:  
2
1
2 1( ) ( ) 1 ( )
t
S
t
G S t S t dS t     (5.8) 
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2
1
2 1( ) ( ) 1 ( )
t
P
t
G P t P t dP t     (5.9) 
Thus, dynamic capital gain is expressed as ( )dS t  and ( )dP t  (or *( )S t dt  and *( )P t dt ).  
 
vi. The accrual capital gains taxation 
The continuous tax system developed by Zuckerman (1989) in which contingent capital 
gains tax liabilities are assessed continuously is applied. For a pure risk-free arbitrage 
opportunity, investors need to complete buy and sell orders simultaneously to avoid an 
outflow of capital, and sell the portfolio as a whole to realize a risk-free return. The 
whole process should happen in a short period of time (after a small change of asset 
price or new income is received) to guarantee the riskless profit. Thus, all capital gains 
liabilities are assumed to be realized and paid immediately when the portfolio is sold. 
As no capital gains tax is deferred over a long time in the process of generating tax 
arbitrage profits, the time benefit of capital gains tax (the tax payment is deferred until 
the sale of asset) is not important in an arbitrage opportunity and therefore ignored in 
this chapter. Capital gains tax is simplified by applying Zuckerman’s model, but the 
incorporation of capital gains tax in a discussion of arbitrage opportunities is still a 
challenging task. This is because capital gains could turn out to be either positive or 
negative at the end while income from an asset with a long position must be non-
negative. So the calculation of capital gains tax is different from that of income tax. A 
discussion of tax arbitrage with capital gains tax is also different from that with income 
tax only. This difference cannot be shown from calculation formulas in this section but 
can be shown from the discussion of tax arbitrage opportunities in Section 5.3 and 5.4. 
One of main contributions of this chapter is to find tax arbitrage with capital gains tax 
and income tax together. Further details are given in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.  
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vii. Tax on capital gains  
Investor i has a contingent tax liability on capital gains received from the two risky 
assets. At time t the investor will have a contingent liability equal to:  
* *( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))i i i i iS S P PCGT cgt t S t cgt t P t                                                                (5.10) 
where ( )iCGT  , ( )iScgt   and ( )
i
Pcgt   are functions of taxation. The argument of the tax 
liability ( )iCGT   is referred to as investor i’s taxable capital gains, and the argument 
of the taxable capital gains ( )ijcgt  is referred to as the total capital gains from asset j. 
For convenience, investor i’s tax liability on capital gains at time t is sometimes denoted 
by ( )iCGT t , taxable capital gains from asset j at time t by (t)ijcgt , and their derivatives 
(marginal tax rate) by *( )iCGT t  (or 
*iCGT ) and *(t)ijcgt . 
 
viii. Heterogeneous tax treatment of gains and losses  
The heterogeneous treatment of capital gains and losses is included in the model, as 
follows:  
* * *( ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))i i i i i iS S S S S Scgt S t t S t cg t S t cg    
 
    (5.11) 
* * *( ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))i i i i i iP P P P P Pcgt P t t P t cg t P t cg    
 
    (5.12) 
In (5.11) and (5.12), capital gains *( ( ) ( ))iS t S t
  and *( ( ) ( ))iP t P t
  are taxed at tax rates 
i
Scg   and 
i
Pcg  , and capital losses 
*( ( ) ( ))iS t S t
  and *( ( ) ( ))iP t P t
  are taxed at tax 
rates i
Scg   and 
i
Pcg  . This setting may cause the taxation function to be non-
differentiable at zero capital gains. The solution to this non-differentiability has 
previously been developed (Basak and Croitoru 2001). For non-zero capital gains, the 
functions ( )iCGT  , ( )iScgt   and ( )
i
Pcgt   are assumed to be continuously differentiable.  
 
b. Dynamic Net Return 
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In the optimization, the total dynamic net return from the portfolio is based on the value 
of asset holdings, dynamic income and capital gains. Given current wealth ( )iX t , the 
net incremental amount for the current period is obtained by summing the return from 
the riskless bond, [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( )i i iS PX t t S t t P t r t dt   , with the total return from the 
two risky assets, ( )[ ( ) ( ) ]iS St dS t t dt  and ( )[ ( ) ( ) ]
i
P Pt dP t t dt  , and deducting total 
tax liabilities on incomes and capital gains (t)iT  and (t)iCGT . Thus, 
( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ]i i i i iS P S SdX t X t t S t t P t r t dt t dS t t dt         
( )[ ( ) ( ) ] ( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))i i i i i iP P S S S P P Pt dP t t dt T t t t t t t dt          
* *( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))i i i i iS S P PCGT cgt t S t cgt t P t dt                      (5.13) 
In addition, after replacing variables for income and capital gains, ( )dS t , ( )S t dt , 
( )dP t  and ( )P t dt , with corresponding Brownian motion variables in (5.13), a new 
equation with stochastic variable W is obtained as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )i i iS S SdX t X t r t dt t S t { t r t dt t dW t }       
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i iP P Pt P t { t r t dt t dW t } T t dt CGT t dt        (5.14) 
Using the Markowitz mean-variance model, the objective of investors will be to 
maximize the expected value of total net dynamic return in a finite time period [0,T],  
0
[ ( )]
T
iMax E dX t  (5.15) 
while risk is considered in a risk constraint. 
 
c. Risk Constraint 
If the total risk (volatility of return) is equal to zero, this portfolio is called as an 
arbitrage portfolio when its expected return is larger than the free-risk rate. If total risk 
is not equal to zero, investors need to constrain it to be under a certain level. To control 
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for this factor, a risk constraint is added. Since the correlation coefficient between two 
assets is equal to 1, so the total volatility of the portfolio should be equal to the linear 
combination of the two assets’ own volatility. Consequently, a function is defined to 
reflect the total portfolio risk as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )i i i iS P S P maxt t S t t t t P t         (5.16) 
Here, ( )i t × ( )S t  is the portfolio return volatility. 
 
5.2.2. Model for Non-perfectly Correlated Assets 
For non-perfectly correlated assets, another optimization model is proposed based on 
the work of Dammon and Green (1987) in which heterogeneous taxation across 
investors and assets is considered. Their work is extended by programming the problem 
in continuous-time (pay-offs from assets are not static but continuous), and adding to 
the model heterogeneous taxation on income and capital gains, taxation of capital losses 
and asymmetric tax treatment of long and short positions.  
It is assumed that investors are able to invest in a set of underlying assets whose 
prices
jA  follow Brownian motion. Two independent Brownian motions, i jW   and c jW  , 
for each asset’s income and capital gains, are introduced so that the asset returns are 
non-perfectly correlated.  
 
a. Dynamic Returns with Bounds 
 
(i)        Dynamic income and capital gains  
As in subsection 5.2.1a, it is assumed that there is no fixed correlation between capital 
gains and income. Stochastic income and prices are generated using different W for 
different assets j, 1 2j { }   . 
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,( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( )]j j A Aj jA A i j
d t t t dt t dW t       (5.17) 
,( )+ ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( )]j j j
c c
j A j A A c jdA t t dt A t t dt t dW t     (5.18) 
 
(ii)      Caps and floors  
In Dammon and Green (1987), static pay-offs from assets are used when tracing 
arbitrage opportunities. In this work, pay-offs are assumed to be continuous. Basak and 
Croitorn  (2001) discuss tax arbitrage under continuous pay-offs. However, they assume 
perfect correlation (1 or -1) between selected assets. In reality, most assets have non-
perfect correlation between each other. As a result, the use of Basak and Croitorn’s 
model is restricted. To relax this restriction, it is assumed that there is a cap and a floor 
on each underlying asset’s income and capital gains instead of perfect correlation 
between two selected assets. 50  In practice, this assumption can be achieved by 
purchasing derivative instruments (e.g. collars). New dynamic income and capital gains 
with bounds are then defined as:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
j A A jj j
B
A At dt Max{Flo t Min{Cap t t dt}}      (5.19) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
j j
B
j A A jdA t Max{Flo t Min{Cap t dA t }}    (5.20) 
 
b. Optimization Model and Arbitrage Opportunity 
Investors want to maximize net portfolio returns ( )idX t at time t, calculated as follows:  
( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ( ) ( ))]
j j j j j
i i B B i i i B
A j A A A A
j j
dX t t dA t t dt T t t t dt        
*[ ( ( ) ( ))]
j j
i i i B
A A j
j
CGT cgt t A t dt                                                         (5.21) 
                                                          
50 Here, a cap is defined as a derivative whereby the seller makes payments at the end of each period in 
which the asset price exceeds the strike price. Similarly, a floor is defined as a derivative whereby the 
buyer receives payments at the end of each period in which the asset price is below the strike price. 
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If there is a portfolio guaranteeing that: 
( ) 0 ( ), ( )
j
i B B
j AdX t dA t t dt                                                                           (5.22) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
j
i i
A j
j
X t t A t                                (5.23) 
where there are values of ( )BjdA t  and ( )j
B
A t dt  such that ( ) 0
idX t  , then a tax 
arbitrage opportunity exists for investor i. Note that if such a set of asset holdings exists 
but the portfolio is limited to a small size to retain the arbitrage opportunity, only a local 
tax arbitrage opportunity exists. If the portfolio is not limited to a small size, there is a 
global tax arbitrage opportunity in which investors are able to secure a large amount of 
risk-free return on an after-tax basis. Section 5.4 contains more analysis of this type of 
opportunity.  
 
5.3. Tax Arbitrage for Perfectly Correlated Assets 
In this section, tax arbitrage is discussed when two risky assets are positively perfectly 
correlated. This can happen when both financial assets (including derivatives) are 
derived from the same underlying asset. In Basak and Croitorn (2001), the equilibrium 
between two perfectly correlated assets in the market is achieved on the assumption that 
there is equilibrium between two investors when neither of them can realize more risk-
free profit by enlarging current holdings further. This assumption, however, does not 
always hold in the market. In this section, constraints on the existence of tax arbitrage 
are determined so that the arbitrage opportunity can be found quickly according to given 
asset parameters and tax functions (rates). In theory, a global tax arbitrage is an 
arbitrage opportunity for which an investor can always increase his/her risk-free profit 
by enlarging current holdings given enough liquidity. When a global tax arbitrage 
opportunity exists, rational investors will want to realize as much risk-free profit as 
possible, and there will be no equilibrium in the market at that moment. Subsequently, a 
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large number of buying orders will quickly change the asset price and therefore remove 
the global tax arbitrage opportunity. In Section 5.3.1, conditions for the existence of tax 
arbitrage are discussed. The result can help investors to judge if there is a tax arbitrage 
opportunity between two given assets in the current market and how much risk-free 
profit can be made at most. In Section 5.3.2, equilibrium between the two assets is 
discussed and compared to the equilibrium found by Basak and Croitorn (2001). The 
comparison will help us to assess the importance of capital gains tax when discussing 
tax arbitrage. 
 
5.3.1. Conditions for the Existence of Arbitrage Opportunities 
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, investors want to maximize dynamic net return within a 
given risk budget (see equation (5.15)). The best way to achieve this objective is to find 
riskless arbitrage opportunities. In other words, investors want to determine a portfolio 
between two perfectly correlated assets for which risk ( )i t  (see equation (5.16)) is 0 
while its dynamic return ( )dX t  is larger than that from a riskless ‘bond’ with price B. 
As in Basak and Croitorn (2001), on a pre-tax basis, if two assets are perfectly 
positively correlated, an arbitrage opportunity exists when there is a pre-tax mispricing 
between these two assets. This mispricing is defined as:  
( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) 0S P S S P Pt t r t t t r t t          (5.24) 
In other words, there is a pre-tax mispricing if two assets’ risk premiums (expected 
return minus risk-free rate) per unit of volatility risk are different. 
Similarly, on an after-tax basis, a so-called tax arbitrage opportunity exists when 
there is mispricing between two assets.  
* *( ( ) ( ) ) ( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i iS S P P S P S Pt t t t t t t t S t P t                 (5.25) 
or,  
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* *( ( ) ( ) ) ( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i iS S P P S P S Pt t t t t t t t S t P t                 (5.26) 
where 
[ ( ) ( )] ( )S S St r t t     
* *[ ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))] ( ( ) ( ))i i i i i i iS S S S S S S P P P St t t t T t t t t t t S t t          
* * * * *[ ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))] ( ( ) ( ))i i i i i i iS S S S P P SS t cgt t S t CGT cgt t S t cgt t P t S t t       (5.27) 
[ ( ) ( )] ( )P P Pt r t t     
* *[ ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))] ( ( ) ( ))i i i i i i iP P P P S S S P P P Pt t t t T t t t t t t P t t          
* * * * * *[ ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))] ( ( ) ( ))i i i i i i iP P S S P P PP t cgt t P t CGT cgt t S t cgt t P t P t t        (5.28) 
S  and P  are risk premiums per unit of volatility risk on an after-tax basis for assets S 
and P. Using 
S  as an example, [ ( ) ( )] ( )S St r t t   is pre-tax risk premium per unit of 
risk. The following expression 
* *( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))i i i i i i iS S S S S S S P P Pt t t t T t t t t t t        
calculates the income tax on investment of asset S. The income tax cost per unit of risk 
is calculated by dividing this income tax by asset price and volatility risk, ( ) ( )SS t t . In 
addition, the following expression 
* * * * *( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))i i i i i i iS S S S P PS t cgt t S t CGT cgt t S t cgt t P t     
calculates the capital gains tax on investment of asset S. The capital gains tax cost per 
unit of risk is calculated by dividing this capital gains tax by asset price and volatility 
risk, ( ) ( )SS t t . Finally, the risk premium per unit of risk on an after-tax basis is 
calculated by deducting income tax cost per unit of risk and capital gains tax cost per 
unit of risk from pre-tax risk premium per unit of risk, as shown in equation (5.27). 
In contrast to the pre-tax analysis, mispricing on an after-tax basis depends on 
marginal tax rates and therefore on asset returns and asset holdings. If the after-tax 
mispricing of the arbitrage opportunity is non-zero and retains the same sign under any 
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possible returns from certain asset holdings (see inequalities (5.25) and (5.26)), then it is 
defined as a tax arbitrage opportunity. 
Henceforth, assets are assumed to be neither free of tax on income nor free of tax 
on capital gains. The two assets are perfectly positively correlated, so their income and 
capital gains should have a linear relationship. In statistics, the correlation coefficient is 
a measure of the linear correlation between two variables X and Y, giving a value 
between +1 and −1 inclusive. There will be a linear relationship between two variables 
if their correlation coefficient is 1. This measurement was developed by Karl Pearson 
(1895) from a related idea introduced by Francis Galton in the 1880s. So, with an 
assumption that two assets’ returns are perfectly positively by correlated (correlation 
coefficient is 1), we obtain:  
( ) ( )+ S Pt a t b     (5.29) 
* *
cg( ) ( ) cgS t a P t b    (5.30) 
* *
total( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))S P totalt S t a t P t b       (5.31) 
where, a , cga , totala , b , cgb , b  are all constant, and a , cga , totala  are equal to
S P 
   , cg S P    , total S P    respectively. Since  , cg , total  are all 1, a ,
cga , totala  should all be equal to the ratio of corresponding volatility, S P   , S P   ,
S P  . We then obtain the following expression for after-tax mispricing from (5.27) 
and (5.28),  
* *( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))
( ) ( ) ( )
i i i i i i i
S S S S S S S S P P P
S P
S S
t r t t t t t T t t t t t t
t S t t
       
 
 
 
    
* * * * *( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))
( ) ( )
i i i i i i i
S S S S P P
S
S t cgt t S t CGT cgt t S t cgt t P t
S t t
  



* *( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))( ) ( )
[
( ) ( ) ( )
i i i i i i i
P P P P S S S P P PP
P P
t t t t T t t t t t tt r t
t P t t
      
 

   
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* * * * * *( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))
]
( ) ( )
i i i i i i i
P P S S P P
P
P t cgt t P t CGT cgt t S t cgt t P t
P t t
  


    
* * *( ) [( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))]i i iS P S S S P P Pt t t S t t t t P t t T        
* * * * *[( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))]i i iS S P PS t cgt S t t P t cgt P t t CGT    
*( ) [ ( ) ( ( ) ( ))iS P S St b t S t t     
* * *( )( ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )))]i i iP S S P Pt a t S t t t P t t T      
*[ ( ) ( ( ) ( ))icg S Sb cgt S t t  
* * * *( )( ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )))]i i icg S S P PP t a cgt S t t cgt P t t CGT      
= ( )S P in cgt MisTax MisTax     (5.32) 
where  
inMisTax =
* * *
*( ) ( ) ( )[ ( )( )]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i i i
iS S P
P
S S P
b t a t t
t T
S t t S t t P t t
 
  
    
cgMisTax =
* * *
* *
( ) ( ) ( )
[ ( )( )]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i i i
cg S cg S iP
S S P
b cgt a cgt cgt
P t CGT
S t t S t t P t t  
    
Here,  represents the corresponding taxable income and capital gains from asset S, and 
*iT = *( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))i i i i iS S S P P PT t t t t t t      
*iCGT = * * *( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))i i i i iS S P PCGT cgt t S t cgt t P t    
This leads to the following properties giving the conditions for the existence of tax 
arbitrage (case one).51 
Proposition 1 Given two assets’ parameter values, , , , ,cg cga b a b  ( ),S t ( ),P t ( ),S t
( ),P t  and tax functions of investor i, ( ),
i
St  ( ),
i
Pt  ( ),
iT  ( ),iScgt  ( ),
i
Pcgt  ( )
iCGT  , if for all 
scenarios in Table A.2 ( ,i j ), the following inequality always holds 
 ( ) 0S P in cgt MisTax MisTax     
                                                          
51 MisTaxin refers to net income tax of the portfolio and MisTaxcg refers to net capital gains tax of the 
portfolio. 
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then there is a tax arbitrage opportunity between the two assets (case one – referred to 
(5.35)). 
 
5.3.2. Proof of Proposition 1 
From equation (5.32), it follows that there will be a tax arbitrage opportunity if and only 
if S P   is positive (or negative) for any possible value of capital gain
*( )P t . A 
precondition that  
* *
( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
i i
S S P Pcga cgt S t t cgt P t t  =0 
must hold. This is because capital gains *( )P t  could be either a large positive or 
negative figure, which makes it difficult to predict the value of  
* * *( )( ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )))i icg S S P PP t a cgt S t t cgt P t t   
in 
cgMisTax  and consequently makes it difficult to keep the value of S P   positive 
(or negative) for any value of capital gains. If * ( ) ( ( ) ( ))i
S Scga cgt S t t
*
( ) ( ( ) ( ))
i
P P
cgt P t t  
is zero for any value of capital gains, then 
* **
( )( ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )))
i i
S S P PcgP t a cgt S t t cgt P t t   will also be zero for any value of 
capital gains, and therefore the value of 
cgMisTax will be independent of 
*( )P t . 
Consequently, S P   will always be positive (or negative) under any value of capital 
gains. In other words, its sign will be constant for any value of capital gains. However, 
when asset holdings and short sale amounts are not large enough, the volatility of 
capital gains will change the argument ( )  and make their marginal tax rate *
j ( )
icgt  
move between its lower and upper bounds, making it impossible to retain the equality
**
( )( ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
i
S ScgP t a cgt S t t
*
( ) ( ( ) ( )))=0
i
P P
cgt P t t . Thus, local arbitrage opportunities in 
which investors expect to obtain a limited riskless return do not exist for perfectly 
correlated assets. So it is only necessary to discuss global arbitrage opportunities. 
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In theory, for a global arbitrage opportunity, investors can expect to secure a large 
riskless positive return by enlarging their positions. In practice, this enlargement is 
subject to real market restrictions, such as the number of assets in the market. Thus all 
conditions to secure a large profit mentioned in the following discussion are theoretical. 
Investors can increase the return by enlarging the size of the global arbitrage portfolio 
until some real market practical limit is reached. In the following analysis, therefore, 
this chapter seeks to prove mathematically that there may exist a portfolio (stated in 
Proposition 1) with a large size (M) which has a positive (or negative) net marginal 
mispricing, and further enlargement will not change the mispricing.52 So investors can 
keep enlarging the portfolio to lock in more and more positive risk-free return (global 
arbitrage opportunity). It can be seen from equation (5.32) that the value of the 
mispricing depends on marginal tax rates, * * * * * *( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ,i i i i i iS P S St t cgt cgt CGT T , and 
the marginal tax rates depend on the argument of the corresponding tax function. To fix 
these marginal tax rates at a certain level, a minimum size of holding, M, is set on each 
asset such that even with the smallest non-zero income or capital gain (e.g., £0.01), the 
investor will be subject to the top tax rate. In other words, M is assumed large enough 
so that * *( ) ( )i iS s St M t M   for any non-zero value of s . For example, if the investor 
pays the top income tax rate when income is over £20,000, this minimum size will be 
20,000/0.01=2,000,000. The minimum size for capital gains (both long and short 
positions) is also calculated, and the larger value of these minimum sizes is set as the 
value of M. If both income and capital gains tax rates are constant (independent of the 
total return), M could be any value. In the following proof, the argument of M means 
the investor is subject to the top tax rate (i.e., *( )iSt M ). In other words,  
( )iS t M    (5.33) 
                                                          
52 In the mathematical proof, we assume that the market can provide enough liquidity so that all buying or 
selling orders can be executed at the current price.  
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In addition, setting the portfolio risk equal to 0, the following is obtained from equation 
(5.16): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0i iS S P Pt S t t t P t t                                                                 (5.34) 
As a result, there will be a global arbitrage opportunity if and only if: 53  
Case One:  
( ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ) ( M M ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) )S S P P S PS t t P t t t S t tM tM t P t                  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )S Pt t S t P t        (5.35) 
Case Two:  
( M M ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ) ( M M ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) )S S P P S PS t t P t t t S t t P t t t                  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )S Pt t S t P t        (5.36) 
In both cases, the inequality exists for at least one possible outcome.  
In these two cases, all marginal tax rates, *( )iSt , 
*( )iSt , 
*( )iPcgt , 
*( )iPcgt , 
*( )iT  and 
*( )iCGT , have three possible outcomes depending on the argument ( )M , ( )M  and 
(0) . In addition, from equation (5.32), it follows that the mispricing on an after-tax 
basis, S P  , can be divided into three independent parts: pre-tax mispricing between 
assets, different income taxes and different capital gains taxes. Since the first part is 
only dependent on constant parameters, only the second and third parts need to be 
discussed in detail in the proof. (Note: since the proof of Case Two is simply the proof 
of Case One when S is set as P and P is set as S, only the proof of Case One is given).  
 
a. Differential Tax on Capital Gains 
In this section, different capital gains taxes which are dependent on *( )S t  and *( )P t  
are discussed. As capital could increase or decrease, the arguments *( ) ( )S t S t  and 
                                                          
53In arbitrage, investors will always hold the under-priced asset while short selling the overpriced 
asset. 
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*( ) ( )P t P t  could be positive, negative or zero. Different scenarios are discussed 
dependent on the value of capital gains.    
 
i. When *( ) 0S t   and *( ) 0P t    
As discussed above, to guarantee a positive mispricing in (5.32), the first condition 
which must hold is that 
* *
( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) =0
i i
S S P Pcga cgt M S t t cgt M P t t  . 
In addition, if =0cgb , according to equation (5.30), 
*( )S t  and *( )P t  will always have 
the same sign. So the condition  
* *
( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) =0
i i
S S P Pcga cgt M S t t cgt M P t t   
can be transformed to 
* *
( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) =0
i i
S S P Pcg cgt S t t cgt P tM tMa      
and 
* *
( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) =0
i i
S S P Pcg cgt S t t cgt P tM tMa                                                       (5.37) 
However, if =0cgb  does not hold, the arguments ( )M  for the two assets could be 
different (one is ( )M  and the other is ( )M ) depending on the value of their capital 
gains *( )S t  and *( )P t . Thus, the marginal tax rate for positive and negative capital 
gains needs to be the same, 
* *( ) ( )i iS Scgt cgtM M    (5.38) 
* *( ) ( )i iP Pcgt cgtM M    (5.39) 
such that  the following condition can be retained: 
* *
( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) =0
i i
S S P Pcg cgt S t t cgt P tM M ta    
Capital gains taxes are then given by:  
* *=[( ( ( ) ( ))) ( )] ( - 0)i icg cg S SMisTax b S t t cgt oM M Mr CG MT or       (5.40) 
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Now, the value of 
cgMisTax  only depends on certain asset parameters and is static at 
several specific amounts. 
 
ii. When *( ) 0S t    
Since the two assets are perfectly positively correlated, we obtain  
*( ) /cg cgP t b a   (5.41) 
Substituting this into equation 5.32 and setting the argument of *iPcgt  and  
*i
PCGT  as 
cg
cg
a
b , 
we have total marginal capital gains taxes:  
* *={ [ ] ( ( ) ( ))} ( )
cg cgcgi i
cg P P
cgcg cg
b bb
MisTax cgt P t t CGT
aa
M M
a
     (5.42) 
iii. When *( ) 0P t    
Since the two assets are perfectly positively correlated, we obtain  
*( ) cgS t b  (5.43) 
Total marginal capital gains taxes are then given by:  
*= [ ( )] ( ( ) ( ))icg cg S cg SMMisTax { b cgt b S t t }
*[ ( )]i cgMCGT b   (5.44) 
In conclusion, with the constraint on the marginal capital gains tax rate (equations 
5.38 and 5.39), the total capital gains tax (MisTaxcg) is changed to be static (when M = 
+M, -M or 0) rather than continuous. This amount is dependent on the value of the asset 
parameters, such as bcg, S(t) and ( )S t . With static capital gains tax payments, it is 
possible to find an arbitrage opportunity.  
 
b. Differential Tax on Income 
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In this section, different income taxes which are dependent on ( )S t  and ( )P t  are 
discussed. Since both ( )S t  and ( )P t  must be non-negative, the discussion of income 
tax is different from that of capital gains tax.  
( ) ( )S Pt a t b      (5.45) 
( ) ( ) 0S Pt t   , =1 0S P S Pa            
54 (5.46) 
From equation (5.45) and (5.46), we obtain:  
( ) 0S t max{ b }    (5.47) 
( ) 0 )P t max{ b a }      (5.48) 
Dependent on the value of b , we can divide the discussion of income tax into three 
scenarios, (i) to (iii), as below. 
 
i. 0 ( ) ( ) 0S Pb t b t       
Similar to the analysis of capital gains tax, the bound of MisTaxin is now discussed 
depending on the value of ( )P t . 
 
1) When ( ) 0P t    
An arbitrage opportunity will exist, if and only if 
* *( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) 0i iS S P Pa t M S t t t M P t t       (5.49) 
From equation (5.32) , (5.33) and (5.35), the following can be obtained 
* * *
*( ) ( ) ( )[ ( )( )]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i i i
iS S P
in P
S S P
b t a t t
MisTax t T
S t t S t t P t t
 
  
     
* * *
*( ) ( ) ( )[ ( )( )]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i i i
iS S P
P
S S P
b t M a t M t M
t T
S t t S t t P t t
 
  
  
      
                                                          
54 In other words, since income from both assets, S and P, are perfectly positively correlated, a  must be 
positive. 
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As *( )iSt M , 
*( )
( ) ( )
i
S
SS t
Mb t
t



 and * *( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))i iS S P Pa t M S t t t M P t t     are constant, 
the value of the MisTaxin is only changed by ( )P t  and 
*iT . Since the marginal tax rate 
*iT  is non-negative, there will be a constant upper bound for the value of MisTaxin, if and 
only if equation (5.49) holds, as below    
* *
0
lim {[ ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )( ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
P
i i
in S S P S SMisTax b t M S t t t a t M S t t 

  

      
* *( ) ( ( ) ( )))] }i iP Pt M P t t T                                                            (5.50) 
Considering the argument of 
*iT , the value of MisTaxin is 
* *[ ( ) ( ( ) ( ))] ( ( ( )) ( ( )))i i i iS S S S P Pt b S t t T tM M Mt t t                                            (5.51)
                                     
Therefore55  
( ( )) ( ( ))i iS S P Pt t tM tM      =+M, -M or 0 
and  
inMisTax
* *
0 [ ( ) ( ( ) ( ))] ( )
i i
m { } S SM Mmax { t b S tM t T m }                                 (5.52) 
The constant upper bound for MisTaxin in equation (5.52) leads to a constant lower 
bound for S P  . Now, to guarantee the arbitrage opportunity, we only need to 
consider this lower bound to see whether it will make the expression S P   non-
negative for any value of ( )S t  and ( )P t .  
 
2) When ( ) 0P t    
Income tax payments are constant at  
* *[ ( ) ( ( ) ( ))] ( )i iin S SMisTax t b S t t TM M      (5.53) 
                                                          
55Here, when ( ) 0S t  , 
* *( )i iS St t M  , and 
*( ) ( ( ) ( ))iS St b S tM t   is constant. Thus the value of 
the MixTaxin above is only changed by 
* *( )( ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )))i iP S S P Pt a t M S t t t M P t t      
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ii. 0 ( ) 0 ( )S Pb t t b a          
 
1) When ( ) 0S t    
Similar to the analysis in (i), to guarantee the existence of an arbitrage opportunity, we 
require:   
* *( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) 0i iS P P Pt S t t tM tM P t                                                            (5.54) 
so that there is a constant upper bound for income taxes.  
*
0
0
{ lim { ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )
S
i
in m { } S PM SMMi MsTax max t b S t t t

 
    
    
* * *[ ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))]} ( )}i i iS S P Pa t M S t t t M P t t T m        
*
0 {[ ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )
i
m { }M M S Smax t b S t t b aM            
* * *( ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )))] ( )}i i iS S P Pa t M S t t t M P t t T m        (5.55) 
The argument of *( )iSt   depends on the value of income from asset S. In equation (5.55), 
the income from asset S is set to be infinitely close to but not equal to 0. Thus, 
multiplied by a large holding amount, the argument of *( )iSt   should still be +M  but not 
0 (see definition of +M in section 5.3.2). 
 
2) When ( ) 0S t    
Since the income is 0, ( )=P t b a    . From (5.55), income tax payments are constant at 
* *=[ ]( ( ) ( ( ) ( ))) ( )i iin P PMisTax b a t P t t TM M         (5.56) 
 
iii. 0 ( ) ( ) 0S Pb t a t        
 
1) When ( ) 0S t   and ( ) 0P t   
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To guarantee the existence of an arbitrage opportunity, we require  
* *( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) 0i iS S P Pa t M S t t t M P t t       (5.57) 
so there is a constant upper bound for income taxes.  
*
0
0 0
{ lim [ ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
P S
i
in m { } S SM MMisTax max t M b S t t
 

       
    
* * *( ) ( ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )))] ( )}i i iP S S P Pt a t M S t t t M P t t T m             
0                                                                                                                (5.58) 
which leads to a constant lower bound for S P  . To guarantee the arbitrage 
opportunity, we only need to consider this lower bound to see whether it will make the 
expression S P   non-negative for any value of ( )S t  and ( )P t .  
 
2) When ( ) 0iS t   and ( ) 0
i
P t    
Income tax payments are constant at 0. All possible scenarios of the values of MisTaxcg 
and MixTaxin have been discussed, and the upper bound for each of them in each 
scenario has been found. To check if the value of mispricing between two assets on an 
after-tax basis is non-negative consistently for any value of income and capital gains 
(case one tax arbitrage), we just need to make sure that in each scenario, even when the 
values of MisTaxcg and MixTaxin are at their maximum, S P  is non-negative, as 
shown in Proposition 1. Discussions in section 5.3.2 are summarized in Table 5.2 and 
support Proposition 1. 
Table 5. 2 Arbitrage for Case One 
Constraints  
1: 
* *( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
i i
cg S P
S P
a cgt cgt
S t t P t
M
t
M
   56                                                                      see eq. (5.37) 
2: 
* *( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
i i
S P
S P
Ma t t
S t t P t t
M
 
 
                                                                             see eq. (5.49) 
3: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0S P S P in cgt t t MisTax j MisM M M M Tax i i j                  
                                                          
56 If 0cgb  , we only require 
* *( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i i
cg S P
S P
M Ma cgt cgt
S t t P t t 
 
  and 
* *( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i i
cg S P
S P
M Ma cgt cgt
S t t P t t 
 
  
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i  * *( ) ( )S t P t   ( )cgMisTax i   
i=1  *( ) 0S t  ; 
  
* *
( ) ( )
[ ( )] ( 0)cg
S
b i i
SS t t
Mcgt or M MGT orMC      
57                (5.40) 
i=2  *( ) 0S t    * *
( ) ( )
[ ( ))] ( ( ))cg cg
P
b a i i
P cg cg cg cgP t t
{ cgt M b Ma } CGT b a

                (5.42) 
i=3  *( ) 0P t    =
* *
( ) ( )
[ ( )] [ ( )]cg
S
b i i
S cg cgS t t
{ cgt b } CGTM M b                                 (5.44) 
If 0b    
j  ( ) ( )S Pt t    ( )inMisTax j                                                                                     
j=1  ( ) 0P t    
* *
0 ( ) ( )
[ ( )] ( )
S
b i i
m { } SS tM tM
max { t T m }M
   
                                    (5.52) 
j=2  ( ) 0P t    =
* *
( ) ( )
[ ( )] ( )
S
b i i
SS t t
t TM M                                                             (5.53) 
If 0b    
j  ( ) ( )S Pt t    ( )inMisTax j   
j=1  ( ) 0S t    
*
0 ( ) ( )
[ ( )+( / )
S
b i
m { } SM tM S t
max t M{ b a         
* *( ) ( ) *
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )] ( )
i i
S P
S P
a t t i
S t t P t t
M M
T m }  
 
                                                           (5.55) 
j=2  ( ) 0S t    =
* ( ) *
( ) ( )
[ / ]( ) ( )
i
P
P
t i
P t t
M
b a T M  

                                                           (5.56) 
If 0b    
j  ( ) ( )S Pt t    ( )inMisTax j   
j=1  ( ) 0S t   
  
0                                                                                                   (5.57) 
j=2  ( ) 0S t   
  
=0                                                                                                    (5.58) 
 
5.3.3. Further Special Cases 
The discussion above is based on the assumption that both assets are subject to income 
tax and capital gains tax. However, there are cases in which assets may be tax-free with 
respect to either income tax or capital gains tax.  
 
If one of the assets is free of capital gain tax ( ( ) 0ijc Mgt  )  
                                                          
57For this case, the argument of *( )iScgt   has two possible values, M  and M . The argument of 
*( )iCGT   has three possible values, M , 0 and M . Thus in total, the whole expression has six 
possible values. If arbitrage exists, all six values must hold the sign of after-tax mispricing unchanged. 
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According to Constraint 1 in Table 5.2, if a tax arbitrage opportunity exists, the other 
asset must also be free of capital gains tax. Thus, the existence of tax arbitrage depends 
only on income taxes.  
 
If one of the assets is free of income taxes ( ( ) 0ijt M  )  
(a) If ( ) 0i
S
t M   and ( ) 0i
P
t M   
According to Constraint 2 in Table 5.2, only an arbitrage opportunity in Case One may 
exist. 
(b) If ( ) 0iSt M   and ( ) 0
i
Pt M    
According to Constraint 2 in Table 5.2, only an arbitrage opportunity in Case Two may 
exist.  
(c) If ( ) 0iSt M   and ( ) 0
i
Pt M    
The existence of a tax arbitrage opportunity depends only on capital gains taxes.  
 
5.3.4. Implications 
According to Table 5.2, if the arbitrage opportunity in Case One exists, the values of the 
parameters must satisfy the three constraints, 1, 2 and 3. In the constraints, capital gains 
tax and income tax are calculated separately by different functions according to their 
different tax rules. There are two findings from the above analysis. First, a local 
arbitrage opportunity in which investors expect to obtain a finite riskless return does not 
exist between perfectly correlated assets without caps and floors. This is because the 
uncertainty of the sign and unbounded positive size of capital gains make it impossible 
to retain the condition 
* *
( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) =0i i
S S P Pcga cgt S t t cgt P t t     
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with a small holding. So a riskless return cannot be guaranteed without restrictions 
imposed on capital gains. Second, a global arbitrage opportunity exists between 
perfectly correlated assets without caps and floors but does not exist consistently 
depending on asset prices. Only when the prices of the two assets satisfy the condition  
* *
( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) =0i i
S S P Pcga cgt M S t t cgt M P t t   
with a large holding can a global arbitrage opportunity exist, and the top tax rate needs 
to be considered in the constraints as well. With these constraints, investors can quickly 
determine whether there is a global tax arbitrage opportunity between two perfectly 
correlated assets with given asset parameters and tax functions. 
 
5.3.5. Equilibrium with Tax Arbitrage 
In real markets, investors usually optimize portfolios based on expectations derived 
from assets’ historical performance. In this continuous-time model, however, it is 
assumed that all optimal portfolios are achieved when current returns are used as 
expectations of the future in the optimization (note: this return is dynamic and should 
follow a random walk in future). Under this assumption, there will be a dynamic 
equilibrium between risky assets for investors when there is no global arbitrage 
opportunity. In equilibrium, the after-tax mispricing should be zero so that there is no 
motivation for investors to change the current portfolio to get a better return under the 
risk budget.  
 
a. Equilibrium for a Single Investor 
In equilibrium on an after-tax basis, two perfectly correlated assets’ after-tax risk 
premium per unit of volatility risk must be the same. Consequently, the following 
equation is obtained (the definition of this premium can be obtained from equation (5.27) 
and (5.28)):  
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( ( ) ( ) ) ( ( ) ( ) )i i i iS S P P S Pt t t t t t                                                                                 (5.59) 
Including the pre-tax mispricing ( )S P t in this equation, we obtain the following 
expression:  
( ) ( ) ( ( ( ) ( ) ) ( ( ) ( ) ))i i i iS P S P S S P P S Pt t t t t t t t                
* *[( ( ) ( ( ) ( ))) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ( ) ( ))) ( ( ) ( ))]i i i iS S S S S P P P P Pt t t t S t t t t t t P t t          
*( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))i i i i iS S S P P PT t t t t t t      
* * * * * *[( ( ) ( ( ) ( ))) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ( ) ( ))) ( ( ) ( ))]i i i iS S S P P PS t cgt t S t S t t P t cgt t P t P t t      
* * *( ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )))i i i i iS S P PCGT cgt t S t cgt t P t                                         (5.60) 
Proposition 3 in Appendix A.1 presents the resulting condition on rational holdings 
( )ˆ ˆi iS P   in equilibrium which is derived from equation (5.60).  
 
b. Market Equilibrium 
This section assumes that there is an equilibrium between two investors, and pre-tax 
mispricing ( )S P t exists. This allows us to explain the role of mispricing in financial 
markets and the properties of equilibrium. The following analysis assumes that the 
taxation functions are continuously differentiable. According to the conclusion of Basak 
and Croitorn (2001), with given risk exposure budget for investor 1 and 2, 1( )t  and
2 ( )t , the mispricing has to be such that two investors’ holdings, i
S  and 
i
P  (i =1, 2), 
determined from non-satiation, clear the financial markets. This yields the expression 
for mispricing reported in Proposition 4 in Appendix A.2. The proposition on market 
equilibrium in Basak and Croitorn (2001) is improved by including tax on capital gains.  
As in the conclusion of Basak and Croitorn (2001) at the individual level, the pre-
tax mispricing compensates each investor for differences in taxation across securities: 
they will adjust their portfolio holdings to the equilibrium level until the compensation 
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is exact. By doing this a single investor will in general not simply choose the portfolio 
strategy that minimizes the amount of tax paid. However, at the market level, investors' 
demand/behavior is aggregated to that of a representative investor in the market. 
Adopting this macro view, it can be proved that the pre-tax mispricing in the market 
equilibrium is set so that the representative investor effectively minimizes the amount of 
aggregate tax paid. In this work, after including capital gains tax, it is found that in 
equilibrium, the representative investor minimizes the aggregate amount of income tax 
payments as well as capital gains tax payments, 1 2 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )T t T t CGT t CGT t   , as 
proved in Proposition 5 in Appendix A.3.  
From a mathematical viewpoint, the inclusion of capital gains tax leads to a 
simple conclusion that equilibrium is obtained when aggregate income tax is minimized 
if only income tax is considered, and equilibrium is obtained when aggregate tax on 
both income and capital gains is minimized if both income and capital gains tax are 
considered. However, this conclusion has a significant implication in finance. It is 
assumed that there is only one asset in the market with a constant supply N, and that 
there are two investors, A and B, subject to different tax rates (A has a high tax rate on 
income but a low tax rate on capital gains while B has a low tax rate on income but a 
high tax rate on capital gains). We further assume that both investors are passive and the 
market will decide on the distribution of the asset weight between them. Market 
equilibrium is obtained when the total net return of both investors are maximized 
(Pareto Optimality). In fact, no matter how the market distributes the asset weight, the 
total gross return from both investors is constant and independent of the distribution. 
The heterogeneous tax rates between the two investors, however, means that the total 
tax payment from both investors and therefore their total net return depends on the 
distribution of the asset weight. For example, more asset weight to investor A will 
decrease the total capital gains tax but increase the total income tax, and more asset 
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weight to investor B will decrease the total income tax but increase the total capital 
gains tax. If the conclusion of Basak and Croitorn (2001) is adopted, then the market 
always distributes all asset weight to investor B to minimize the aggregate income tax 
payment, and this distribution is regarded as equilibrium in the market. Nevertheless, 
this equilibrium should never exist since an efficient market will find the best trade-off 
between income tax and capital gains tax to minimize the aggregate tax payment. As a 
result, investors as a whole can get maximum net reward from the market. This 
conclusion is also applicable when there are more than two assets and more than two 
investors in the market. So the conclusion of Basak and Croitorn (2001) does not hold, 
and my work proves that in the discussion of market equilibrium on an after-tax basis, if 
investors are subject to capital gains tax, market equilibrium obtained with an income 
tax only assumption would not be applicable after incorporating capital gains tax. 
 
5.4. Tax Arbitrage for Non-perfectly Correlated Assets 
This section extends the model introduced in Section 5.2.2 to determine the constraints 
that will allow the existence of tax arbitrage opportunities between non-perfectly 
correlated assets with caps and floors.  
 
5.4.1. Single Investor 
It is first assumed that there is only one investor and two risky assets.  
 
a. Local Arbitrage with Static Payoff 
In local arbitrage, an investor obtains a small riskless return by holding one asset and 
short-selling the other, and this return cannot be increased by enlarging the size of the 
arbitrage portfolio. If the payoff of assets is static, then proposition 6 below can be 
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obtained. ( )BjA t  and ( )j
B
A t  are ‘asset price with bound’ and ‘income with bound’, 
respectively. 
 
Proposition 6. There will be a local tax arbitrage opportunity if and only if there is a set 
of asset holdings, ( )
j
i
A t , for investor i , that solves the following system of inequalities:  
( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ( ) ( ))]
j j j j j
i i B B i i i B
A j A A A A
j j
dX t t dA t t dt T t t t dt        
*[ ( ( ) ( ))]
j j
i i i B
A A j
j
CGT cgt t A t dt   
0 ( ) ( ) 1 2
j
B B
j AdA t t dt j                                                                        (5.61) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
j
i i
A j
j
X t t A t   (5.62) 
In (5.61),  
( )[ ( ) ( ) ]
j j
i B B
A j Aj
t dA t t dt   
is the pre-tax total return from the portfolio in the period dt while  
[ ( ( ) ( ))]
j j j
i i i B
A A Aj
T t t t dt   and 
*
[ ( ( ) ( ))]
j j
i i i B
A A jj
CGT cgt t A t dt  
are income and capital gains tax payments respectively. Thus, the expression calculates 
the net return from the portfolio in the period dt. If this net return is non-negative for 
any value of income and capital gains in the period, there is an arbitrage opportunity on 
an after-tax basis.  
 
Proposition 7. The local tax arbitrage opportunities can be divided into two types. 
1. Arbitrage type A  
Suppose that holdings exist such that the dynamic return of the portfolio is 
( ) 0 ( ) ( ) 1 2
j
i B B
j AdX t dA t t dt j       (5.63) 
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In arbitrage type A, the investor expects to obtain a positive riskless return.  
2. Arbitrage type B  
Suppose that holdings exist such that there is at least one possible return 
( ) ( ) 1 2
j
B B
j AdA t t dt j     for which  
( ) 0idX t   (5.64) 
In arbitrage type B, the investor only has a chance of obtaining a positive riskless 
return. In other words, the portfolio will return either 0 or a positive net profit to 
arbitrageurs. A non-negative rather than a positive net profit is guaranteed. 
 
b. Local Arbitrage with Continuous Payoff 
In the model given by equations (5.63) and (5.64), if the optimal solution returns a non-
negative objective function value, the portfolio obtained is a tax arbitrage portfolio. This 
optimization method is applicable for assets with static payoffs. There is, however, a 
technical issue for assets with continuous payoffs. How can one use finite constraints to 
present infinite possible payoffs (continuous payoffs)? To deal with this issue, cap and 
floor options are introduced. As in Section 5.2, cap and floor options can set a boundary 
on both income and capital gains for each asset. Without taxation, it is easy to confirm 
the existence of arbitrage opportunities if one asset’s floor of total return is above the 
other asset’s cap of total return. However, with taxation, the assets’ caps and floors will 
depend on marginal tax rates and consequently the total amount of asset holdings. Thus, 
the marginal after-tax floor and cap on incomes, ( ( ))
A jj
tax i
A
Flo t t

 and ( ( ))
A jj
tax i
A
Cap t t

 , and on 
capital gains, ( ( ))
j j
tax i
A A
Flo t t and ( ( ))
j j
tax i
A A
Cap t t  at time t are introduced. Their values are 
calculated as follows: 
( ( ))
A jj
tax i
AFlo t t    
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( ) 1 [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ( ) ( )]
( )
A j j A j j Aj j j
i i i i i
A A A Aj
j
Flo t { t t Flo t T t t Flo t }
A t
   
 
 
          (5.65) 
( ( ))
j j
tax i
A AFlo t t   
( ) 1 [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ( ) ( )]
( )
j j j j j j j
i i i i i
A A A A A A Aj
j
Flo t { cgt t Flo t CGT t t Flo t }
A t
   
                              (5.66) 
( ( ))
A jj
tax i
ACap t t     
( ) 1 [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ( ) ( )]
( )
A j j A j j Aj j j
i i i i i
A A A Aj
j
Cap t { t t Cap t T t t Cap t }
A t
   
 
 
                                 (5.67) 
( ( ))
j j
tax i
A ACap t t    
( ) 1 [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ( ) ( )]
( )
j j j j j j j
i i i i i
A A A A A A Aj
j
Cap t { cgt t Cap t CGT t t Cap t }
A t
   
                           (5.68) 
Note that in practice, since the higher tax rate from a higher return is only applied to the 
incremental amount, the inclusion of taxes will not change the ranking order of returns: 
the cap and floor on a pre-tax basis are still the cap and floor after deducting tax 
payments. 
Expressions for the marginal after-tax floor and cap on total return (total 
marginal floor and cap) are obtained as follows:  
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))
j A j j jj
tax i tax i tax i
total A A A AFlo t t Flo t t Flo t t        (5.69) 
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))
j A j j jj
tax i tax i tax i
total A A A ACap t t Cap t t Cap t t        (5.70) 
If long and short position tax treatments are the same, a tax arbitrage opportunity 
exists simply when a long-position asset’s total marginal floor is above a short-position 
asset’s total marginal cap. As shown in Fig.5.1, no tax arbitrage opportunity exists if the 
long-positioned asset’s total marginal floor stands below the short-positioned asset’s 
total marginal cap for any amount of capital.  
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Figure 5. 1 Figure 5.1 No Arbitrage Opportunity 
 
      
Furthermore, as shown in Fig.5.2, a local arbitrage opportunity exists if the total 
marginal floor stands above at the beginning and intersects with the total marginal cap 
later as capital increases. In this case, investors are able to obtain a finite riskless return 
without an outflow of capital at the beginning and are willing to enlarge arbitrage 
portfolio proportionately (keep the same composition) until the intersection point.  
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Figure 5. 2 Local Arbitrage Opportunity 
 
 
c. Global Arbitrage 
 
i. Restricted global arbitrage  
In restricted global arbitrage, an investor can guarantee a non-negative riskless return by 
holding a large amount of one asset and short-selling a large amount of the other. This 
portfolio can be enlarged but cannot be downsized to a small amount. This arbitrage 
opportunity exists if and only if there is a set of asset holdings, ( )
j
i
A t , for investor i , 
that satisfy the system of inequalities given in Appendix B.1.    
Similar to the analysis in the Section 5.4.1, as shown in Fig.5.3, a restricted global 
arbitrage opportunity exists if the total marginal floor intersects the total marginal cap 
and remains above it as capital increases. In this case, investors can achieve a risk-free 
return after intersection and are willing to enlarge the arbitrage portfolio to secure a 
riskless profit. 
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Figure 5. 3 Restricted Global Arbitrage 
 
 
ii. General global arbitrage  
In general global arbitrage, an investor expects to obtain a non-negative riskless return 
by holding one asset and short selling the other, and the portfolio can be either enlarged 
or downsized. In other words, this portfolio can be multiplied by a large (e.g. 1000) or 
small (e.g. 0.001) figure without eliminating the arbitrage opportunity. This arbitrage 
opportunity exists if and only if there is a set of asset holdings, ( )
j
i
A t , for the investor i , 
that satisfy the system of inequalities given in Appendix B.2. 
For general global arbitrage, as shown in Fig.5.4, the opportunity exists if the 
total marginal floor always stands above the total marginal cap for any amount of 
capital. In this case, investors can obtain a risk-free return from the beginning and are 
willing to enlarge the arbitrage portfolio to secure a large riskless profit.  
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Figure 5. 4 General Global Arbitrage 
 
 
d. Implications 
In summary, a tax arbitrage opportunity may exist between two non-perfectly correlated 
assets under a continuous time model if there are caps and floors on their incomes and 
capital gains. In real markets, investors usually get continuous time returns but not static 
returns from assets, and caps and floors can be set easily by purchasing a collar (short-
selling a call option and using the proceeds to purchase a put option). According to 
Section 5.4.1, individual investors can quickly identify tax arbitrage opportunities by 
comparing the assets’ total marginal caps and floors. If they can find two assets such 
that the long-positioned asset’s total marginal floor stands above the short-positioned 
asset’s total marginal cap, a tax arbitrage opportunity will exist between the two assets. 
If the floor remains above the cap only for a small amount of capital, the arbitrage is 
local. If, on the other hand, the floor stands above the cap only for a large amount of 
capital, it is restricted global arbitrage. If the floor is always above the cap for any 
amount of capital, there is a general global arbitrage opportunity.  
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5.4.2. Multiple Investors 
Arbitrage opportunities between two investors with heterogeneous taxation but a single 
asset should be discussed too. It is found that an opportunity may exist between two 
investors if the low-taxed investor holds a long position while the high-taxed investor 
holds a short position. The constraints on tax policy are also determined from the 
government’s viewpoint to avoid different types of arbitrage opportunities and identify 
the market equilibrium for which there is no tax arbitrage opportunity.  
 
a. Local Arbitrage 
In local arbitrage between multiple investors, a finite riskless return from a single asset 
can be obtained between two investors when one investor holds a long position while 
the other investor holds a short position. This arbitrage opportunity exists in the market 
if and only if for a certain asset 1 2j { }    there is a set of asset holdings between 
investors 1 2i   , ( )
j
i
A t , that satisfy the system of inequalities given in Appendix B.3.  
Similarly, defining the marginal after-tax cap and floor for each investor as
( ( ))
A jj
tax i
AFlo t t  , ( ( ))j j
tax i
A AFlo t t , ( ( ))A jj
tax i
ACap t t  and ( ( ))j j
tax i
A ACap t t , we can obtain 
their precise values as follows: for investor i , 1 2i     
( ( ))
A jj
tax i
AFlo t t    
( ) 1 [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ( ) ( )] ( )
A j j A j j Aj j j
i i i i i
A A A A jFlo t { t t Flo t T t t Flo t } A t   
 
  (5.71) 
( ( ))
j j
tax i
A AFlo t t   
( ) 1 [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ( ) ( )] ( )
j j j j j j j
i i i i i
A A A A A A A jFlo t { cgt t Flo t CGT t t Flo t } A t 
 
  (5.72) 
( ( ))
A jj
tax i
ACap t t    
( ) 1 [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ( ) ( )] ( )
A j j A j j Aj j j
i i i i i
A A A A jCap t { t t Cap t T t t Cap t } A t   
 
  (5.73) 
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( ( ))
j j
tax i
A ACap t t   
( ) 1 [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ( ) ( )] ( )
j j j j j j j
i i i i i
A A A A A A A jCap t { cgt t Cap t CGT t t Cap t } A t 
 
  (5.74) 
The total marginal floor and cap is then obtained as follows: 
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))
j A j j jj
tax i tax i tax i
total A A A AFlo t t Flo t t Flo t t        (5.75) 
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))
j A j j jj
tax i tax i tax i
total A A A ACap t t Cap t t Cap t t        (5.76) 
A tax arbitrage opportunity exists when the long-position investor’s total marginal floor 
is above the short-position investor’s total marginal cap. As shown in Fig.5.5, no tax 
arbitrage opportunity exists if the long-position investor’s total marginal floor stands 
below the short-position investor’s total marginal cap for any amount of capital.  
 
Figure 5. 5 No Arbitrage by Cooperation 
 
 
Furthermore, as shown in Fig.5.6, a local arbitrage opportunity exists if the total 
marginal floor stands above the total marginal cap at the beginning and intersects it later 
as capital increases. In this case, a positive risk-free return can be obtained and the 
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arbitrage portfolio between two investors can be enlarged proportionately until the 
intersection point58.  
 
Figure 5. 6 Local Arbitrage by Cooperation 
  
 
b. Global Arbitrage 
 
i. Restricted global arbitrage  
In restricted global arbitrage, a riskless return can be obtained on a single asset between 
two investors, but the portfolio between two investors can only be enlarged but not 
downsized. This arbitrage opportunity exists in the market if and only if for a certain 
asset 1 2j { }   , there is a set of asset holdings between investors 1 2i   , ( )
j
i
A t , that 
satisfy the system of inequalities given in Appendix B.4.   
As in Section 5.4.2, and as shown in Fig. 5.7, a restricted global arbitrage 
opportunity exists if the long-position investor’s total marginal floor intersects the short-
                                                          
58 On a before tax basis, it is realistic to find two assets such that one’s floor of return is larger than the 
other’s cap of return. However, on an after tax basis, when an asset is tax free (e.g. Treasury bills or some 
other tax-exempt product) while the other is subject to the top tax rate (the investor must pay top tax rate 
on taxable profit), then it is possible that the tax-exempt asset’s floor is larger than the other asset’s cap. 
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position investor’s total marginal cap and remains above it as capital increases. In this 
case, a risk-free return can be obtained after the intersection point and the arbitrage 
portfolio between two investors can be enlarged to secure a large risk-free return.  
 
Figure 5. 7 Restricted Global Arbitrage by Cooperation 
 
 
ii. General global arbitrage  
In general global arbitrage, a riskless return on a single asset can be obtained between 
two investors, and this portfolio between two investors can be either enlarged or 
downsized. If so, this portfolio can be multiplied by a large or small figure without 
eliminating the arbitrage opportunity. This arbitrage opportunity in the market exists if 
and only if for a certain asset 1 2j { }    there is a set of asset holdings between 
investors 1 2i   , ( )
j
i
A t , satisfying the system of inequalities given in Appendix B.5.  
For general global arbitrage, as shown in Fig. 5.8, the opportunity exists if the 
long-position investor’s total marginal floor always stands above the short-position 
investor’s total marginal cap for any capital. In this case, a risk-free return can be 
 182 
 
obtained from the beginning and the arbitrage portfolio between two investors can be 
enlarged to secure a large risk-free return.  
 
Figure 5. 8 General Global Arbitrage by Cooperation 
  
 
c. Implications 
In summary, from the investor’s viewpoint, in addition to the arbitrage opportunity 
between two assets, tax arbitrage may also exist on a single asset between two investors 
if they are subject to different tax codes, and the long-positioned investor’s marginal 
floor stands above the short-positioned investor’s marginal cap. As in Section 5.4.1, all 
arbitrage opportunities can be divided into three classes: local, restricted global and 
general global arbitrage, and two types, A and B.  
From the government’s viewpoint, for fixed-income assets for which the cap is 
always equal to the floor on a pre-tax basis, the inclusion of heterogeneous taxation will 
make the long-positioned investor’s total marginal floor stand above the short-
positioned investor’s total marginal cap, at least during the initial period as shown in 
Fig.5.9. The local arbitrage cannot be eliminated completely unless all investors are 
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subject to the same tax code. The government, however, can remove the possibility of a 
large risk-free return between any two of investors by applying the same top tax rate to 
all investors. This will make the marginal total floor and cap equal after a certain 
amount of capital, as shown in Fig. 5.9. 
  
Figure 5. 9 No Global Arbitrage by Cooperation 
 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
Two improved continuous-time models are proposed for after-tax portfolio optimization. 
One applies to assets with perfect correlation and the other applies to non-perfectly 
correlated assets with caps and floors. Asset returns are assumed to be continuous and 
the Brownian motion process is used to simulate market prices. Both capital gains tax 
and income tax are included, and differential taxation for investors with long and short 
positions is considered.  
For perfectly correlated assets, the work of Basak and Croitorn (2001) is extended 
by including tax on capital gains. In contrast to their analysis, which mainly concerns 
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market equilibrium when no global tax arbitrage opportunity exists, mathematical 
constraints on tax rates and asset parameters (i.e. asset price, variance and expected 
return) are determined to prove the existence of global tax arbitrage opportunities with 
no restriction on capital gains and income. An arbitrage portfolio between perfectly 
correlated assets exists when all constrains are satisfied. Since income must be non-
negative while capital gains could be either positive or negative, it is more difficult to 
prove the existence of arbitrage opportunities with both capital gains tax and income tax 
than with income tax only. This improvement increases the level of complexity but is 
necessary for an analysis of tax arbitrage opportunities. It is concluded that only a 
global but no local tax arbitrage opportunity may exist. It is also concluded that since 
asset prices (referred to as ask prices when purchasing and bid prices when selling) 
which are dynamic over time are in the tax arbitrage opportunity constraints, so the 
arbitrage opportunities between perfectly correlated assets are dynamic as well and do 
not exist consistently. When no arbitrage opportunity exists, as in Basak and Croitorn 
(2001), investors will act to reduce aggregate market income tax payments, and market 
equilibrium will be achieved when the sum of income tax payments are minimized. 
However, according to my work, investors will act to reduce the aggregate of both 
market income and market capital gains tax payments, and market equilibrium will be 
achieved when the sum of both income tax and capital gains tax payments rather than 
income tax payment only are minimized. This proves that, with regard to market 
equilibrium on an after tax basis, if investors are subject to capital gains tax, equilibrium 
asset prices obtained under income tax only would not apply after incorporating capital 
gains tax. 
For non-perfectly correlated assets with caps and floors, three new continuous-
time optimization models are proposed to find conditions for the existence of local, 
global and restricted global arbitrage opportunities. These opportunities are further 
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divided into two categories, type A and type B, depending on whether a strict positive 
or only nonnegative future net after-tax return will be obtained with certainty without an 
outflow of funds at any time. On the other hand, given tax rates and asset parameters, a 
new function, which requires asset holdings as inputs, is proposed to calculate an asset’s 
marginal cap and floor on its total net return. It is concluded that the existence of tax 
arbitrage opportunities between non-perfectly correlated assets simply relies on the 
difference between assets’ marginal caps and floors. A single investor can expect to 
receive a risk-free return when the long-position asset’s marginal floor stands above the 
short-position asset’s marginal cap. In addition, an arbitrage opportunity exists between 
two investors if for the same asset, the long-positioned investor’s marginal floor stands 
above the short-positioned investor’s marginal cap. In the fixed-income market, It 
shows that a local (finite) tax arbitrage opportunity between investors is difficult to 
eliminate unless they are all subject to the same tax policy, but a global (large risk-free 
return) tax arbitrage opportunity can be avoided if the government applies the same top 
tax rate to all investors.  
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Chapter 6 – Conclusions 
 
Mathematical programming is used to quantify the effect of tax on investments, capital 
flows and arbitrage. By using proposed models, the impact of taxes on private portfolio 
optimization, global market performance and asset pricing are investigated. The 
experimental results demonstrate the importance of tax in all three fields and provide 
some useful conclusions for investors and governments.  
 
6.1 Personal Investment Tax in Portfolio Optimization 
In Chapter 3, to investigate the impact of personal investment taxes on private portfolio 
optimization, a post-tax portfolio optimization model with integer-based trading 
constraints is developed. In order to examine the real influence of income tax on 
portfolio management, many real-world trading constraints are considered. These 
include the need for diversification, requirements on both the number of assets in a 
portfolio and the maximum holdings in single assets, round-lot buying, and taxation on 
cash withdrawals (the last two are modeled with integer variables). The proposed model 
also accounts for the risk in estimating expected asset returns through the introduction 
of a stochastic constraint, by which the expected return of the portfolio exceeds the 
threshold with a high confidence level.  
One key contribution of this thesis is that it innovates on the basic Greedy 
algorithm, making it available for post-tax portfolio optimization problems in which 
stochastic risk and real-life market restrictions modelled with integer constraints are 
simultaneously considered. The combination of integer and nonlinear constraints 
reflects the complexity involved in solving such problems under large-scale applications 
for which very few solvers are efficient. The efficacy of the approach is evaluated on 
more than 50 problems containing up to 288 assets, and the computational results 
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provide evidence of its efficiency in two aspects: precision of solution and required 
computing time.  
It is found that income tax has a clear impact on portfolio optimization for 
investors, which supports the conclusion from existing theoretical work. It also shows 
that with real trading constraints, tax rates and portfolio composition have a complex 
relationship that is neither linear nor convex. Convexity assumptions often made in the 
literature to guarantee global optimality, therefore, are not only unrealistic but also 
erroneous simplifications. This is the main advantage of my work over prior theoretical 
research on post-tax portfolio optimization. In addition, in the investigation on effects of 
withdrawal tax, it is found that for single-period optimization, this factor has a very 
limited influence. Investors can simplify the optimization model by ignoring withdrawal 
tax without changing the optimal solution significantly. Finally, the analysis proves that 
investors’ preference for certain assets is significantly influenced by taxation. 
Governments should estimate its quantitative effects before carrying out a new tax 
policy to avoid an unexpected capital outflow or excessive demand in relevant financial 
products. 
 
6.2 Tobin Tax in Global Financial Markets 
In Chapter 4, to investigate the impact of Tobin tax capital flows between regional 
markets, a post-tax portfolio optimization model with non-linear trading constraints and 
objective function is developed. To undertake a better examination of the influence of 
heterogeneous withholding and Tobin tax on international financial markets, almost all 
the real-world trading constraints are considered in the model. These include the need 
for diversification, requirements for both the number of assets in a portfolio and the 
maximum holdings in single assets, annual tax, deferred capital gains tax and taxation 
on cash withdrawals. So, investor behaviour can be simulated better. This influence is 
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quantified by observing the rebalancing activities of rational investors under different 
tax settings.   
Regarding the comparison between residence- and source-based taxes on 
internatinoal investments, it is found that the global optimal portfolio is highly sensitive 
to a change in regional investment tax rates. This sensitivity depends on the size of the 
change, market specifications and the international investment tax environment 
(residence only, source only or mixed tax). In a pure tax environment, the source only 
tax union will on average have more capital transits in international markets than the 
residence only tax union, and its optimal market portfolio will be more sensitive to 
regional tax policy changes. In a mixed tax system, double taxation between residence- 
and source-taxed markets will significantly reduce the attractiveness of the latter while 
the credit method will perform much better (increasing the attractiveness of the market 
with a source-based tax by up to 20%). In addition, experimental results suggest that 
volatile markets are usually accompanied by less unrealized capital gains and therefore 
are more sensitive to a government's tax policy than trending markets. 
As regards the Tobin tax, market trading volume from rebalancing activities of 
rational investors (who seek to maximize the net Sharpe ratio) is highly sensitive to the 
implementation of Tobin tax. This sensitivity not only varies by market specifications 
but also varies by investment tax rules. A volatile market in a “Mixed with credit 
method” tax environment will be more sensitive to Tobin tax than a trending market in a 
“Mixed with double taxation” tax environment. Furthermore, experiments show that the 
capital locking effects of Tobin tax is mainly dependent on its effective rate but not the 
side of taxation (tax is levied on capital inflow only, outflow only, or both) if a 
consistent Tobin tax rule is applied globally. When the rule is heterogeneous across 
countries, for the market with relatively high Tobin tax rate, inflow Tobin tax will have 
a much higher capital lock-out effect, and outflow Tobin tax will have a much higher 
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capital lock-in effect, in comparison to a consistent Tobin tax system across countries. 
In other words, the capital locking effect of Tobin tax is enlarged significantly when 
heterogeneous Tobin tax rates are applied globally. As a result, it will be very helpful if 
all countries can reach a deal on the implementation of Tobin tax. Otherwise the 
relatively high Tobin tax will significantly reduce the attractiveness of the local market 
to overseas investors. 
 
6.3 Tax Arbitrage Optimization 
In Chapter 5, to investigate tax arbitrage opportunities and therefore post-tax asset 
pricing, two improved continuous-time models for after-tax portfolio optimization are 
proposed. One applies to assets with perfect correlation and the other applies to 
uncorrelated assets with caps and floors. It is assumed that asset returns are continuous 
over time and use the Brownian motion process to simulate market prices. Both capital 
gains tax and income tax are included, and differential taxation for investors with long 
and short positions is also considered.  
For correlated assets, the work of Basak and Croitorn (2001) is extended by 
including tax on capital gains. In contrast to their analysis which mainly concerns 
market equilibrium when no global tax arbitrage opportunity exists, mathematical 
constraints on tax rates and asset parameters (i.e. asset price, variance and expected 
return) are determined in this thesis to prove the existence of global tax arbitrage 
opportunities with no restriction on capital gains and income. An arbitrage portfolio 
between correlated assets can be achieved when all constrains are satisfied. Since 
income must be positive while capital gains could be either positive or negative, it is 
more difficult to prove the existence of arbitrage opportunities with both capital gains 
tax and income tax than with income tax only. This improvement increases the level of 
complexity but is necessary for the analysis of tax arbitrage opportunities. It is 
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concluded that only a global but no local tax arbitrage opportunity may exist. It is also 
concluded that since asset prices (referred to as purchase prices) which are dynamic 
over time are restricted in the constraint, tax arbitrage opportunities between correlated 
assets are also dynamic and do not exist consistently. When no arbitrage opportunity 
exists, in contrast to conclusions of Basak and Croitorn, investors will act to reduce 
aggregate market tax payments and market equilibrium will be achieved when the sum 
of capital gains tax payments and income tax payments rather than income tax payments 
only are minimized. This finding has a significant implication to financial markets and 
relevant research. It also proves that in the discussion of market equilibrium on an after 
tax basis, if investors are subject to capital gains tax, many equilibriums obtained under 
income tax only would be sub-optimal. 
For uncorrelated assets with caps and floors, three new continuous-time 
optimization models are developed to achieve local, global and restricted global 
arbitrage opportunities. These opportunities are further divided into two categories, type 
A and type B, depending on whether a strict positive or only nonnegative future net 
return on a tax basis will be returned for sure without an outflow of funds at any time. 
On the other hand, given tax rates and asset parameters, a new function, which takes 
asset holdings as an input, is proposed to calculate an asset’s marginal cap and floor on 
its total net return. According to the analysis, it is found that the existence of tax 
arbitrage opportunities between uncorrelated assets simply relies on the difference 
between assets’ marginal caps and floors. A single investor can expect to receive a risk-
free return when the long-positioned asset’s marginal floor stands above the short-
positioned asset’s marginal cap. In addition, an arbitrage opportunity exists between two 
investors if for the same asset, the long-positioned investor’s marginal floor stands 
above the short-positioned investor’s marginal cap. In the fixed-income market, a local 
tax arbitrage opportunity between investors is difficult to eliminate unless they are all 
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subject to the same tax policy but a global tax arbitrage opportunity can be avoided 
efficiently if the government applies the same top tax rate to all investors. 
 
6.4 Summary 
In this thesis, the impact of tax in financial markets is quantified from three aspects 
using mathematical programming. 
First, as regards the impact of tax on private portfolio optimization, it is proved 
that under a single-period optimization model, differential tax rules across investment 
accounts (i.e. the way the investment return is taxed in offshore bond account, onshore 
bond account and unit trust account) have limited impact on the optimal portfolio 
composition. Differential tax rates across asset classes (i.e. equities, bonds and 
commodities), however, have a significant influence on the optimal portfolio 
composition. As a result, taxation constraints should be included in a portfolio 
optimization model. However, these constraints can be simplified only to reflect 
differential tax rates over asset classes if a single-period model is used. 
Second, as regards the impact of tax on capital flows between regional markets, 
it is proved that not only local investment tax but also Tobin-style international 
transaction tax has a remarkable impact on global market balance. The experimental 
results show that different ways of charging Tobin tax lead to different capital locking 
effects. Tobin tax on capital inflows imposes a capital lock-out effect (i.e. stop capital 
flowing into local markets), while Tobin tax on capital outflows imposes a capital lock-
in effect (i.e. stop capital flowing out of local markets). In addition, experiment results 
show that Tobin tax will lead to a volatile global market if its application is 
heterogeneous across countries. An agreement across countries on Tobin tax can reduce 
this effect. 
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Finally, as regards the impact of tax on asset pricing, it is proved mathematically 
that differential taxes across asset classes and investors may lead to a tax arbitrage 
opportunity when basic CAPM is used to price assets. The arbitrage opportunity can 
exist between both correlated assets and uncorrelated assets. In the analysis, for these 
two cases, different constraints are found to help investors to check the existence of 
arbitrage opportunities. In addition, the work also proves that local tax arbitrage 
opportunities are difficult to eliminate completely. However, global tax arbitrage 
opportunities can be avoided if the same top tax rate is applied across all asset classes 
and investors. 
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Appendix A. Propositions and Proofs 
 
As in the work of Basak and Croitorn (2001), investor i will divide his/her composite 
risk exposure between S and P in such a way that he/she is either indifferent to marginal 
shifts from one security to the other, or any shift yields negative gain. Proposition A.1 
presents the resulting condition on rational holdings. 
 
A.1. Proposition 359  
Let ( )i t  and ( )S P t  be given. If taxation is continuously differentiable, investor i is 
indifferent between all pairs,  
( ) ( ( ( ) ( ) ) ( ( ) ( ) ))ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
i ii i i i
S P S PS P S Pt t t t t t              (A.1) 
leading to the same value for his risk budget ( )i t  such that  
( ( ) ( ) ) ( ( ) ( ) )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
i ii i i i
S P S PS Pt t t t t t          (A.2) 
 
A.2. Proposition 460  
Assume that market equilibrium exists; that there is a net supply N  of asset S ; and that 
investors’ composite risk budget sharing are given by 1( )t  and 2 ( ))t . The pre-tax 
mispricing is then given by  
1* 1 11 1( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) [( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]ˆ ˆ
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
S SS S S P P S P P
S P
S P
t t t t t t t t S t t t P t t
t { }
S t t P t t
      
 


  
    
          1* 1 1 11 1[ ( ( ) ( )) (( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))]ˆ ˆS SS S P S P PT t t t t t t S t t t P t t          
                                                          
59The proof of Proposition 3 follows from Proposition 3.1 in Basak and Croitorn (2001), with only 
obvious changes in notation. Q.E.D.  
60A proof of Proposition 4 follows from Proposition 4.1 in Basak and Croitorn (2001), with only obvious 
changes in notation. Q.E.D. 
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* 1* * * 1* 1 *1 1( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) [( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]ˆ ˆ
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
S SS P S P
S P
S t cgt t S t P t cgt t t S t t P t P t t
{ }
S t t P t t
  
 
  
   
         1* 1 * 1 1 *1 1[ ( ( ) ( )) (( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))]ˆ ˆS SS P S PCGT cgt t S t cgt t t S t t P t P t t          (A.3) 
where 1 21 1( ) ( ( ) ( ) )ˆ ˆS St t t t      satisfies:  
1* 1* 11 1( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) [( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]ˆ ˆ
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
S SS S S P P S P P
S P
t t t t t t t t S t t t P t t
{ }
S t t P t t
      
 
  
  
1* 1 1 11 1[ ( ( ) ( )) (( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))]ˆ ˆS SS S P S P PT t t t t t t S t t t P t t          
* 1* * 1* 1 *1 1( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) [( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]ˆ ˆ
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
S SS P S P
S P
S t cgt t S t P t cgt t t S t t P t P t t
{ }
S t t P t t
  
 
   
   
1* 1 * 1 1 *1 1[ ( ( ) ( )) (( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))]ˆ ˆS SS P S PCGT cgt t S t cgt t t S t t P t P t t        
2* 2* 21 1( ) (( ( )) ( )) ( ) [( ( ) ( ( ))) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]ˆ ˆ
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
S SS S S P P S P P
S P
t t N t t t t t N t t t P t t
{ }
S t t P t t
      
 
    
   
2* 2 2 21 1[ (( ( )) ( )) (( ( ) ( ( )) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))]ˆ ˆS SS S P S P PT t N t t t t N t S t t t P t t            
* 2* *1( ) (( ( )) ( ))ˆ
( ) ( )
SS
S
S t cgt N t S t
{
S t t



  
* 2* 2 *1
2*( ) [( ( ) ( ( )) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]ˆ [
( ) ( )
SP S P
P
P t cgt t N t S t t P t P t t
} CGT
P t t
 

   
   
2 * 2 2 *1 1(( ( )) ( )) (( ( ) ( ( )) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))]ˆ ˆS SS P S Pcgt N t S t cgt t N t S t t P t P t t        (A.4) 
 
A.3. Proposition 5 and Proof 
In market equilibrium, the mispricing adjusts so that, among all pairs of portfolio 
holdings ( )i iS P  , 1 2i   , that satisfy investors’ risk budget ( )
i t  and clear financial 
markets, investors choose the one that minimizes total tax on both income and capital 
gains 1 2 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )T t T t CGT t CGT t   .  
 
Proof: In equilibrium, total tax is given by  
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1 1 1 11 1[ ( ( ) ( )) (( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))]ˆ ˆS SS S P S P PT t t t t t t S t t t P t t         
1 1 * 1 1 *1 1[ ( ( ) ( )) (( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))]ˆ ˆS SS P S PCGT cgt t S t cgt t t S t t P t P t t        
2 2 2 21 1[ (( ( )) ( )) (( ( ) ( ( )) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))]ˆ ˆS SS S P S P PT t N t t t t N t S t t t P t t            
2 2 * 2 21[ (( ( )) ( )) (( ( )ˆ SS PCGT cgt N t S t cgt t     
*1( ( )) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))]ˆ S S PN t S t t P t P t t     (A.5) 
The first-order condition of the problem consisting of minimizing this expression with 
respect to 1 ( )S t  is (A.4). Q.E.D.  
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Appendix B. More Detail on Restricted Global, General Global, and Local Tax 
Arbitrage 
 
B.1. Restricted Global Tax Arbitrage Opportunity for Single Investors 
This arbitrage opportunity exists if and only if there is a set of asset holdings, ( )
j
i
A t , for 
investor i , satisfying the following system of inequalities:   
 ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ( ) ( ))]
j j j j j
i i B B i i i B
A j A A A A
j j
dX t M t dA t t dt T t M t t dt            
 
*[ ( ( ) ( ))]
j j
i i i B
A A j
j
CGT cgt M t A t dt    
 0 ( ) ( ) 1 2
j
B B
j AdA t t dt j       (B.1) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
j
i i
A j
j
X t t A t   (B.2) 
(Note: different from the inequality (5.64), M represent a very large number. It is 
multiplied with ( )
j
i
A t  to make sure that the total number of holding shares in arbitrage 
portfolio exceeds the minimum requirement.) 
 
B.2. General Global Tax Arbitrage Opportunity for Single Investor 
This arbitrage opportunity exists if and only if there is a set of asset holdings, ( )
j
i
A t , for 
investor i , satisfying the following system of inequalities:  
( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ( ) ( ))]
j j j j j
i i B B i i i B
A j A A A A
j j
dX t t dA t t dt T t t t dt            
*[ ( ( ) ( ))]
j j
i i i B
A A j
j
CGT cgt t A t dt    
0 (0 ) ( ) ( ) 1 2
j
B B
j ALiquidity dA t t dt j           (B.3) 
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( ) ( ) ( ) 0
j
i i
A j
j
X t t A t   (B.4) 
(Note: different from the inequality (5.61),   is multiplied with ( )
j
i
A t  to make sure 
that the number of holding shares in arbitrage portfolio can be cut or increased.) 
 
B.3. Local Tax Arbitrage Opportunity for Multiple Investors 
This arbitrage opportunity exists in the market if and only if for a certain asset
1 2j { }   , there is a set of asset holdings between investors 1 2i   , ( )
j
i
A t , satisfying 
the following system of inequalities:  
( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ( ) ( ))]
j j j j j
i B B i i i B
j A j A A A A
i
dX t { t dA t t dt T t t t dt       
*[ ( ( ) ( ))]
j j
i i i B
A A jCGT cgt t A t dt}  
                0 ( ) ( )
j
B B
j AdA t t dt                                                                   (B.5) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
j
i
j A j
i
X t t A t                                                                                           (B.6) 
 
B.4. Restricted Global Tax Arbitrage Opportunity for Multiple Investors 
This arbitrage opportunity exists in the market if and only if for a certain asset
1 2j { }   , there is a set of asset holdings between investors 1 2i   , ( )
j
i
A t , satisfying 
the following system of inequalities:  
( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ( ) ( ))]
j j j j j
i B B i i i B
j A j A A A A
i
dX t { M t dA t t dt T t M t t dt           
*[ ( ( ) ( ))]
j j
i i i B
A A jCGT cgt M t A t dt}    
0 ( ) ( )
j
B B
j AdA t t dt                                                                                         (B.7) 
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( ) ( ) ( ) 0
j
i
j A j
i
X t t A t   (B.8) 
(Note: different from the inequality (B.5), M is multiplied with ( )
j
i
A t  to make sure 
that the number of holding shares in arbitrage portfolio exceeds the minimum 
requirement.) 
 
B.5. General Global Tax Arbitrage Opportunity for Multiple Investors 
This arbitrage opportunity in the market exists if and only if for a certain asset
1 2j { }   , there is a set of asset holdings between investors 1 2i   , ( )
j
i
A t , satisfying 
the following system of inequalities:  
( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ( ) ( ))]
j j j j j
i B B i i i B
j A j A A A A
i
dX t { t dA t t dt T t t t dt           
[ ( ( ) ( ))]
j j
i i i B
A A jCGT cgt t A t dt} 

   
0 (0 ) ( ) ( )
j
B B
j ALiquidity dA t t dt        (B.9) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
j
i
j A j
i
X t t A t   (B.10) 
(Note: different from the inequality (B.5),   is multiplied with ( )
j
i
A t  to make sure that 
the number of holding shares in arbitrage portfolio can be cut or increased.) 
 
